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Abstract
This thesis examines the role played by America and its native
inhabitants in John Locke's Two Treatises of Government. It
begins by examining the large collection of travel books
written by explorers to the new world in Locke's library.
Locke uses the information from these sources selectively,
employing those facts which support his view of natural man and
ignoring those which do not. His reasons for using the Indians
in his Two Treatises goes beyond simply providing empirical
evidence. Locke, steeped in the colonial zeal of his patron,
the Earl of Shaftesbury, is, particularly In the chapters on
property and conquest, arguing In favour of the rights of
English colonists. While it has been recognized that Locke's
political philosophy reflects the domestic political needs of
Shaftesbury, very little has been written in previous
scholarship about the Earl's colonial aims. Locke, as
secretary to both the Lords Proprietors of Carolina and the
Council of Trade and Plantations, was Immersed in the colonial
questions of his day. Following in the steps of Hugo Grotius,
whose notions of property and war were shaped by his employment
In the East Indies Company, Locke uses natural law to defend
England's colonization of America. His chapters on property
and conquest delineate a very English form of settlement. By
beginning property In a very specific form of labour, namely
agrarian settlement, and denying the right to take over land by
virtue of conquest, Locke creates the means by which England
can defend its claims in America with regard to both other
European powers and the native Indians. The strength of this
argument Is demonstrated by the extent to which it was used by
ministers, politicians and judges in the early years of the
American republic. In particular, Thomas Jefferson's powerful
attempts to transform large groups of nomadic Indians into
settled farmers can be traced back to Locke's ideas of the
natural state and civil society.
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Introduction
'Thus in the beginning all the World was America.1
America, as it appears in these famous words from the Two
Treatises of Government, is John Locke's political Genesis.
For Locke, America is the beginning of civilization, to the
extent that it reveals civil society's natural origins. But
Locke's vision of the new world is a 'beginning' for the old
world, in a different, although equally profound, sense.
Steeped in the colonial zeal of his patron, the Earl of
Shaftesbury, John Locke saw America as the second Garden of
Eden; a new beginning for England should she manage to defend
her claims In the American continent against those of the
Indians and other European powers. America, like the world
described in the original Genesis, is England's second chance
at paradise, providing the colonial masters of the old world,
with a land full of all the promise known in that first Idyllic
state. America thus represents for Locke and his readers a
two-sided Genesis, a place to find both the origins of their
past and the promise of their future.
It is the role of America and Its native inhabitants In Locke's
political theory which has been previously overlooked in
scholarship on the Two Treatises. Given the number of specific
references In this work to America, and Locke's lifelong
Involvement In the colonization of the new world, it Is Indeed
surprising that so little has been written on the subject. The
oversight is Important for without considering Locke's use of
-5-

directly, by accepting Locke's examples of natural men as
written, and examining the role played by America in the Two
Treatises.
I - A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The reasons for ignoring the American dimension of Locke's work
is twofold. Firstly, European scholars have concentrated on
Europeans, that is men in civil society. They have, therefore,
expressed little interest in what Locke said about natural man,
beyond what he revealed about their own, civil society. The
failure to consider the role of American Indians in Locke's
thought also rests on the belief that Locke, himself, had no
real reason to include them in his treatise beyond a
superficial need to provide some empirical evidence for his
abstract notion of a natural state. But Locke deliberately
included America and its inhabitants in his treatise for very
specific reasons originating in the colonial debates within
which he, and his patron Shaftesbury, were enmeshed throughout
the latter half of the 17th century. While much has been
written during the last thirty years on the specific political
events of the 17th century which shaped Locke's purposes in
writing the Two Treatises, most scholars have limited
themselves to the domestic policies of the day and have failed
to consider the importance of foreign and, more specifically,
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colonial concerns to the political ideas of Locke and his
patron.
In 1957, Maurice Cranston published the now classic biography,
John Locke, which provided, through letters and other
documentation, clear new evidence of Locke's activities, the
politics which surrounded him, and the context of his
compositions over the course of his life. In particular,
.Cranston destroys the attempts of Victorian biographers to make
Locke a political innocent in all of Shaftesbury's intrigue,
demonstrating that Locke was completely involved in many of the
Earl's varied, and occasionally subversive, political
interests.4
This domestic political context, within which the Two Treatises
were first composed, was given full consideration in 1960, when
Peter Laslett published, based on the documents in the Lovelace
Collection, his edition of the Two Treatises of Government.5
His analysis suggests that the Two Treatises were originally
written as one piece between the years 1679 and 1680, ten years
prior to the traditional date of composition, at the same time
that Locke's clde friend, James Tyrell wrote and published,
Patriarcha non Monarcha. 6 Moreover, Locke wrote in response to
Sir Robert Filmer, who was at the height of his fame in these
years, and not in response to Thomas Hobbes, as had been
traditionally thought. Central to the composition of the Two
-8-
Treatises, according to Laslett, was Locke's relationship to
the Earl of Shaftesbury and the political intrigues of the day.
The dating of its composition necessarily altered the domestic
political event to which it was thought to be responding. As
Laslett himself says, 'The Two Treatises is an Exclusion tract
not a Revolution pamphlet.' 7 Given the date of publication,
Laslett argues, it was the attempt by Shaftesbury to exclude
the Catholic James from the throne which provided the political
inspiration, for Locke's political thesis, not the Glorious
Revolution of 1688, as had been traditionally assumed. Laslett
thus provides a new domestic political context within which
Locke's essay was created.
The debate over the year of the Two Treatises' composition, the
link between them and the domestic politics of Shaftesbury in
England, and the relationship of Locke to his contemporaries,
such as Sir Robert Filmer and James Tyrell had begun in
earnest. Richard Ashcraft, in Revolutionary Politics and
Locke's Two Treatises of Government, challenges Laslett's
analysis. 8 Ashcraft claims that the First Treatise was
composed in 1680 and the Second Treatise over the next year or
two, following the Oxford Parliament in March 1681, where the
last attempt at exclusion failed. The Two Treatises were not
written, as Laslett claims, to defend Shaftesbury's actions in
the exclusion debate, but were a far more radical defense of
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the Rye House plot, that is the plan to kidnap the King and his
brother.
While this scholarship has demonstrated the influence of
domestic English politics on Locke's political ideas, the
impact of colonial policy has been left virtually untouched.
Similarly, while much has been written about the British
sources, such as Richard Hooker and James Tyrell, used by Locke
to provide supporting evidence for his view of the state of
nature, next to nothing has been written on the American and
English colonial sources he used to illustrate the same natural
state. By taking seriously Locke's references to America in
the Second Treatise and incorporating the colonial sources
available to hi.n through his personal library and work, this
thesis will cast new light on the definition of important
terms, such as natural law and property.
Since the publication of Wolfgang Von Leyden's studies of Locke
and the laws of nature in the 1950's, natural law has been
considered by many scholars, such as James Tully, S.B. Drury
and Karl Olivecrona, to underlie Locke's Two Treatises. 9
 Hugo
Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf are often named as the two most
important sources for Locke's developing views on natural
law.'° While several scholars, such as Edward Dumbauld and
Albert Hyma have analyzed the importance of colonialism in
Grotius's ideas regarding the freedom of the seas, no such
analysis has been applied to Locke's use of natural law to
- 10 -
explain his theories regarding property in land. More
recently, Richard Tuck in a talk given at the London School of
Economics on October 19, 1989, outlined the differences between
Pufendorf and Crotius based on the differing colonial interests
of their respective countries.11
Tuck, Dumbauld and Hyma all conclude that natural law, evolving
through a long history stretching back to the ancient Greeks,
was transformed in the 17th century, by the needs of expanding
colonial empires into the 'law of nations'. Foremost amongst
the developments of these newly forumated laws were the
arguments regarding the origins of private property. In
England and Holland, in particular, it was of great importance
to ascertain the conditions under which the land and sea,
respectively, could be considered one's own, and therefore not
open to someone else's appropriation. Locke, as it shall be
argued in this thesis, writes in the tradition of 17th century
English natural law, where the questions raised by the
settlements in Carolina concern the origin of property in land
rather than the sea.
The definition of property, which has been given such careful
consideration, in works such as James Tully's, A Discourse on
Property: John Locke and His Adversaries has been limited to
how proprietorship in land has been defined in England.12
Thus, Peter Laslett can claim that Locke's repeated use of
'wast' in the chapter on property is a reference 'to open field
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tillage in England', even when Locke specifically refers to the
land used by the American Indian.' 3
 'Wast', when one consults
the colonial records, has a completely different meaning in the
American context. The oversight in the context of defining the
value of property is particularly surprising, given Locke's
explicit comparisons between the Indian hunter and the
Devonshire farmer.
The role of America and its inhabitants in Locke's political
philosophy has, only recently, been given some cursory
attention. At a 1990 conference on Locke, James Tully read a
paper entitled, 'Rediscovering America'. In it he argued that
the American Indian is central to Locke's theory of property
and popular sovereignty. 14 Another group of scholars have
analyzed Locke's 'political anthropology'. William Batz, for
example, compares Locke's analysis of the American Indian to
the account given by Joseph D'Acosta, the Spanish explorer
quoted in the Two Treatises. Recent articles by Jeremy Waldron
and Ruth Grant argue that the anthropological record is
irreconcilable with Locke's account of the natural state.
Grant points out that traditional forms of authority d- not
provide evidence of the idea of consent. Waidron concludes
that the radical change envisioned by Locke between the natural
state and civil society is not supported by any anthropological
studies. Both conclude that Locke's anthropology comes second
to his need to develop a theory of government based on the
natural rights of individuals and their consent to the
- 12 -
formation of civil society. Herman Lebovics's 'The Uses of
America in Locke's Second Treatise of Government' attempts to
link England's colonial interests in the new world with Locke's
views of natural man. Lebovics, as I shall argue, is mistaken
in concluding that Locke's goal was to move the poor of England
to the new world. Shaftesbury and Locke were far more
interested in moving the rich, that is, those who had money and
the ability to plant, to the new world in order to insure the
success of the plantation. Finally, there has been a debate
between Thomas Flanagan and Nicholas Griffin, in recent
editions of the Canadian Political Science Review, over the
basis of European appropriation of Indian land. While both
Flanagan and Griffin touch on Locke's role in the development
of this theory, neither fully consider the links between Locke
and other colonial thinkers of his time, or the importance of
his thought in the early American republic. 15
While the role of America and its inhabitants in the
development of Locke's political thought has been mainly
overlooked, the reverse proposition, that is, the role of Locke
in the development of American politi.al thought has been
studied intensely. We shall be examining the influence of the
Two Treatises in the United States in the final chapter of this
thesis, but rather than analyze the implications of Locke's
thought for just the early American citizens and their state,
we shall also consider the implications of his thought for the
Indian.
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Of the literature which has examined Locke's influence on
American history, the traditional view is articulated by Carl
Becker in his book, The Declaration of Independence (1922).16
Becker concludes that Thomas Jefferson and his colleagues used
Locke's political treatise to form the philosophical basis of
the American constitution, thereby placing the Declaration of
Independence in a 'liberal', rights-based, tradition.' 7 This
view has been challenged over the last twenty-five years from
scholars both of American history and of John Locke.
American historians were the first to take up the challenge.
In the fifties, books such as The 18th Century Commonwealth
Man, by C. Robbins and Seedtime of the Republic, by C.
Rossiter, examine other philosophical traditions in the
founding of the American republic. 18 Robbins emphasizes
America's libertarian heritage and looks to Alernon Sidney and
other English Whig thinkers. Rossiter looks at the history of
modern republicanism, beginning with Machiavelli, to find the
source of American revolutionary thought. Finally, B. Bailyn
in his book, The Ideological Origins of the American
Revolution, published in 1967, traces five different
philosophical sources for the American Revolution, including
the thought of classical antiquity, the Enlightenment, English
Common Law, New England Puritans and lastly the English
Whigs. 19
 Like Robbins, Bailyn concludes that the Whig
pamphlets had the most impact.
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Lockean scholars added their own analysis. In 1969, John Dunn
published an article entitled, 'The Politics of John Locke in
England and America in the 18th Century', which claimed that
Locke's Two Treatises were virtually unknown in America for the
first half of the 18th century, while Locke's political theory,
far from being the revolutionary liberal treatise needed by the
signators of the constitution, was very conservative indeed.
The Two Treatises were, according to Dunn, 'the dignifying of
the legal order of the polity'.20
Martyn Thompson in a 1976 article analyzing the degree to which
Locke's Two Treatises were known in the early part of the 18th
century, agrees with Dunn that Locke was seen at the time as a
conservative thinker and those who wanted a more 'liberal'
philosophy turned to Algernon Sidney, James Tyrell or
Montesquieu. 21
 Gary Wills' 1978 book, Inventing America:
Jefferson's Declaration of America, challenged the long-
standing belief in the most fundamental philosophical
relationship in the liberal orthodoxy of American history,
namely that between John Locke and Thomas Jefferson. Wills
argues that Jefferson's political ideas are less prolucts of
Locke's thinking than that of the Scottish Enlightenment.22
Chaudhuri Joyotpaul and George Mace also conclude that Locke's
impact on the American revolutionaries was minimal.23
Recent scholarship has witnessed the inevitable backlash
against this view and commentators have, once again,
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reevaluated the impact of Locke's political thought on American
history. Many have concluded that the traditional view, in
many respects, still holds true. Richard Stevens argues, in a
recent article, that the American Constitution is the practical
manifestation of Locke's political philosophy. 24 Thomas Pangle
strongly disagrees with what he considers to be the prevailing
revisionist view of American history that Locke had little
impact on the fathers of the American constitution.
What we have traced through the pages of Locke
is the most completely worked out presentation
of that current in political philosophy which
exerted the strongest pull on the Framers [of
the Constitutionj as they struggled to
formulate. ..their ultimate goals.25
Other writers, such as R. Hamoviy and Morton White have provided
strong evidence that Wills' interpretation of Jeffersonian
thought may be faulty. 26 It will be argued in the final
chapter of this thesis, in line with this second school of
thought, that Locke had an important influence on Thomas
Jefferson. The focus, however will move from the Declaration
of Indepedence, to consider the development of Jefferson's
policies towards the Indian, and more specifically, his
attempts to bring the Indians into 'civil society' by
converting them from hunting to farming.
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While Lockean scholars and American historians have failed to
draw any links between the Two Treatises and the American
Indian, scholars of native Indian history, have provided plenty
of evidence that such connections, in a broader sense, do
exist. Scholars such as James Axtell, Bernard Sheehan and J.E.
Chamberlain provide strong evidence that the colonial interests
of 17th century writers had an important influence on the
development of their ideas; the most important being the
fundamental distinction drawn between the civil society of
England and the savage state of the American Indians. 27 A
necessary consequence of this dichotomy, for European thinkers,
was the transcending of the latter state by the former. While
this transcendence was often depicted as a religious event,
Locke transformed it, as I shall argue, into a more purely
political form of conversion.
Within this general dichotomy of civil and savage states was
the central question of property. It has been noted, by
scholars of native history, that the shift in attitudes towards
the Indians' land in the latter half of the 17th century was a
direct consequence of the change in England's colonial
ambitions. Francis Jennings, Loren Pennington and Gary Nash
have described how the dispossession of the Indians became a
central goal only when Englisn objectives in America shifted
from trade and mining to settlement. 28 Jennings, in
particular, describes how the definition of property was
changed to suit the new goals of the colonists. 29 The
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implications for the American natives, as she points out, were
devastating. Not only did the Indians have to be removed from
the land but attempts were made, over the next two hundred
years to make them farmers rather than hunters. The centrality
of agrarian labour to the dispossession and conversion of
Indians during the first few decades of the United States has
been described in depth by historians such as Wilcomb Washburn
and Francis Paul Prucha. 3° Wilbur Jacobs in his book,
Dispossessing the American Indians, identifies Locke's Two
Treatises as the original source for this treory of private
property. 31
 He does not, however, explore, in any depth, the
relationship between Locke, America and the native Indians, but
chooses, instead, to point out how the argument was developed
by subsequent American leaders.
Thus, no body of scholarship has yet drawn the links between
the colonial plans of England in America, Locke's involvement
in such projects, the development of his theory of property as
a response, in part, to these needs, and the ultimate
implications of his thoughts for the natives of America.
II - JOHN LOCKE AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN: A SYNOPSIS
In attempting to explore all facets of this relationship
between Locke and the new world, this thesis will pose for
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itself five fundamental questions. Firstly, what evidence does
Locke draw from the American sources contained in his own
personal library? Secondly, to what extent do Locke's colonial
experiences, as Secretary to the Lords Proprietors of Carolina
and Secretary to the Council of Trade and Plantations, shape
his political ideas? Thirdly, what are the exact colonial
debates, within which Locke, through his Two Treatises, is
engaged? Fourthly, what specific implications are there for
his theory of property? Finally, what impact has Locke's
theory had in America, not in terms of the development of civil
society, but in terms of natural man? In answering all of
these questions, this thesis will provide an original
interpretation of the Two Treatises. Let us consider each of
these questions further.
The question of empirical evidence is, for Locke, an important
one. One of the main criticisms Locke makes of his rival, Sir
Robert Filmer, is that he fails to support his basic theory of
government with any empirical examples. Locke believes that
the elucidation of one's theories is enhanced by the use of
concrete evidence from the empirical world. Within his own
library were dozens of travel books, written by individuals who
had been to the 'new world', which recorded details of the
people who lived there. It is from these travel books that
Locke derives some of his evidence for his conception of the
state of natural man. The first chapter of this thesis
contains an analysis of Locke's library of travel books to
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America and his use of them in the Two Treatises. It will be
argued that the evidence contained in these books on the new
world is employed in a very specific and selective way by Locke
in order to elucidate certain aspects of his theory. He
ignores those writings, amongst his books on the Indians of
America, which are opposed to his conception of natural men;
for the goal is not to understand the Indians themselves, but
only to use them to illustrate his own ideas.
The second question, regarding Locke's work in the colonization
of America, will be addressed by examining the correspondence,
memos and notes for which Locke was responsible as secretary to
both Carolina and the Council of Trades and Plantations. The
problems encountered and the solutions suggested by Locke and
his patron Shaftesbury, will be shown to reflect the general
experience of all the English colonies. The views of the
English colonizers towards the 'Indian problem' will be given
particular consideration.
Locke's views on English colonization of America develop within
the context of several specific debates occuring in England
during the latterhalf of the 17th century. Firstly, Locke
writes in the tradition of English economic writers of his
time, including Thomas Mun, Sir Josiah Child and Charles
Davenant, who defend the English plantation before a highly
skeptical audience at home. 32 Until the beginning of the 18th
century, most of England's politicians were opposed to English
- 20 -
settlements in America, because it was perceived to be a drain
on English fortunes. Both Locke and his patron Lord
Shaftesbury had considerable personal, political, and
philosophical interests in the well-being of the English
plantations of America, and Locke uses his Two Treatises to
defend the cause, using the same arguments as Child and
Davenant to defend the plantation against the skeptics.
Secondly, Locke adopts, in his defense of England's
plantations, a specific set of arguments made against those
Englishmen in America who claim England's right to land is
limited by the prior occupation of the Indians. Locke, in the
tradition of John Witherspoon, Samuel Purchas, William
Strachey, and others, argues that England has the right to take
land claimed by the Indians for a variety of reasons which
shall be considered when we come to that chapter.33
After we have examined the travel books, Locke's colonial
experience and the intellectual traditions within which he
wrote about political theory, we shall turn specifically to the
Two Treatises and the fourth question to be asked, namely, to
what extent is Locke's theory of the natural state and its
central focus on property an articulation of his ideas on
colonial issues? The fifth chapter of the Second Treatise is
noteworthy for containing three quarters of the references to
American Indians in the work as a whole, while including,
concurrently, almost all the examples of property defined as
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land, rather than life or liberty as it is conceived elsewhere
in the Two Treatises. These figures are not coincidental but
rather a reflection of Locke's decision to write a political
justification for England's appropriation of land claimed by
the Indians in America. It will be argued that Locke's Two
Treatises was a response to England's need, by virtue of its
colonial aims in America, for a new definition of property.
Until the end of the 17th century, when the English actually
settled in the new world, property had been defined as
occupation. However, this definition became a problem in
America when the Indians claimed, by virtue of their
occupation, proprietorship in certain tracts of land, coveted
by the English. A new definition of property, which would
allow the English to supercede the rights claimed by virtue of
occupation, was needed. The Two Treatises of Government
provided the answer. Labour, rather than occupation will begin
property and those who till, enclose, and cultivate the soil
will be its owners. England supercedes the right of occupation
by the Indians by virtue of their specific form of labour.
Suddenly a whole continent was open to English colonization,
and agrarian labour became the basis of both England's colonial
claims and Locke's Two Treatises.
While Locke writes in the context of, and with the same
interests as, those defending England's colonial aims, his
argument is wholly original for two main reasons. The first is
that he bases England's claims over American land on natural
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right rather than natural law or a grant from God or King, as
previous defenders of England's colonies had done. Secondly,
he provides a peaceful means by which the English may take over
the land. As shall be discussed, Locke argues forcefully
against the right of property by virtue of conquest. This
argument is a direct attack on the views of Hugo Grotius and,
more particularly the Spanish who justified appropriation of
land by right of force.
In the last chapter of this thesis, we shall consider the
impact Locke's theory has had in America, not in terms of its
account of civil society but in terms of 'natural man', that
is, the American Indian. Locke's influence on policies towards
the In1ians, it will be argued, was greatest during the period
from the revolution until tne decisions of Supreme Court
Justice Marshall regarding the Indians which began in 1S23.
Agrarian labour as the basis for one's right to property will
be a theme heard first from the pulpits of 18th century New
England, where preachers, such as Revs. John Bulkley, Ezra
Stiles and John Witherspoon used Locke's theory to justify the
American's right of property with regard to both the English,
and the Indians. 35
 Politicians, likewise, began to adopt
Locke's theories, not only from their readings of Locke
himself, but also from the work of other European thinkers who
had used Locke as the basis of their own views on property,
such as Sir William Blackstone, Emeric de Vattel and William
- 23 -
Paley. 36 No other political figure better demonstrates the use
to which Locke's theory was put during this period than Thomas
Jefferson. His views went beyond simply limiting Indians to
certain parcels of land to a belief, as articulated by Locke in
his Two Treatises, that the natural state must eventually
succumb to civil society and the hunter's life to that of the
farmer.
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Chapter 1: Locke's Travel Books
There has been a great debate surrounding John Locke's state of
nature as described in his Two Treatises of Government. How
natural man lives, his essential character, the level of
internal peace or discord in such a state and its historical
validity have all been subjects of controversy. Political
philosophers have demanded a coherent answer to all the
questions raised by Locke's ambiguous natural state, for upon
it depends his account of the rights and obligations ascribed
to man in civil society.
Most modern scholars have argued that the state of nature holds
no historical validity, concluding that Locke drew the state of
nature to be an analytical rather than historical abstraction.
John Dunn, for example, posits that the state of nature is an
'ahistoric.al condition', a 'topic for theological reflection,
not for anthropological research'. Dunn argues that Locke was
attecipting to 'devise a criterion which was outside of history,
in terms of which to judge the moral status of the present
political structure.' He concludes emphatically, 'it is
neither a piece of philosophical anthropology nor a piece of
conjectural history. Indeed it has literally no transitive
empirical content whatsoever." C.B. MacPherson comes to a
similar conclusion:
Locke, like Hobbes, introduces the 'natural'
cond.tion of mankind not as an historical
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condition existing before the emergence of civil
society but as a logical abstraction from the
essential nature of man.2
Locke, however, did see his state of nature existing in an
historical sense. Clearly he believed that governments exist
in relation to one another as in a state of nature but, more
significantly, Locke conceived of native Americans as examples
of natural men and thus uses them to draw conclusions about
conditions in the state of nature.
The confusion over the historical authenticity of Locke's
state of nature arises when commentators assume that the state
of nature is an historical model of European society. Thus,
those who conclude that Locke was only using the state of
nature as a purely hypothetical construct reject the idea that
such a state existed prior to that of every part of European
civilization. Nevertheless, one can reject this historical
notion of a universal natural state while still recognizing
that Locke believed that such natural states did exist at the
time of his writing, amongst the Indians of America. While
many modern scholars have overlooked the American dimension of
Locke's state of nature, a few, such as Richard Ashcraft have
recognized the importance of the new world to Locke's
understanding of natural man.
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Since [Locke's] arguments rest upon appeals to
historical, demographic and sociological evidence
derived from records of voyages to the new world,
this aspect of Locke's discussion of the state of
nature has a distinctly empirical cast to it.3
Thus, while Locke believed that his state of nature helped him
to draw logical conclusions about civilized man, it was by no
means based upon pure hypothetical conjecture. Locke based
his account of natural man on the descriptions provided by the
dozens of travel books he had in his library on the Americas.
Many modern commentators overlook the fascination amongst the
learned men of 17th century England in the 'new world'. Locke
was not alone in his fascination with the 'new world'. Many
of his contemporaries were equally absorbed by the discoveries
being made by European explorers, as evidenced by the wide
circulation amongst the 17th century English elite of such
books as Sir Walter Raleigh's History of the World, or Samuel
Purchas's Pilgrims or Richard Hakluyt's Principle
Navigations .
Locke owned all of these works and used them, along with other
accounts of the new world in his library to provide concrete
evidence of the character of 'natural man'. While his choice
of information, was of 'a distinctly empirical cast', it was
not scientific, as Locke only chose those historical examples
which would support his overall theory. Locke's selective use
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of information from his library can be accounted for by his
view that one's theoretical principles should be established
before examining history for examples. Thus he writes in his
journal,
'One who hath well settled in his mind the
principles of of morality and knows how to make a
judgement on the actions of men...may learn great
and useful instructions of prudence from a study
of history.'5
As such moral principles are primary, a 'study of history'
must be reconcilable to these foundations. It is this pattern
he seems to have adopted in his Two Treatises, when he uses
historical examples of natural man to support his theories
regarding the nature of property and civil obligation.
In the Two Treatises, Locke criticizes Sir Robert Filmer, for
failing to reconcile his philosophy with the facts; a point,
according to Richard Ashcraft, which is central to Locke's
critique:
The telling argument against Filmer's theory is
that for all its reliance upon 'scriptural
history', it cannot 'be accomodated to the nature
of things', nor can it 'be made to agree with that
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constitution and order which God had settled in
the world.'6
Locke sets out, instead, to develop a theory based upon his
principles governing civil society, supported by historical
examples. Locke's method, however, is problematic for in
reconciling fact with theory, when the latter is established
first in order to 'make a judgernent' on the former, one must
necessarily fashion 'things' to elucidate the theory rather
than to understand the things in themselves. As a result,
Locke chose only those aspects of native American life which
fit his theory. While native Americans, are used by Locke to
explain his principles of natural rights and civil
obligation; an understanding of the real natural man is
partial and distorted.
Locke's perceptions of the new world derived from two
principle sources. The first was his collection of
travelogues; volumes written by European explorers to the new
world about what they encountered during their voyages. The
second was his moe practical involvement in colonial
adminstration; first through his secretarial work to the Lord
Proprietors of Carolina, secondly through the Council of Trade
and finally as a Commissioner on the Board of Trade. In both
cases, he and his colleagues were absorbed by the question of
British colonial practise toward native Americans. Locke's
perceptions of native Americans are both revealed through
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his work on behalf of the Empire and shaped by the colonial
experiences he encountered.
I -THE TRAVEL BOOKS: LOCKE'S HISTORICAL EVIDENCE
In this chapter, we shall consider the former source, namely
his impressive collection of travelogues. In 1965, John
Harrison and Peter Laslett published The Library of John
Locke, within which they listed 195 titles under the category
of voyages and travels. Most of these describe trips to the
Americas by European explorers.7
Such voyages were very expensive to mount and were usually
sponsored either by the monarchy or by the church in Europe.
It must be born in mind in analysing these texts that writers
were interested in two main goals in relaying their
descriptions of native Americans back to Europe, namely the
enlargement of a kingdom or church. Thus Father Joseph
D'Acosta, head of a Jesut College and quoted by Locke in his
Second Treatise, writes in his Natural and Moral History of
the Indies,
The intention of this Historie is not onely to
give knowledge of what hath passed at the Indies,
but also to continue this knowledge, to the fruite
S
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we may gather by it, which is to helpe this people
for their soules health, and to glorifie the
Creator and Redeemer, who hath drawne them from
the obscure darkenes of their infidelitie and
imparted unto them the admirable light of his
Gospel.8
Father Cristoval D'Acuna makes clear that the objective is not
just Christian but political.
Such is the sum of the new discovery of this great
river which excludes no one from its vast
treasures, but rewards all who wish to take
advantage of them...those who are most interested
in this discovery, are the zealous men who seek
the honour of God and the good of souls...faithful
ministers of the Holy Gospel, that, by its
brightness, thei may dispel the shadow of death in
which these miserable people have lain for so long
a time...this new vineyard will always require
fresh and zealous labourers to cultivate it, until
it is made- entirely subject to the keys of the
Roman church.9
Similarly Gabriel Sagard Theodat was appointed, as is made
clear in the preface of his book, to bring the church to North
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America. M. De La Salle, a French explorer, expresses most
succinctly the dual nature of his voyage:
The design of travelling from the Lake of
Frontenac in Canada, to the Gulf of Mexico through
a vast unknown country, [is] to bring the
inhabitants to the knowledge of the Christian
religion, and extend the dominions of France.1°
The purpose of the expeditions necessarily shaped the
resulting descriptions. In order to understand how these
travelogues were used by Locke, we must examine what he chose
both to include and ignore in his final description of natural
man and the implications such choices had on native Americans.
b
From the earliest accounts of explorers to North America,
Locke would have found descriptions of a 'state of nature'.
Sir Walter Raleigh, the first Englishman to attempt colonizing
New England, wrote extensively about the peoples of America
and his travels there. In 'A Discourse of the Original and
Fundamental Ceuse of Natural, Arbitrary, Necessary and
Unnatural War', he introduces the 'state of nature':
The mere state of nature, of men out of community,
where all have an equal right to all things; and I
shall enjoy my life, my substance, or what is dear
to me, no longer than he that has more cunning or
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is stronger than I, will give me leave: for
natural conscience is not a sufficient curb to the
violent passions of men out of the laws of
society
It should be noted that Raleigh bases his state of nature on
his observations of American Indians. He claims a fundamental
freedom and equality in this natural state. Moreover, even
though natural law exists, man will still, eventually, succumb
to the greater forces of passion within himself. This is
similar to Locke's conception of natural man. Raleigh goes on
to say:
A people leaving the state of nature have entered
into a community, and made laws, as they justly
may to preserve that community, which laws are to
be obeyed under the penalty of displeasing God
himself; yet the administrators of those laws,
being visibly and incurably defective in
preserving the whole may be removed; for...where
the people have no such right, they have 1 ost all
liberty.12
Here we see that Raleigh's natural men, like Locke's, enter
into a community and thereby form laws to insure its
preservation. Moreover, Raleigh allows for a dissolution of
government where the 'administrators' can no longer preserve
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the whole. The people's right to dissolve such governments is
clearly based on their more fundamental right of natural
'liberty' and is reflected, in part, in Locke's important
chapter in the Second Treatise on the dissolution of
government.
Perhaps the most profound element included in almost all of
the travel books read by John Locke was the essential
distinction between the cyilized Christian man and the pagan,
American savage. The latter, by virtue of the Christian
faith, had to be converted to the former. The starting point
in these analyses was European civilization; explorers,
therefore, soon ascribed to the mythical 'savage', the
'other', attributes which were the antithesis of those found
in European phiosophy and religion. Natural men were
perceived eithei as innocents still existing in a garden of
Eden, or followers of the devil. This seeming contradiction
in the moral worth of 'natural' man can only be understood in
relation to the view such thinkers took of civilization.
Those who viewed European civility as essentially good saw the
savage of North America as bad; conversely those who viewed
civilization as primarily a set of restrictive and binding
obligations on the freedom of natural man saw the same savages
as essentially good. This distinction between the noble and
ignoble savage has been explored in some depth by various
scholars. According to Bernard Sheehan,
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Savages might be either noble or ignoble, either
the guardians of pristine virtue or the agents of
violent disorder. Savagisin assumes meaning only
in the sense that it inverted the civil
condition •13
What is essential to both types of descriptions, is the
central idea that savagery is a condition both theoretically
defined by and historically prior to civilization and must
necessarily yield to its onslaught.
Once classified as a savage, the Indian could be
expected to play out his role in relation to the
civil order. Either he would make the transition
to civility or he would resist the influence of
European society and face destruction.'4
The 'savage' described in these travelogues grew progressively
more ignoble as conflicts grew between the natives and
European settlers.
In the history of political thought we can certainly see both
the ignoble and noble savage described in the writings of
Thomas Hobbes and Jean Jacques Rousseau respectively. Both
men, familiar with exploration in the new world, could
certainly find the data to support their own perceptions, but
their differing accounts of natural man depend on their
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views of civilization. Thus Hobbes, searching for the order
and stability of civil society, paints its inversion as a
bleak and ignoble natural state. Conversely, Rousseau's
natural man, noble and free provides the perfect counter-point
to a degenerative civilization which enslaves individuals and
creates inequalities.15
John Locke seems to incorporate both in his naturaI. state.
This ambiguity is essential to Locke's civil statft as both
conceptions, the noble savage living peacefully and in
recognition of the law of nature and the ignoble savage
entering the state of war over 'every the least difference',
are needed if Locke is to argue that man by virtue of his
natural rights may both recognize civil authority and dissolve
it. Thus Locke used the descriptions n the travelogues to
create first a reason for entering citl society (thus the
ignoble tendency toward a state of war) and then also an
alternative preferable to absolute tyranny (namely the noble
savage living peaceably together.)- Both descriptions can be
found in European descriptions of native Americans. Each will
be considered in turn.
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II - NATURAL MAN: NOBLE vs IGNOBLE SAVAGE
The idea of the noble savage can be traced in the Christian
tradition to the ideal of Adam in the Garden of Eden. Many of
the early descriptions of the Americas which Locke would have
read refer to the new world in terms of such a paradise. For
example, Acuna describes his new world as follows:
But of the river of Amazons it may be affirmed
that its banks are a paradise of fertility, and if
the natural riches of the soil were assisted by
art, the whole would be one delightful garden.16
Father Sagard Theodat also speaks of the great plethora of
plants and animals, referring to the area as 'notre jardin'.
Within these settings the natives are often likened to Adam
and Eve.
An important aspect of the noble savage inhabiting the garden
of Eden is the plentitude of available resources. Repeatedly
authors describethe abundance of fruit, vegetables and other
materials available to natural man. These observations are
usually coupled with a comment on the small amount of labour
necessitated by such an easily available cornucopia. Sheehan
comments:
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Paradism exaggerated the resources of the new
world and the ease with which they could be
exploited. In this process the Indians played an
ambiguous part. For all their virtues, they had
failed to use what nature provided.17
Locke adopts this paradisaical view of America when he
describes it as, 'rich in Land...with the materials of Plenty,
i.e. a fruitful Soil, apt to produce in abundance'. The
inhabitants, Locke goes on to say have failed to improve what
nature has provided.18
The final aspect of the noble savage described in these
accounts is the recognition that civilization has degenerated
with the evolution of man. Likewise, those still existing in
the innocence of the natural state must, by virtue of the
biblical account, inevitably fall from grace. It is this fall
which transforms the noble man into the ignoble savage. John
Locke clearly shared this view. The Christian influence on
Locke's conception of the state of nature is revealed in a
note he wrote about the origins of man in 1693:
[Man, created by God, was] put into possession of
the whole world...instinct and reason carried him
the same way, and being neither capable of
covetousness or ambition when he had already the
first use of all things...[fall of Adam mentioned]
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and when private possessions and labour which now
the curse on the earth had made necessary by
degrees made a definition of conditions it gave
room for covetousneess, pride, and ambition which
by fashion and example spread the corruption which
has so prevailed over mankind.'9
The progression in Locke's state of nature as outlined above
is one of an increasingly degenerate existence, culminating
with the introduction of money, inequality, and conflict
between people; in essence it is the political philosopher's
version of Adam's fall. As Richard Ashcraft writes of Locke,
'Beneath the veil of 'history' of course is the Christian view
of man's fall from Grace.' 2° The transformation of natural
man from the peaceful and free nomad to the vicious savage
within the state of war is as inevitable as the fall of Adam
from the Grace of God. Thus we arrive at the ignoble savage.
For many European explorers the native Americans encountered
went well beyond fallen man; he was described as violent in
nature, without any discipline or industry, uncivilized in his
personal habits and a worshipper of the devil.
Samuel Champlain comments: 'They have among them certaine
Savages...which speak visibly with the Divell'. He concludes
that, 'for the most part', Indians live like 'brute beasts'.
Sir Walter Raleigh makes similar claims:
e
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The Mexicans and other people of America were
brought by the devil under his fearfull servitude
in which he also holdeth the Floridians and
Virginians at this day.23
As both English settlers and natives became increasingly
hostile towards each other, the European rhetoric about the
ice of native life was raised to a feverish pitch. In a
universe created by a Christian God, only Satan could be
responsible for the native's fallen and degenerate way of
life. The perennial Christian struggle between good and evil
was thus imposed on the inhabitants of the new world. As
Sheehan puts it:
Virtue could not exist without a corresponding
vice. Christian theology accepted the role of
Satan in a world created and government by
God...[Thu s } it involved a real struggle in the
European soul to resist the temptations of
incivility, the dangers of violence, brutality,
and disorder that men found within themselves.
The Indians saved European society from itself.24
Once percieved as a threat to civil and religious order, in
both a practical and philosophical sense, the native American
was under attack, and his natural rights came into question.
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For example, Samuel Purchas justifies the deprivation of
natives rights due to their savage nature:
If they bee not worthy of the name of a Nation,
being wilde and Savage: yet as Slaves, bordering
rebells, excommunicates and out-lawes are lyable
to the punishments of Law, and not to the
priviledges; So it is with these Barbarians,
Borderers and Out-lawes of Humanity.25
For each of these explorers, natural man is ignoble to the
extent that he is inferior to men in civil society. Locke
adopts the ignoble savage written about in many of his
travelogues in his discussion of the degeneration of the state
of nature into the state of war.
Natural men or native Americans are inferior to Englishmen,
according to Locke, primarily because his reason has not yet
developed to the same extent, comparing the gap in
understanding to that between children and adults. In An
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke draws a parallel
between native Americans, idiots and children, asserting that
all have a diminished sense of understanding and responsiblity
before the law. 26 This parallel between natural men and
children is extended in Locke's Second Treatise to a
comparison between childhood and the state of nature.27
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If we may not suppose Men ever to have been in the
State of Nature, because we hear not much of them
in such a State, we may as well suppose the Armies
of Salmanasser or Xerxes were never Children...For
'tis with Common-wealths as with particular
Persons, they are commonly ignorant of their own
Births and Infancies.28
Perhaps the clearest example for Locke that native Americans
are inferior to Europeans in their understanding is their
religious beliefs. In contradistinction to Locke's own views
on the unity and singularity of God, the native Americans
often worshipped a plurality of Gods, something Locke, despite
his views on religious toleration, clearly found unacceptable:
What are these people (polytheists), pray, if not
disguised atheists? For it is just as impossible
that many Gods either exist or can be apprehended,
as that there is no God. In fact to increase the
number of Gods means to abolish divinity.29
In the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke asks: 'What
true or tolerable Notion of a Deity, could they have, who
acknowledged, and worhipped hundreds?3°
The inevitable conclusion for the explorers to the new world
and thinkers like Locke is that the ignoble savage would be
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converted to Christianity and civil life. Conversion became
an important theme to the early colonists. It was often
argued that force would be unnecessary because once the
superiority of a Christian life had been demonstrated to the
natives, they would, by virtue of their own untapped reason,
inevitably convert. Acuna comments:
These tribes of infidels have good dispositions...
if they received notice of the true Creator of
heaven and earth they would embrace his holy law
with little hesitation.31
Acosta writes of his fellow explorers: 'When they shew the
Indians their blind errors by lively and plaine reasons, they
are presently perswaded and yeelde admirably to the trueth.'32
Like many of the explorers, Locke believes that Christianity
will spread throughout the world by virtue of the growth in
natural man's reason.
The suitableness of such a Notion [the Christian
God] to the Principles of common Reason, and the
Interest Men will always have to mention it often,
must necessarily spread it far and wide; and
continue it down to all Generations...some
imperfect and unsteady Notions, conveyed thereby
to the unthinking part of Mankind [my emphasis].33
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The conversion of the native Americans from paganism to
Christianity, so pervasive in the accounts of explorers to the
new world is not only endorsed by John Locke but, in the Two
Treatises, is expanded to encompass the broader notions of the
natural state and civility generally. Some explorers had
argued that a conversion to civility was a necessary corollary
to the natives accepting Christianity. Thus, Samuel Purchas
concludes that the English were in America to:
recover them [the Indians] if it be possible, as
by Religion, from the power of Sathan to God; so
by humanity and civility from Barbarisme and
Savagenesse to good manners and humaine polity.34
James Axtell writes that, for early explorers, it was
necessary to 'civilize savages before they can be converted to
Christianity and that inorder to make them Christians, they
must first be made men'. 35
 In both cases of conversion,
religious and political, the men in the former natural state
would inevitably yield to the latter stage of civilization.
Locke, like these explorers, assumed that natural man would,
by virtue of his own reason, join civil society. This
movement away from the state of nature to civil society was
for Locke, not only inevitable but fairly rapid.
Thus Mankind, notwithstanding all the Privi].edges
of the state of Nature, being but in an ill
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condition, while they remain in it, are quickly
driven into Society. Hence it comes to pass, that
we seldom find any number of Men live any time
together in this State.36
In essence, Locke adopts not only the underlying dichotomy of
these travelogues between the darkness of pagan savagism and
the lightness of Christian civility as the basis for his state
of nature and civil society, respectively, but he also
transforms the idea of religious conversion into the more
political doctrine that the state of nature will inevitably
yield to civil society. The Second Treatise is, in fact, an
explanation of this transformation.
III - THE TRAVEL BOOKS: LOCKE'S OMISSIONS
While native Americans were the models for Locke's natural man
and he garnered much of his information from accounts written
by explorers in the new world, it is clear that Locke was
selective in the 'facts' tie chose to include about them. His
exclusions can only be understood in terms of his overall
objectives in writing the Two Treatises and his desire to
understand and describe the rights and duties of Europeans,
that is civilized men, and not those of his original subject,
namely natural man. Locke also believed ttat history was only
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useful to those thinkers who had already 'well settled' in
their minds 'the principles of morality' and were using
historical examples only to make 'judgements on the actions of
men.
Thus, Locke's descriptions of natural man, while drawn from
accounts of native Americans, were forced into a theoretical
framework demanded by both the needs of his political
philosophy and his moral judgement of civil man; what did not
fit was ignored. Let us consider Locke's exclusions in more
depth.
Locke's state of nature proceeds through a series of stages.
Beginning with nomadic life, natural man gradually developed a
private system of cultivation which leads to the use of money,
conflict and inequalities and the need for civil government.
William Batz in his article, 'The Anthropology of John Locke',
argues that Locke in fact borrowed this evolutionary process
from Acosta's account of the Mexican natives.
Locke merely borrowed the order of Acosta's
account, extracted the pattern from its Aztec
embodiment, and so acquired the outline for his
own developmental theory of political
institutions 38
,
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Locke himself cites Acosta in the Second Treatise as providing
supporting evidence for his state of nature.
And if Josephus Acosta's word may be taken, he
tells us, that in many parts of America there was
no Goverment at all. There are great and apparent
Conjectures, says he, that thee_Mn, speaking of
those of Peru, for a long time had neither Kings
nor Common-wealths, but lived in Troops...which
have no certain Kings, but as occasion is offered
in Peace or War they choose their Captains as
they please.39
While Acosta does describe the invasion of the original
peoples of Mexico, the barbarous and savage Chicinecan by the
more civilized Navaltaclan who by dividing the land into fixed
portions served to 'increase and beautify their commonwealth',
there are some profound difficulties in Batz's conclusion that
Locke used this desription as a mode]. for his own natural
state. These problems demonstrate Locke's capacity to ignore
factual accounts in favour of the logic of his own argument.
We shall consider these omissions or errors in turn.
Firstly, Locke claims in the Second Treatise that the initial
form of government is monarchy.
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If we look back as far as History will direct us,
towards the Original of Common-wealths, we shall
generally find them under the Government and
Administration of one Man.4°
In fact Acosta claims that the first form of government
brought to the people of Mexico and Peru was that of
'comminalities' defined by Acosta as 'rule of the many'.
There was not in Peru in olde time, any king or
lord to whome all obeyed, but they were
comrninalities...where they were governed by the
advice and authoritie of many, which are as it
were Counsellors.41
It was from within the commonality, that monarchy developed.
In many tribes of the Indies beyond Peru itself, according to
Acosta, no such king or sovereign was ever present:
Many nations of the Indies have not indured any
Ki'gs or absolute and soveraigrie Lords, but live
in comminalities.42
Secondly Locke argues that monarchy not only existed first but
was, being simple, the most suitable form of government for an
early period of society.
-55-
It was no wonder, that they should pitch upon, and
naturally run into that Form of Government, which
from their Infancy they had been all accustomed
to...To which, if we add, that Monarchy being
simple, and most obvious to Men, whom neither
experience had instructed in Forms of Government,
nor the Ambition or Insolence of Empire had taught
to	 beware	 of	 the	 Encroachments	 of
Prerogative...but also best suited to their
present State and Condition; which stood more in
need of defence against foreign Invasions and
Injuries, than of multiplicity of Laws.43
Furthermore, in some cases for Locke, monarchy is 'no Form of
Civil Government at all' but men still existing within the
state of nature. 44
 Acosta's account, on the other hand, not
only states that monarchy was the last and most developed form
of government but was the best. Thus he writes how explorers
to Latin America have found three forms of government, the
'best' being a monarchy.45
Thirdly, while Locke claims that civil government, including
monarchy, was established by common consent, Batz himself
admits that 'as Acosta relates it, the monarchy was
established [by] 'some excellent men', most likely the
aristocrats', and not by consent of the people as a whole.46
This is particularly ironical, as in the Second Treatise,
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Locke cites Acosta's account as specific evidence that civil
government was established by men whose 'consent were all
equal, till by the same consent they set Rulers over
themselves. So that their Politick Societies all began from a
voluntary Union.
Finally, Locke claims that the monarchy was hereditary.
Conformable hereunto we find the People of
America, who...enjoy'd their own natural freedom,
though, caeteris paribus, they commonly prefer the
Heir of their deceased King.'48
Acosta points out as the characteristic feature of monarchies
the fact they were elected, not hereditary. This was also the
case with the Hurons where Sagard claims that monarchs were
originally appointed through election. 49 While Locke admits
at another point, that monarchies have been elective he fails
to reconcile these origins with his own theory that nations
evolve, as a child does from existing under paternal
autocratic rule to th age of reason where they are free to
choose, that is to elect, their own form of government.50
Instead, he uses the fact of elected monarchies to attack Sir
Robert Filmer's theory that monarchy was natural, linked in
paternal authority to the original king, Adam. Stating that
some men, meaning Filmer, have mistaken hereditary monarchy as
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the natural form of government for all time, Locke argues that
such monarchs exist only in the beginning of civil societies,
when the people's understanding is immature and their only
model until now of authority has been the father. This will
necessarily evolve, with maturity, into other forms of
government, including an elected monarch.
The Father's Pre-eminency might, in the first[rny
emphasis] institution of some cornmon-wealths, give
a rise to, and place, in the beginning, the Power
in one hand; Yet it is plain, that the reason,
that coritiriued{my emphasis] the form of Government
in a single person, was not any Regard, or Respect
to Paternal Authority; since all petty Monarchies,
that is, almost all Monarchies, near their
Original, have been commonly, at least upon
occasion, Elective.5'
Locke thus argues that commonwealths may in the beginning,
that is, in their immaturity, start as paternal monarchies,
but 'continue' not in a hereditary manner but as an elected
position. Once again Locke ignores his evidence, for Sagard
makes clear that the tribes in Canada had in fact done the
opposite to what Locke described, namely elected their
monarchs first, but later followed a rule of inheritance.52
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The gap between Locke's theory and evidence arises from his
decision to use 'fatherhood' as the framework within which the
origins of government must be initially understood and the
starting point to attack Filmer. Locke states:
Thus, whether a Family by degrees grew up into a
Common-wealth, and the Fatherly Authority being
continued on to the elder Son, every one in his
turn growing up under it, tacitly submitted to it,
and the easiness and equality of it not offending
any one, every one acquiesced, till time seemed to
have confirmed it, and settled a right of
Succession by Prescription.53
The monarch is thus described as a father who protects and
educates his children throughout their infancy.
And unless they had done so, young Societies could
not have subsisted: without such nursing Fathers
tender and carefull of the publick weale, all
Governments would have sunk under the Weakness and
Infirmities of their Infancy, and the Prince and
the People had soon perished together.54
At the point, however, that children or nations reach the age
of reason, Locke argues that they are no longer under any
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obligation to their father or sovereign respectively. This is
a direct attack on Filmer's theory of paternal right.
[There are] those, who would perswade us, that
being born under any Government, we are naturally
Subjects	 to	 it...because	 our	 Fathers	 or
Progenitors passed away their natural Liberty, and
thereby bound up themselves and their Posterity to
a perpetual subjection to the Government.55
Locke argues instead that paternal authority is limited:
[One] cannot, by any Compact whatsoever, bind his
Children or Posterity. For this Son, when a Man,
being altogether as free as the Father, any act of
the Father can no more give away the liberty of
the Son, than it can of any body else.56
Paternal authority is not, as Filmer claims, a derivative of
Adam's divine rule over other men, through the institution of
monarchy in perpetuity. Rather, for Locke, it is limited to
the first immature stage of political and personal
development. The lives, liberties and estates of individuals
or nations who reach the age of reason are no longer under the
authority of their fathers or princes unless consented to at
that time. Central to this whole theory is the notion of
consent.
-60-
In this discussion of the origins of political society, Locke
is trying to achieve two basic ends. Firstly he is trying to
undermine Filmer's notion of divine rule and hereditary
paternal authority via Adam. Secondly, he is trying to
establish that true government originates in consent between
individuals of mature reason. Consequently, he is forced to
argue that hereditary monarchy, arising from the model of
paternal authority, is the most simple and primitive form of
government. Nations, like children, mature and, contrary to
Filmer's argument, must ultimately consent to political
authority. Thus Locke's argument leads him to conclude that
monarchy must, at this later stage, be established by consent,
perhaps even by election.
In order to prove his point Locke ignores Acosta's claims that
democracy was the first form of government in Mexico, that
many provinces had no such monarchs, that monarchy was the
most advanced and best form of government in the Indies, that
it arose from democracy and not vice versa, that it was
established not by common consent but by aristocrats; and that
it was often elective from its inception and not constituted
as such later on.
A second element of the Two Treatises which illustrates
Locke's omission of certain aspects of native American life
irreconcilable with the natural man demanded by his political
philosophy is his state of war. Locke's state of nature
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presupposes individual savages whose decision to enter into a
state of war is contingent upon the protection of their
individual property. In fact, most of the warfare which
occured between native Americans in the new world was tribal
rather than individual. One of the greatest flaws of the
state of nature device, when it is used as a mirror to
European civilization, is its complete obliteration of any
specific characteristics of the individuals themselves. Thus
natural man belongs to no tribe and has no political or
ethical codes associated with that collectivity. Rather he is
an individual amongst an undifferentiated and ahistorical mass
of non-European, non-civil savages.
War, as a consequence, must be explained in terms of private
lives, liberties and properties rather than as a result of
conflict between two nations as it might be in civil warfare.
In creating such a natural state, Locke ignores the countless
references to nationhood in his travelogues and more
specifically the fact that tribes, not individuals, engage in
war. Acuna writes:
All this new world, if we may call it so, is
inhabited by barbarians, in distinct provinces and
nations...they exceed one hundred and fifty all
with different languages.57
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Acuna then goes on to describe each of these nations in some
detail. Like all men and all countries, each have their own
individual and collective characteristics. Moreover, nations
rarely, if ever fight within themselves. Even the Cashibos,
described as 'cannibals' who none would 'dare to venture
amongst', 'will not kill someone within his own tribe'.58
Hostilities were not caused either in Europe or the Americas
by the lack of a common authority to adjudicate differences.
Neither could they simply be explained as the result of
individuals protecting their own self interests. The true
state of war is more often than not groups of individuals with
common identities and goals fighting against other groups
either for access to a scarce common resource, or for their
collective pride or glory or both. The theoretical
consequence of such a state of war is to justify the forceful
inception of natural men, such as native Americans into a
civil state, as the latter is defined as preferable to the
former. Locke clearly uses his formulation of the state of
war as 'one great reason of Mens putting themselves into
Society, and quitting the State of Nature'.59
A third aspect of Locke's natural man is his failure to use
his industry to produce maximum levels of agricultural or
mineral goods. This is a common theme in Locke's Second
Treatise and other writings and is linked to the Christian
notion that man should develop the skills provided by God to
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exploit the world's resources. Knowledge and industry must be
improved, therefore, as an obligation to the Creator.
We may truly say, nature gives us but the seeds of
it; we are born to be, if we please, rational
creatures, but it is use and exercise only that
makes us so, and we are, indeed so no farther than
industry and application have carried us.6°
He goes on to say how such faculties are lacking amongst
American Indians:
Tis rational to conclude, that our proper
Imployment lies in these Enquiries, and in that
sort of Knowledge, which is most suited to our
natural Capacities, and carries in it our greatest
interest, i.e. the Condition of our eternal
Estate...Of what Consequence the discovery of one
natural Body, and its Properties may be to humane
Life, the whole great Continent of America is a
convincing instance: whose Ignorance in usefull
Arts [denies them the use of] the Mineral of
Iron.61
These views are reflected in the Second Treatise, in the
chapter on property when he writes:
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There cannot be a clearer demonstration of any
thing, than several Nations of the Americans are
of this, who are rich in Land, and poor in all the
Comforts of Life; whom Nature having funished as
liberally as any other people, with the materials
of Plenty, i.e. a fruitful Soil, apt to produce in
abundance...yet for want of improving it by
labour, have not one hundreth part of the
Conveniences we enjoy.62
This idea that native Americans are primitive in their use of
land is prevalent amongst English explorers of this period.
As Karen Kupperman comments:
[There is an] assumption which was universal among
Englishmen that their technology was obviously
superior to that of the Indians.63
Such a conception was essential to the idea of development
from primitive forms of nomadic life to the civilized
cultivation of land; the latter by definition must not only be
superior to the former, it must supersede it. The problem
however, is that such a theory disregards the fact that many
English settlers in fact depended on the natives and their
technology for food. Sheehan comments:
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The native people of Virginia derived a major
portion of their food from farming, a practice
quickly noted and exploited by the
English.. .although they occasionally acknowledged
and regretted their dependence, the English failed
utterly to see the incompatibility between reality
and their conception of Indians as savage people.
Even while subsisting on Indian corn, they
stressed	 the	 scarcity	 that	 they	 believed
inevitably afflicted those unable to transcend the
savage condition.64
This dependence on the natives for food was not only
recognized but became a matter of concern amongst the English
settlers. For years English technology simply was not as
efficient as that of the natives. Thus, two early settlers
write:
Writers from all areas tell of the Indians
instructing them in planting and tending of Indian
corn, but the Plymouth colonists complained that
they still had smaller harvests than the Indians
did.65
It was common practise, as these writers point out, for native
Americans to instruct settlers in the proper cultivation of
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American crops. William Wood writes of New England natives in
1634:
Many wayes hath their advice and endeavour beene
advantagious unto us; they being our first
instructors for the planting of their Indian
come, by teaching us to cull out the finest
seede, to observe the fittest season, to deepe
distance for holes, and fit measure for hills, to
worme it and weede it, to prune it and dresse it
as occasion shall require.60
Why then does Locke choose to ignore these facts in his Second
Treatise and instead continue to claim that native use of land
was negligible while the Europeans improved its value ten, one
hundred or a thousand times. First, it is crucial to Locke's
whole argument about property that labour and industry develop
in tangent with civil society, being in all ways superior to
the natural state and closer to God. Secondly, the notion
that native Americans did not properly use God's gifts, as
Europeans did, was a common belief amongst those English
involved in settling the new world. Locke clearly concurred
with these views.
Although Locke's theory of property will be examined in great
detail in chapter six, it is worth inquiring here, how Locke's
analysis of property in the state of nature compares to that
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of the Indians described in his travel books. First, his
assertion that private property was essential to natural man
from his inception would not be supported by most
commentators. For example, Locke's description that natural
men exist 'confining their desires within the narrow bounds of
each man's small property' is irreconciliable with
descriptions such as that of Robert Gray who wrote in 1609,
'These Savages have no particular proprietie in any part or
parcell of that Countrey, but only a generall recidencie
...there is not meum and teum amongst them. 67
 As Cray and
several others describe the attitude of native Americans, the
notion of private possession was simply not part of their
vocabulary. Using the earth's resources, through labour, did
not imply ownership of those resources as Locke assumes.
Secondly, his assertion that cultivation of land is
necessarily private again ignores practises of native
Americans. The Hurons, described as 'socialistic in type' by
later commentators owned and cultivated their property as a
community. Thus Sagard comments, 'All the forests, meadows,
and uncleared land are common property.'68
Not only was property owned and cultivated in common but some
tribes even traded as a community, establishing simple forms
of social welfare. Thus Acuna describes the Chiquito tribe as
follows:
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{ The Chiquitos] cultivate cotton and sugar cane.
Their produce is sold for the benefit of the
community, and a fund is formed for the relief of
the infirm and aged...For manufacturing sugar,
they fabricate their own copper boilers and they
understand several trades.69
Their level of industry is clearly fairly advanced in Lockean
terms of development in the state of nature, and yet they
continue to own, manufacture and sell their products as a
collective entity. Families also often lived in collective
units, as described in accounts such as those of M. de La
Salle of Portage natives or Acuna's description of the Yoriman
tribe. 70
Finally, Locke argues that the introduction of money allows
natural man to store value, thus introducing inequalities
between people when the limits set by natural law are
transcended. Locke argues in this chapter that once something
of value is discovered and known amongst men in the state of
natire it will be used to store wealth. Locke states:
Thus in the beginning all the World was America,
and more so than that is now; for no such thing as
Money was any where known.
	 Find out something
that hath the Use and Value of Money amongst his
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Neighbours, you shall see the same Man will begin
presently to enlarge his Possessions.7'
In fact some American Indians did produce metals that had 'the
use and value of money' but chose not to use them to enlarge
possessions. Acosta, quoted by Locke on a different subject
in this chapter on property, writes:
We finde not that the Indians in former times used
gold, silver, or any other rnettall for mony, and
for the price of things, but only for
ornament...the maner of the Indians trafficke, and
their buying and selling, was to exchanges, and
give things for things.72
Thus money is not something intrinsic to the state of nature
or to natural man.
IV - CONCLUSION
In all of the examples given above, Locke chooses to ignore
the accounts provided in his own books about the American
Indian for very specific philosophical reasons. For example,
in order to attack Filmer's theory of the natural law of
monarchy and develop his own notion of popular consent, Locke
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argues that hereditary monarchy is the initial form of
government, followed by elective kings when a community
reaches a certain point of maturity, to be replaced finally by
a government based on popular consent, despite the fact that
the European explorer he depends on most heavily for his
information, namely Acosta, provides much evidence to the
contrary. Similarly, Locke's arguments on the nature of war
amongst natural men, their lack of industry and their
propensity to own and cultivate land in a private fashion are
all contradicted by the evidence at hand, of which Locke
himself was aware. How could Locke be so selective in his
evidence?
Locke's primary philosophical objective in writing the Second
Treatise was to articulate the ends of civil, that is
European, government. For Locke the most important of these
ends is the preservation of property. In order to preserve
individual property from both the vagrancies of other men and
monarchs, it was necessary for Locke to posit that ownership
of private property is, by nature, a right, based on
individual cultivetion. The American Indian was u'sed to
elucidate this theory and had to begin, therefore, to
recognize, cultivate and own separate parcels of land before
it could be considered that any type of social relations or
society was established. Actual tribes which did not
recognize this notion of ownership, or held land as a
community, were thus irreconcilable with Locke's theory and
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had to be ignored in the more important task for the
philosopher of elucidating the rights of civil men. Locke's
purposes, however, go beyond the purely philosophical, to the
pressing colonial interests of England, which shall be
discussed fully in the next three chapters.
Thus, Locke used his large collection of travel books to
provide the empirical evidence of his natural man. From Sir
Walter Raleigh's state of war to Sagard's 'primitive state of
innocence', Locke had available to him the necessary
requisites of natural man. Central to all of these
descriptions was the fundamental dichotomy between the state
of nature and civil society. Philosophically, the picture of
the American Indian, which ultimately arose from Locke's
selective use of his travel books, was a savage who had fallen
from grace, who would eventually develop into civilized men in
order to find salvation. In the meantime, he could be used as
an inverted image of civil man and more importantly for Locke,
as a natural being whose rights in nature could be used to
justify the philosophical demands made of civil society,
namely to protect and preserve the right of property.
The mythological dichotomy between civil and savage man,
between good and evil, has thus come full circle. Beginning
with the assumptions made by explorers to the new world in
their travel books, translated by Locke in his philosophical
treatise into a powerful political doctrine of civil
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conversion, the Indian has found himself and will continue to
be, for the next three centuries, a distorted inversion of
civil society, and the ultimate victim of such myths.
-73-
Notes
1. John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke, Cambridge,
1969, pp. 97, 101, 103.
2. C.B. MacPherson, ed., Second Treatise of Government,
Indianoplis, 1980, p. xiii.
3. Richard Ashcraft, Locke's Two Treatises of Government,
London, 1987, p. 123.
4. See for example, Sir Walter Raleigh, Works, Oxford, 1829;
Samuel Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumous or Purchas Pilgrims,
Contayning a History of the World in Sea Voyages and Lande
Travells by Englishmen and Others, Glasgow, 1905-1907.
5. John Locke, Journal, April 6-10, 1677, Bodleian Library, MS
f.2.
6. Locke, Two Treatises, I, para. 34 cited In Richard Ashcraft,
'Locke's State of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral Fiction.'
American Political Science Review, LXII, 3, 1968.
7. See The Library of John Locke by John Harrison and Peter
Laslett, Oxford, 1965.
- 74 -
8. The Library of John Locke, John Harrison and Peter Laslett,
eds., Oxford, 1965; Father Joseph D'Acosta, The Natural and
Moral History of the Indies, (1604), Hakluyt Society, London,
1880, II, p. 295.
9. Father Cristoval D'Acuna, Madrid, 1641, A New Discovery of
the Great River of the Amazons, printed in Expeditions into the
Valley of the Amazons, Hakluyt Society, London, 1859, P. 133.
10. 'An Account of Monsieur De La Salle's East Expedition and
Discoveries in North America Presented to the French King and
Published by Chevalier Tonti', reprinted in Collections of the
York Historical Society, New York, 1911, II, p. 220.
11. Sir Walter Raleigh, 'A Discourse on War in General', The
Works of Sir Walter Raleigh, Oxford, 1829, VIII, pp. 279-281.
Locke had in his library Raleigh's History of the World.
12. Ibid., p. 280.
13. Bernard Sheehan, Savagism and Civility: Indians and
Englishmen in Colonial Virginia, Cambridge, 1980, p. 2.
14. Ibid., p. 3.
-75-
15. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, (1651), London, 1985; Jean
Jacques Rousseau, A Discouse on Inequality, (1754), London,
1984.
16. Acuna, A New Discovery, p. 62.
17. Father Gabriel Sagard Theodat, The Long Journey to the
Country of the Hurons, The Chaplain Society, Toronto, 1939, pp.
210, 222., Acuna, p. 214; Sheehan, Savagism and Civility, p.
34.
18. Locke, Two Treatises, II, para. 41.
19. John Locke, 'A Note Entitled Homo Ante et Post Lapsum,'
1693, Bodlelan Library, MS c.28, folio 113, cited in Ashcraft,
'Locke's State of Nature', p. 910.
20. Ibid., p. 910.
21. Samuel Champlain, 'Voyage of Samuel Champlain', Hakluytus
Posthumus or Purchas His Pilgrims, XVIII, p. 199.
22. Ibid., XVIII, p. 198.
23. Sir Walter Raleigh, History of the World in Works, Oxford,
1829, IV, pp. 693-694.
- 76 -
24. Sheehan, Savagism and Civility, p. 38.
25. Samuel Purchas, 'Virginia's Verger', Purchas Pilgrims, XIX,
p. 224.
26. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Peter
Nidditch, ed., Oxford, 1975, Book I, chapter II, para. 27.
27. For a Locke's comparisons between children and the state of
nature, see the Two Treatises, II, chapter 8.
28. Ibid., II, para. 101.
29. Locke, Essays on the Law of Nature, Oxford, 1954, p. 175.
30. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book I,
chapter II, para. 15.
31. Acuna, A New Discovery, p. 86.
32. Acosta, The Indies, p. 310.
33. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book I,
chapter III, para. 10.
34. Samuel Purchas, 'Virginia's Verger', Purchas Pilgrims, XIX,
pp. 237-238.
- 77 -
35. James Axtell, The Invasion Within: The Conquest of Cultures
in Colonial North America, Oxford, 1985, p. 153.
36. Two Treatises, II, para. 127.
37. Locke, Journal, April 6-10, 1677, Bodleian Library, MS,
folio 2.
38. William Batz, 'The Historical Anthropology of John Locke',
Journal of the History of Ideas, XXXV, 4, 1974, p. 670.
39. Locke, Two Treatises, II, para. 102.
40. Ibid., II, para. 105.
41. Acosta, The Indies, pp. 426-427.
42. Ibid., p. 410.
43. Locke, Two Treatises, II, para. 107.
44. Ibid., II, para. 90.
45. Acosta, The Indies, p. 426.
46. Batz, 'Historical Anthropology', p. 670.
-78-
47. Locke, Two Treatises, II, para. 102.
48. Ibid., II, para. 105.
49. Father Gabriel Sagard Theodat, The Long Journey to the
Country of the Hurons, p. 148.
50. Locke, Two Treatises, II, para. 106.
51. Ibid., II, para. 106.
52. Sagard, The Long Journey, p. 148.
53. Locke, Two Treatises, II, para. 110.
54. Ibid., para. 110.
55. Ibid., para. 116.
56. Ibid., para. 116.
57. Acuna, The Amazon, pp. 79-80.
58. Ibid., p. 156.
59. Locke, Two Treatises, para. 21.
-79-
60. Locke, cited in Richard Cox, Locke on War and Peace,
Oxford, 1960, P. 92.
61. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book IV,
chapter XII, para. 11.
62. Locke, Two Treatises, II, para. 41.
3. Karen Kupperman, Settling with the Indians: The Meeting of
English and Indian Cultures in America, 1580-1640, London,
1980, p. 81.
64. Sheehan, Savagism and Civility, pp. 5-6.
65. William Bradford and Edward Winslow, A Relation or Journal
of the English Plantation settled in Plimoth in New England,
London 1622, p. 60, cited in Kupperman, Settling with the
Indians, pp. 83-84.
66. William Wood, New Englands Prospectus London, 1634, p. 70,
cited in Ibid., p. 84.
67. Robert Gray, A Good Speed to Virginia (1609) New York,
1937, C2", C3"C4.
68. Sagard, The Long Journey, p. 103.
-80-
69. Acuna, The Amazon, pp. 155-156.
70. M. De La Salle, An Account, p. 235.
71. Locke, Two Treatises, para. 49.
72. Acosta, The History of the Indies, p. 189.
-81-
Chapter 2: Colonialism and Natural Law
John Locke's state of nature and more particularly, his natural
man, while derived empirically from the accounts of travellers
to the Americas were created within a certain disc3urse
peculiar to the late 17th century. Locke writes in the
tradition of the natural law. Those commentators who have
recognized this legacy in the Two Treatises, have nonetheless
overlooked the extent to which 17th century natural law
theorists were influenced by the colonial interests of their
particular countries of origin. Natural law, which can be
traced back to the time of Cicero and beyond, is transformed
during the 1600's by the need to answer new questions posed,
both on sea and land by the expanding colonial empires of
Europe. Thus it is necessary to consider the natural law
theorists who influenced Locke and the extent to which colonial
concerns influenced both the questions that were posed and the
answers they gave.
The two most important and influential thinkers to Locke's
conception of natural law are Hugo Grotius and Samuel
Pufendorf. Each shall be considered in turn in the context of
the extraordinary changes occurring in Europe during this
period, most particularly the impact of Dutch, Spanish and
English colonial activities on the notions of natural law.
At the turn of the 17th century, European powers were exploring
the far reaches of the globe. Each country differed in its
approach to the world outside of Europe. Dutch and English
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interests were represented mainly by private companies or
groups of aristocrats to whom a proprietary patent would be
issued, as manifest by the activities of the East Indies
company or the early settlement of America. Others, such as
the Spanish or Portuguese, colonized America through the
auspices of church or state; yet others, such as Sweden, had
very little colonial expansion outside of Europe. Having
established a trading relationship or initial settlement in the
Americas or East Indies, European monarchs or private companies
would often defend jealously their new found wealth. Conflicts
inevitably ensued.
I - COLONIALISM AND NATURAL LAW: HUGO GROTIUS
One particular example of relevance to our discussion was the
conflict which arose between the Spanish, Portuguese and the
Dutch East Indies company over trade in the Eastern Indies.
The Spanish had a monopoly over trade in the area and the Dutch
began exploratory journeys in order to secure their own trade.
The Spanish and Portuguese reacted to the extent that one
Portuguese ship was sunk and the booty was taken from it by the
Dutch East Indies Company. Questions were raised about the
right of trade generally and more specifically the taking of
another ship's cargo. The East Indies company needed a
defence. Hugo Grotius provided it in his treatise De Jure
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Pradae (Law of Prize). 1 One commentator, Edward Dumbauld,
explains the project and Grotius's role in it:
The question to be investigated is whether
it is proper for the captors to receive as
'prize' the proceeds of property captured
from the enemy...Certain shareholders...had
questioned the propriety of the
practise...Grotius was drawn into the
dispute in 1604 when as a young lawyer of
21 he was retained by the directors of the
Amsterdam Chamber of the East Indies
Company	 to	 justify	 the	 practise	 of
capturing enemy goods.2
It was not, however, just the question of appropriating an
enemy's goods but the whole issue of the right to trade which
was at stake for Grotius. Albert Hyma comments on this second
purpose:
Thc greatest work of his youth, De Jure
Pradae, was the direct result of his
efforts to serve the East Indies Company.
A part of its twelfth chapter became the
famous booklet, Mare Liberum [Freedom of
the Seas], the sole purpose of which was to
prove to the world that the Dutch had as
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much right to trade in the East Indies as
did the Spanish and Portuguese.3
Mare Liberum was to be the only chapter to be published during
Grotius' life, but the whole treatise provides the theoretical
foundation upon which his later work would be based. Thus we
shall consider De Jure Pradae in some depth and the
relationship it reveals between the evolution of natural law
and colonial practice.
Grotius himself reveals the purpose behind De Jure Pradae and
the importance of colonial interests in writing it:
Some years ago when I saw that the commerce
within India which is called East was of
great importance for the security of the
fatherland...I gave my attention to
arousing the spirit of our countrymen to
safeguarding bravely what had been so
felicitously begun, since there had been
put before my eyes the justice and equity
of the case itself, the source from which
in my opinion originated the confidence in
law which has been handed down to us by the
ancients. Therefore all the rights of war
and prize and the history of those deeds of
savagery and cruelty which the Portuguese
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had perpetrated against our countrymen...I
had detailed in a sufficiently complete
Commentary which up to the present I have
refrained from publishing.4
The chapter he did eventually publish, was done so because of
Grotius's hope that he might,
...add courage to our countrymen not to
withdraw a title from their manifest right
and might find out whether it were possible
to induce the Spaniards to treat the case a
little more leniently.5
Grotius's arguments on natural right, particularly with regard
to property, are thus firmly grounded in colonial goals. It is
in this context that we shall review his subsequent thought.
In De Jure Pradae, Grotius draws a distinction between movable
and immovable objects in order to create the basis for his
claims about the freedom of the sea. Both Pufendorf and Locke,
as shall be discussed, make similar distinctions.
Appropriation, in the case of movable objects, is accomplished
through 'attachment'. Immovable objects, on the other hand,
cannot be acquired in the same way. Grotius argues that in
this case some form of enclosure is necessary to claim property
in land.
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With respect to movables, occupancy implies
physical	 seizure;	 with	 respect	 to
immovables, it implies some activity
involving construction or the definition of
boundaries 6
It is important to note that Grotius is arguing that enclosure
is necessary to private ownership in order to draw his
conclusions about freedom of the sea. He argues that the sea
cannot be enclosed or built on and therefore is open to all.
No country has the right to stop others from sailing or trading
thereon. Thus, enclosure, which Locke will ultimately use in
his Second Treatise in relation to private appropriation of
land, was originally incorporated into natural law and the
origin of property in order to guarantee the common ownership
of the sea. Each man's distinct colonial purposes allow him
to draw his own conclusions from the same basic premises.7
Grotius also uses the famous ancient argument about theatre
seats which states that while all seating is common to begin
with and therefore open to all; a seat once taken and then left
vacant by the occupier cannot be taken over by another.8
These arguments are neatly tailored to fit the needs of the
European, specifically Dutch, colonizer. Grotius not only
provides the freedom to reach the new world through his
doctrine of Mare Liberum, and the justification for colonial
acquisition in his theory of property, but now defends their
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rights to claim dominion even if no longer occupying the piece
of land. Richard Tuck comments:
Grotius had provided a useful ideology for
competition over natural resources in the
non-European world, [that is the] right to
take what they wanted and protect against
threats .
The struggle over the right to trade in the East Indies became
even more intense with the entry of England into the conflict.
The Dutch now wanted to protect their interests and used
similar tactics to that of the Spanish and Portuguese against
their English counterparts. In 1611, the English presented a
petition to the States General, claiming a national right under
the doctrine of freedom of the sea to trade in the area.
Grotius was chosen to represent Dutch interests as the head of
a mission sent to England to resolve the issue. Ironically,
Grotius argued on behalf of his employers, the Dutch East
Indies Company, against an unqualified free trade on the seas.
Albert Hyrna points out the contradiction:
Grotius,	 in	 1613,	 'contradicts'	 the
arguments of the Mare Liberum, which he
composed in 1604. As the official
spokesman for the Dutch East Indies Company
in London, his aim is to show triat the
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English cannot expect to find a 'free sea'
in the vicinity of the coveted Spice
Islands. 10
Grotius himself states,
Considering the great charge we were at in
maintaining our trade there [East Indies],
we tell the king that it is very hard that
his subjects should trade in those parts,
seeking a harvest at our expense, they
escaping the cost."
Grotius recognized that natural law dictated the freedom
outlined in his own Mare Liberum, but now the exigencies of
Dutch colonial expansion forced him to argue that conventional
law must be considered where the application of natural law is
ambiguous. Thus in his response to the English he writes,
It must be recognized that many of the laws
of nature...are indefinite...the monopolies
which the Dutch had agreed with...the
peoples of the East, thus, being founded on
contract must be observed by others.12
Before these talks ended, Grotius had tried to persuade James I
to join forces with the Dutch against the Spanish. His
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endeavours ultimately failed and the two countries found
themselves at war.
The wars between such colonial powers finally provoked Grotius
to write his greatest piece of work, De Jure Belli and Pacis,
which gives the most thorough view of Grotius's idea of the
state of nature and natural law. 13 Grotius begins this
treatise by outlining the nature of war in his first book,
turning to consider the specific reasons for conflict in the
second. According to Grotius, the first legitimate cause of
war is the protection of 'self and property'. It is necessary
then for Grotius to define property and most particularly, 'the
origin and development of the right of private ownership.'14
It is in this context, namely in defining private property,
that he introduces his state of nature and explains how it
evolves from one form to another over the course of history,
giving rise to private appropriation.
Grotius' natural state was originally one of 'primitive
simplicity', identified from the outset as that of Indians.
This primitive state...exemplified in the
community of property arising from extreme
simplicity, may be seen among certain
tribes in America which have lived for many
generations in such a condition.15
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The state of nature has suddenly been profoundly transformed.
Beginning with Grotius, and followed shortly by Thomas Hobbes
and later John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau, the natural
state, as it has developed in political and Christian thought
from Cicero through Aquinas, is with the 17th century thinkers
wholly grafted without consideration for its implications on to
the European notion of America and its natives. Christianity
and legal theory are fused and become, through natural law, the
singular viewpoint for understanding the new world and its
inhabitants.
Like the Christian Edenic myth, Grotius' natural state is
quickly corrupted. Thus, he states:
But men did not however continue to live
this simple and innocent life, but turned
their thoughts to various kinds of
knowledge, the symbol for which was the
tree of knowledge.'6
Natural law has also changed. For the first time, Grotius
incorporates the idea of natural rights into his theory of
natural law. Rights are defined as 'a moral quality of a
person, making it possible to have or do something lawfully.'17
Grotius, it should be noted, is concerned primarily with the
rights of nations or companies, rather than individuals.
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Secondly, 'ius gentium' is redefined. Previously defined as
the law of nations, that is those aspects of law common to all
nations, Grotius's 'ius gentium' becomes the law between
nations and Grotius, himself, becomes the founder of
international law. Implicit in his analysis, as shall become
explicit in Locke's, is that man under natural law in the state
of nature is equivalent to European nations under the very same
law, with the same natural rights. The state of nature becomes
a metaphor for explaining the relationship between states which
have no overarching authority beyond that of God and natural
law. War is an assumed condition under these circumstances of
colonial competition, and is also taken to be natural between
the individuals in such a state.
Having outlined man's natural state, Grotius than turns to
consider the origin of private property. He begins like Locke
and Pufendorf with God's initial grant to all people of the
world in common. Common ownership was for Grotius, positive,
meaning that everybody owned everything, rather than the
negative form of common ownership which posits that nobody owns
anything. For Grotius, natural law did not need to explain how
the notion of private ownership began, it only needed to decide
who would get what portion of what they already owned as a
community and on what basis. Grotius concluded that if any
individual used something in this natural state he thereby
owned it. Use arising from need was synonymous with
appropriation.
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God conferred upon the human race a general
right over things...each man could at once
take whatever he wished for his own
needs...The enjoyment of this universal
right then served the purpose of private
ownership; for whatever each had thus taken
for his own needs another could not take
from him except by an unjust act.'8
In terms of immovable objects, use was also the origin of
property. While the appropriation of land was based, according
to Grotius, on a 'certain compact or agreement', it
nevertheless assumed a division of property into private hands.
In other words the compact was, in essence, an official
recognition by the community of that property which individuals
had already appropriated to themselves as individuals by their
use. Grotius writes,
As soon as community ownership was
abandoned and as yet no division had been
made, it is to be supposed that all agreed
that whatever each one had taken possession
of should be his property.'19
The agreement could allow only for 'private property', based on
what each individual had 'taken possession of', not communally
held property. Pufendorf, as will be discussed later, takes a
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very different view. Grotius makes an exception to this right
of appropriation in the case of the sea because, being
limitless, it cannot be occupied. This echoes the argument he
made in Mare Liberurn on behalf of the East Indies company to
protect their right to trade on the open seas. Grotius goes on
to argue, as Locke is later to do, that lands which still lie
'unoccupied' are open to appropriation in accordance with
natural law. Grotius, like Locke, believes that unoccupied
land is that which is 'hitherto uncultivated'.20
Land which is used for any other purpose is thus considered to
be open for appropriation or, as Grotius comments:
If within a territory of a people there is
any deserted and unproductive soil...it is
the right for foreigners even to take
possession of such ground for the reason
that uncultivated land ought not to be
considered occupied.2'
Grotius is not referring to property within Europe which he
would not consider to be waste or barren. Rather he is arguing
that lands held as colonial acquisitions by European countries
and not yet settled are still open for cultivation and by
extension, appropriation. This embryonic form of the labour
theory of property becomes central to Locke's theory of both
natural law and rights and will be used to justify England's
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right of property not only against other European countries, as
Grotius claims, but against the American Indians' claims of
occupancy by virtue of hunting or gathering.
Grotius is careful however in his analysis of vacant land to
allow some space for a European king who has claimed ownership
of a tract of land but has not yet cultivated it. Occupation
of this type, that is by the whole community, where land
remains uncultivated, is only legitimate for Grotius when the
property is soon to be divided into private parcels. In this
way, Grotius allows, by definition, that when there is an
agreement on the division of property, only private forms of
appropriation are legitimate. Thus, he opens the paragraph by
referring to 'things which can be made subject to private
ownership, but have not yet become private property.' This
justifies the English and Dutch practise of claiming large
tracts of land, which are later divided into smaller private
parcels from the encroachment of other European powers.22
Grotius turns from his conclusions about property to the issue
which lies at the heart of his thesis, namely war. He begins
by stating that a war may only be justly fought under certain
given conditions: defence, recovery of property or punishment.
The reasons for waging war will necessarily be reflected in
that which may legitimately be acquired from it.
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According to the law of nature, by a lawful
war we acquire things which are either
equal to that which, although it was owed
to us, we could not otherwise obtain, or we
inflict upon the guilty a loss that does
not exceed an equitable measure of
punishment. 23
It is the concept of punishment which is of particular
importance and the only justification for war upon which he and
Pufendorf depart company. Punishment is initially defined as
'an evil of suffering which is inflicted because of an evil of
action' 24 and is based on 'the most ancient law', 'he who does
evil shall suffer evil'. 25 Grotius also makes clear who the
punishers will be and on what basis they may act, arguing that
'according to the law of nature those free from like offences
may exact punishment' even when the offences are committed
against others.26
This position has profound implications when he applies it to
the state's right to wage war.
Kings...have the right of demanding
punishment not only on account of injuries
committed against themselves or their
subjects, but also on account of injuries
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which did not directly affect them but
excessively violate the law of nature.27
Under the auspices of 'punishment', Grotius provides specific
justification for war against native inhabitants of the
Americas or East Indies by those who understand and are better
followers of the natural law. Thus Grotius argues that war may
be waged against 'men who are like beasts', most specifically
'those who feed on human flesh'. Such an argument, as
Pufendorf acknowledges and therefore challenges Grotius on,
would be used to justify attacks on all American Indians.28
Moreover, should such a native population be conquered, they
would have no just cause for retaliatory war, based solely on
the wish to remove colonial rule. Grotius states: 'An unjust
cause for war is the desire for freedom among a subject
people. '29
As one Grotian scholar has pointed out, this clause was needed,
because it was based on the 'nascent empire' already
established by European powers. Commenting on this doctrine,
Professor B. Roling statEs:
This opinion may be associated with the
fact that many peoples already had been
subservient to European states.3°
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E.H. Carr in his book, The Twenty Years Crisis, claims that
Grotius' just war theory was an outgrowth of his views on
imperialism. 'tiodern international law was created by Grotius
and his successors to meet the needs of the new nation-
states.' 3' To which Roling adds, 'Those needs were above all
the legitimacy of expansion in a time when the European states
set out to subject almost the rest of the world.'32
Having outlined the just war, Grotius then turns to consider
'the first and most essential division of war [that of] public
war, private war and mixed war.' 33 These two arguments, the
case for the justice of war and the one for waging it by
private companies rather than by governments, are, as one
scholar notes, the two key theses of his treatise and clearly
rooted in colonial aspirations of the Dutch in Grotius' day.
To justify the Company and pacify the
Anabaptists it as necessary to prove that
war was not opposed to the Christian
religion, and that it was permitted to
Christians to make what was called a 'just
war'.e.it was [also] necessary to prove
that a private company could make private
war in its own defence before it had been
converted into a public war. This was the
double task of Grotius.34
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The importance of such Dutch colonial aspirations to the
formulation of Grotius' natural law becomes all the more
apparent when compared with an equally accomplished legal
theorist whose political context is one of a European country
whose colonial aspirations were far more limited.
II - COLONIALISM AND NATURAL LAW: SAMUEL PUFENDORF
Samuel Pufendorf was a student of Grotius and developed his
theory in Sweden. Neither Sweden, nor his native Germany
resembled Spain, England or Holland in colonial method.
Pufendorf does not begin with war as a given and then consider
the conditions under which it may be just, neither does he
begin with the origins of property and then consider man's
natural state. These are the premises of and the questions put
to political theorists living within an aggressive colonial
power. Pufendorf, unlike Grotius or Locke, is not attempting
to reconcile natural law with his patron's colonial needs.
Pufendorf, it must be noted, was highly regarded by John Locke.
The latter wrote, in his Thoughts Concerning Readings and
Study, that Pufendorf's De Jure Naturae was the 'best book of
that kind'. 35 He also recommended to Lord Mordaunt that he
read Tully, Pufendorf, Aristotle and above all the New
Testament. Laslett concludes from this evidence that, 'of the
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writers he consulted when engaged on his book, Samuel Pufendorf
was perhaps of the greatest use to him.' 36
 It is important
then to understand what Locke took from Pufendorf and what he
left behind and why.
Unlike Grotius, Pufendorf begins his examination of the natural
state not in the context of property but of moral science.
Like Grotius, he considers man to be in a state of natural
liberty but one which must be 'conditioned by a certain
restraint of sound reason and natural law.' 37
 Pufendorf
derives the 'natural state' by stripping civil man of his
civilities. He begins his discussion of natural man, thus:
By the natural state of man we [understand]
that condition for which man is understood
to be constituted, by the mere fact of his
birth, all inventions and institutions
either of man or suggested to him from
above, being disregarded.38
It is interesting to note the natural state for Pufendorf is
something which existed only in a primitive time. He does not
refer, unlike Locke, Hobbes and Grotius, to America or other
parts of the colonial world as examples of contemporary natural
states. 39
 On the contrary, Pufendorf makes clear that he
believes the inhabitants of the Americas are not atomised
individuals within one great natural state, as Locke and
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Grotius seem to believe, but members of nations who must be
treated with the same respect as those of European states.
In particular, Pufendorf attacks Francisco Vitoria's
justification for the Spanish treatment of American Indians by
challenging each of the rights claimed by the author for
Europeans arriving in the new world, concluding 'Franciscus a
Victoria...does not win many to his position when he discusses
the adequate grounds on which the Spaniards felt themselves
entitled to subdue the Indians'.
First is the European's right of travel through Indian lands.
Pufendorf responds:
It is crude indeed to try to give others so
indefinite a right to journey and live
among us, with no thought of the numbers in
which they come, their purpose in coming,
as well as tne question whether...they
propose to stay but a short time or settle
among us permanently.4°
Second is the right of Europeans to trade on these lands with
whomever they please for whatever they wish. Pufendorf states,
in response that he is,
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not as yet able to discover such a freedom
of trade as rulers cannot limit for their
subjects if the well-being of the state
demands it, much less a one as thrusts
foreigners upon us without our permission
and against our will.41
Finally, Vitoria claims that the Spanish have a right to share
in the wealth of America because others already have. Grotius
concurs with Vitoria's views stating, 'if foreigners are
anywhere permitted to hunt, fish, snare birds or gather
pearls...such rights cannot be denied to others.' 42 Pufendorf
argues that one must first consider the Spanish motives for
trade suggesting that they may not act with justice or
moderation. He argues this last point by employing a metaphor:
Suppose I had given some one of my
neighbours the privilege of entering my
garden as often as he wishes, and of
sampling my fruit; when later another man
burst in and decides to break down the
trees, to expel me and make an uninvited
stay in my garden, I will surely have the
right to close my gate to him.43
In this discussion, Pufendorf repeatedly refers to the nations
of America which, he argues, must be treated with the same
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respect as those of Europe. He concludes that Europeans
enjoying the freedom of the seas may only legitimately arrive
on foreign shores such as these because they were 'driven by
storm' or are innocent guests.
Pufendorf challenges Hobbes's position that the state of nature
is concurrently a state of war. Quoting 'thc infallible
authority of the sacred scriptures', Pufendorf concludes, 'the
natural state of men was one of peace rather than war and that
men were more like friends to one another than enemies'.44
This natural peace is based on natural law but is 'a weak and
untrustworthy thing and therefore...it is, without other
safeguards but a poor custodian of man's safety.'45
After concluding in this chapter on the natural state of man
that he cannot live without law, Pufendorf turns to consider
the content of natural law, which he considers 'universal' and
'perpetual'. His fundamental law of nature is,
Every man, so far as in him lies, should
cultivate and preserve toward others a
sociable attitude, which is peaceful and
agreeable at all times to the nature and
end of the human race.46
Pufendorf then proceeds to discuss the specific duties and
rights man is under both with regard to himself and others.
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Unlike Grotius he does not use rights simply as a means to
discuss the nature of nations at war, but rather individuals at
peace.	 Finally in Book IV, having covered the more
fundamental issues of man's natural state and the law he was
under, Pufendorf turns to discuss the issue of property.
Like Grotius and Locke, Pufendorf believes that God gave the
world to mankind in common but unlike his contemporaries, he
does not perceive this to be a positive form of ownership.
Pufendorf, himself, makes the distinction clear:
Tne	 term community	 is	 taken	 either
negatively or positively. In the former
case, things are said to be common...in the
same sense such things are said to be
nobody's [and] lie open to any and every
person. But common things by the second
and positive meaning, differ from things
owned, only in the respect that the latter
belong to one person while the former
belong to several in the same manner.47
Pufendorf makes clear that his notion of 'common' is a negative
one; that is the world is not commonly owned by everyone as
Grotius and Locke contend, but rather the world, while owned by
nobody, is open for use by everyone. Ownership is thus
detached from appropriation, the latter being simply the means
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by which individuals sustain themselves in the natural negative
community of things, the former being the result of an
agreement within any given community.
The grant of God by which He allowed men
the use of the products of the earth, is
not the immediate cause of dominion...
dominion presupposes absolutely an act of
man and an agreement whether tacit or
express 48
It follows from Pufendorf's argument that simple use being
natural to man and ownership conventional, any form of
property, not just private is legitimate, as long as it is
agreed to. Pufendorf argues this explicitly:
It is true that God allowed man to turn the
earth, its products and its creatures, to
his own use and convenierice...yet the
manner, intensity and extent of this power
'ere left to the judgement and disposition
of men; whether in other words they would
confine it within certain limits or within
none at all, and whether they wanted every
man to have a right to everything, or only
to a certain and fixed part of things, or
to be assigned his definite portion with
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which he should rest content and claim no
right to anything else.49
Thus, while consent was crucial to both Grotius's and
Pufendorf's conceptions of property and was to be attacked
directly by Locke, it nevertheless played profoundly different
roles in each theorist's thought. For Grotius, the original
community of things was positive in that each individual had
the right to claim, through simple use, private ownership of a
thing. An agreement by consent therefore, simply recognized
those private possessions which individuals had already claimed
as their own. Pufendorf, on the other hand, begins with a
negative form of community where use implied no right of
ownership and the agreement could give rise to any form of
private or communal division of property.
Like Grotius, Pufendorf discusses the right of 'occupancy as a
whole', but unlike Grotius he does not assume that such an
occupancy, to be considered legitimate, must be divided
ultimately into private parcels. 5° On the contrary, Pufendorf
challenges Grotius directly on this point:
Regarding 'occupancy as a whole'...it is
not necessary that all things which are
occupied in this universal manner should be
divided among individuals and pass into
private hands.51
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Unlike Grotius or Locke, Pufendorf claims, that 'vacant' or
unoccupied land must not automatically be assumed open for
appropriation even when there is no plans on the part of the
people who claim it to divide it into parcels, for it is
perfectly legitimate that an agreement amongst a group of
people render the ownership of their property to be communal.
And so we have not sinned against the law
of nature in entirely doing away with
primitive community, nor have backward
peoples in retaining to this day many of
its features.52
Thus, Pufendorf concludes:
Therefore if anything be discovered in such
an area that is still without a private
owner, it should not at once be regarded as
unoccupied, and free to be taken by any man
as his own, but it will be understood to
belong to the while people.53
Towards the end of his treatise, Pufendorf considers the
justifications for war. He provides three: 'to preserve and
protect ourselves and our possessions against others who
attempt to injure us', 'to assert our claim' or right being
denied, and 'to obtain reparations for losses which we have
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suffered by injuries.' 54
 Unlike Grotius, punishment is not a
just reason for war.
The evils inflicted by right of war have
properly no relation to punishment, since
they neither proceed from a superior as
such, nor have as their direct object, the
reform of the guilty party or others but
the defence and assertion of my safety, my
property and my rights.55
Locke and Grotius both feel that the law of nature allows the
right of punishment against those who breach it. According to
Richard Tuck, the removal of the state's right to punish
undermines the Europeans' claims to have the right to attack
native tribes in the new colonies such as the Americas.56
This becomes explicit when Pufendort directly contradicts
Grotius's claim that war can be waged against 'those who feed
on human flesh', revealing an understanding that such arguments
were often used to justify attacks on Arnericin natives as a
whole.
Thus we cannot agree...that sufficient
cause for waging war upon the Americans can
be found in the fact that they can be held
condemned by the very law of nature,
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because it is their custom to sacrifice men
and eat human flesh.	 On this matter we
should carefully consider whether a
Christian prince can attack the Indians, as
men condemned by nature, merely because
they eat the flesh of their own religion,
or because they eat that of strangers. And
in connexion with their treatment of
strangers we must again inquire, whether
those foreigners come to their shores as
enemies and robbers, or come as innocent
guests or driven by storms - for only in
the last case does a right of war lie with
those whose citizens are treated with such
cruelty, not in the others.57
Pufendorf rightly questions whether the breach in the law of
nature is only of importance when Europeans are concerned. He
also raises the question, as he did in his critique of
Vitoria's claims for European rights in America, what trie
motives are of the foreigners who land on these peoples'
shores, realizing that the colonizers of the new world have
often had little respect for the natural rights of the
inhabitants already there. Finally, he concludes that the
native Americans are justified in attacking those individuals
who land on their shores who neither arrive as innocent guests
nor are driven there by storm.
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III - COLONIALISM AND NATURAL LAW: JOHN LOCKE
Thus if we compare Crotius to Pufendorf over each of these
aspects of the natural state and the law under which all men
are bound, there are profound differences, explicable in part,
especially with regard to Grotius, by their own countries'
colonial interests. They also shed some light on the arguments
made by Locke in his Second Treatise and the implications such
colonial questions have for his political ideas.
	 Let us
examine the relationship between Crotius and Locke on their
conceptions of natural law, comparing them, where appropriate,
to Pufendorf's.
Man in his natural state is different in the theories of
Grotius and Pufendorf and their conceptions of natural law
reflect these differences. Grotius begins with war, a natural
outgrowth of 17th century colonial competition, to determine
the conditions under which it is legitimate. Defence of self
and property being paramount, Grotius then turns to consider
the origins of property - how does one gain dominion over the
land and its produce. His conclusions regarding the right to
wage just war, to punish others, to acquire property and to
navigate freely on the seas provide the answers raised by Dutch
colonial practise and European colonial warfare.
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Similarly, Locke addresses property at the beginning of his
treatise on government. Like Grotius and unlike Pufendorf, the
introduction of property at such an early point in the Second
Treatise, does not seem to follow the logical, philosophical
line of argument. As Peter Laslett comments: 'Locke abruptly
injects into the discussion the concept of property.'58
Property came first for Locke because its origin was of
paramount importance to his purposes. Not only did he want to
defend the philosophical notion of natural rights based on the
broad definition of property, but he concurrently wished to
address some political issues of his day. The domestic
political reasons, namely the arguments against Sir Robert
Filmer, the divine right of kings, and in favour of exclusion
and the Glorious Revolution have been discussed at length in
the scholarship on Locke. What have been overlooked are the
colonial reasons. Locke's theory of property addresses the
question of how property may be claimed in land which lies in
common; the very question which settlers to the new world
needed to answer.
The starting point for Locke and Grotius is the sarre. Property
is assumed to be given by God as a positive communal right of
ownership. Nothing could reflect more clearly the aggressive
colonialism of the Dutch and English than the assumption that
we actually possess everything on earth and it is up to each
individual person or nation to grab its claim before anyone
else does.
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Pufendorf, on the other hand believes that nobody owns anything
but everyone is free to use, rather than possess, the world.
The only question left to be decided in Grotius' and Locke's
scheme is how it shall be divided. For Grotius, the answer was
simply appropriation by use of the individual. In other words,
to use something in the natural state is equivalent to owning
it. The only legitimate form of ownership is consequently
private and therefore essentially European. Locke adopts a
similar position, as Karl Olivecrona comments:
Locke made use of the same idea of
appropriation as Grotius employed, but on a
far larger scale.59
Locke, however is different from Grotius in one crucial
respect. Rather than the general notion of 'use', it is labour
which defines how much of the world each man can appropriate.
For Locke, unlike Grotius, appropriation by labour necessarily
precedes use. Thus Locke states in the Second Treatise that
there must be 'a means to appropriate [things] before [my
emphasis] they can be of any use'. The means is labour by
individuals; in the case of animals by killing them, in the
case of fruit by picking them, and in the case of land by
cultivating it; none of these activities depend on the consent
of others. Pufendorf on the other hand, argues that nobody
owns anything until an agreement is reached between the
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community members concerned. Consequently, private or communal
ownership is allowable depending on the wishes of the people.
The settling of 'vacant' land by European powers was also
central to colonial practise. Locke picks up one thread of
Grotius' argument on property, that it is the cultivation of
'vacant' lands which provides a right of appropriation and
expands it into his central thesis. Once again, Locke's
emphasis reflects that of a theorist answering the questions
posed by England's colonial interests in America.
Grotius also provides that European powers may hold land which
is yet to be divided into private parcels, as a whole without
interference by other European powers. The assumption that
land was to be appropriated by individuals once again rules out
the possibility of communal ownership and consequently claims
by native peoples that they can occupy a piece of land as a
whole. Pufendorf, on the other hand, argues that occupation as
a whole is legitimate whether or not it is to be divided into
private parcels. Locke follows Grotius in assuming that all
property, by definition, will be rendered private and draws an
explicit distinction in the Second Treatise between common
property in civil society (England) and the natural state
(America) to drive home his point.
Enclosure, as the means by which individuals may appropriate
immovable objects, is employed by both Locke and Grotius for
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Idifferent ends. While both contend it is one important
criterion upon which individuals can claim territory in
unoccupied land, Grotius uses enclosure as tne premise by which
he can argue that the sea is free and open, since it cannot be
entlosed, to passage by any colonial power. Locke, on the
other hand, concerned with the English settler's right to
appropriate land in America, uses enclosure as the means by
which the land used by Indians can be considered not yet
appropriated. Enclosure for Locke is thus limited to a
discussion of land in order to demonstrate the English right of
private appropriation therein; for Grotius the same principle
is applied to the sea, in order to prove a communal right of
ownership and the Dutch right of access thereon.
IV - CONCLUSION
Thus Locke writes in the tradition of the natural law theorists
and reflects in many respects, the views of the Dutch theorist,
Grotius in terms of the nature of God's original grant, the
definition of occupancy and the use of enclosure as the basis
of private appropriation of land. Locke's admiration for
Pufendorf's natural law, needed to be tempered by the
exigencies of his own country's colonial interests.
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Locke, however, created an original and profound natural law,
which differed in essence from that of both Grotius and
Pufendorf, on one central ground, namely the foundation of
property. While Grotius and Locke agreed that God had granted
to man a positive right of communal ownership, leaving open not
how we could own the earth, for that was given, but only the
question of how much each man would get and on what basis it
would be acquired, Locke's fundamental premise that one must
labour in order to even use the land or any product of it was a
step futher than Grotius' argument, which stretched back to the
time of Cicero, that it was simply use or occupancy which
determined property. Locke became aware that Indians in the
new world could claim property by way of such ambiguous terms
as 'use' or occupancy; consequently he developed a theory of
agrarian labour which would specifically exclude certain
groups, such as the American Indian from claiming such land.
In coupling this theory of labour with a natural rights
doctrine of individual liberty, Locke was able to defend
England's colonial interests in the new world, couched in the
traditional terms of natural law.
In order to understand how Locke adapted natural law for these
purposes, it is necessary to first examine the general
background of English colonialism in America and the evolving
concepts of property and natural rights within that tradition.
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Chapter 3: English Colonialism
John Locke not only lived in a country on trie threshold of
establishing a global colonial empire, but, like Hugo Grotius,
he was, himself, immersed in both the political and
intellectual questions raised by such colonization. In order
to understand the impact this involvement had on his political
thought, we must consider both the development of British
colonialism in America as a whole, with particular reference to
Carolina, and the colonial writings of Locke's day to draw the
connections between his thought and the historical events and
ideas which surrounded him.
I - ENGLISH COLONIALISM: TRADE vs SETTLEMENT
English exploration of America began in the 16th century giving
rise to the first attempts at colonization in the 'new world'.
Sir Walter Raleigh was granted the first charter in 1583 which,
after repeated attempts, failed to establish any lasting
settlement of Englishmen in America. This initial failure,
however, was followed by the more successful endeavours of the
Virginia Charter of 1606, the founding of Bermuda and Barbados,
the Pilgrims settling of Plymouth and Massachuetts, followed by
the remainder of New England, and latterly, Carolina. The
reasons which lay behind the zeal for colonization which
gradually emerged in the 16th and 17th centuries are numerous
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and change with the evolution of England's involvement in the
new world.
Initially and throughout much of the early colonial period, the
penultimate reason given for colonizing America was religious.
Thus Article 3 of the First Charter of Virginia calls for:
The propagating of Christian religion to such
people as yet live in darkness and miserable
ignorance of the true knowledge and worship of
God.1
The first governor of the Massachusetts Company states in a
letter to Captain Endicott of Salem:
We trust you will not be unmindful of the main
end of our Plantation, be endeavouring to bring
the Indians to the knowledge of the Gospel.2
This is followed by more explicit instructions from the Company
itself to the Captain and his council that 'the propagating of
the Gospel is the thing we do profess above all co be our aim
in settling this Plantation'. 3
 The first charter of Carolina,
also refers to the the eight proprietors, 'being excited with a
laudable and pious zeal for the propagating of the Christian
faith.
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Seventeenth century colonists and politicians clearly viewed
conversion as the most noble of goals in colonization but one
which too often became secondary to the other objectives of
national glory or private gain. We shall return to the
religious motives of colonization when we consider the
implications of colonization for native Americans, but let us
first consider the other forces behind the development of
England's burgeoning empire.
As settlements were formed, the glorification of God through
conversion of the heathens was often coupled with the expansion
of England's empire. Most of the charters for English colonies
followed a similar pattern; first a declaration regarding
Christian conversion, like that of the Carolina charter cited
above, directly followed by a second objective, in Carolina's
case, 'the enlargement of our empire and dominions'.5
Expansion of the English empire is a goal always implicitly and
often explicitly in competition with the aims of other
European powers. Spain, in particular, was viewed as the
country to beat in the new world. Thus, the Cambridge History
of the British Empire states, 'among worldly motives [for
colonization] hostility to Spain took a prominent place.'6
Oliver Cromwell stated in a speech to Parliament, cited by
Captain John Smith of Virginia in his Description of Virginia,
'Truly God's great enemy is the Spaniard. He is a natural
enemy.' 7
 Sir Walter Raleigh was particularly bitter in his
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claims for British colonization aimed, 'against the ambitious
and bloody pretences of the Spaniards who, seeking to devour
all nations, shall be themselves devoured.'8
The antipathy towards the Spanish was strong in Carolina, being
the colony closest to Spanish settlements in Florida and
previously explored by the Spanish nation. Lord Ashley
received a letter from William Owen in September 1670, stating
that the English settlement should cease its defensive
posturing towards the neighbouring Spanish settlements and
recommending an offensive war against the Spaniards.9
Domination of trade against other European nations rather than
settlement was the initial goal of colonial policy in England.
A concise statement of this goal in Carolina is given by Robert
Sanford who undertook an exploratory voyage for the Lords
Proprietors in June 1666 in the area of Port Royall. He
concludes his report by stating colonization of this region
will ensure,
...a trade to the Kingdome of England ar great
as that shee has with all her Neighbours, and
render Our Soveraigne Lord the King within his
owne Dominions and the Land possessed by his
Naturall English subjects universall Monarch of
the Traffique and Commodity of the whole
World. 10
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A third and most important objective in the colonization of the
American continent was the potential private gains to be made
by the individuals involved. Often this was conceived in
monetary terms but there were other benefits to be won,
including personal fame and honour. As Richard Hakluyt wrote
to Sir Walter Raleigh of the first attempts to colonize.
Up then, go on as you have begun, leave to
posterity an imperishable monument of your name
and fame, such as age will never obliterate.
For to posterity no greater glory can be handed
down than to conquer the barbarian, to recall
the savage and the pagan to civility, to draw
the ignorant within the orbit of reason, and to
fill with reverence for divinity the godless
and ungodly.1'
Historians, such as Sir Charles Lucas, argue that while factors
such as enlarging the English empire, balancing it against that
of Spain, and spreading the gospel were often the ostensible
reasons given for imperial pursuits, the nature of its
development was really determined by private interests.
The actual course of English colonization dealt
with lower motives and contented itself with
more commonplace successes.12
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In early colonial enterprises such as Virginia and Massachuetts
where proprietary government was vested in a corporation, or
Pennsylvania and Maryland where it was embodied in a sole
proprietor, or Carolina with its eight Lords Proprietors, the
interests of the individuals involved were often paramount. In
the words of Sir Edward Coke on Massachusetts, 'The ends of
private gain are concealed under cover of planting a Colony.'13
Locke himself benefited from the colonial expansion of England
in America. As Cranston puts it, 'Locke's interest in the
colonies was not purely theoretical and bureaucratic.' 14 In
1672 Locke became a merchant adventurer in a new company of
traders in the Bahamas. One of the other traders, Sir Peter
Colleton, brother of Sir John Colleton, a Lord Proprietor of
Carolina, wrote to Locke advising him against planting if he
wanted to profit from his investment.
I find I am your partner in the Bahama trade
which will turne to accompt if you meddle not
with planting...if other men will plant there,
I mean the Bahamas, hinder them not, they
improve our province, but I would neither have
you nor my lord [Shaftesbury] ingadge in it)5
Locke followed Colleton's advice and later sold out his stock
at some profit. It is interesting to note that this land was
basically lying 'waste', deliberately uncultivated, for the
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sole purpose of bringing returns back to its owner, in this
case John Locke.
John Locke was also made the first landgrave in Carolina,
contrary to the King's Charter which stated that only
inhabitants and not individuals living in England could be
given such status. The proprietors also gave Locke 4,000
estates of land in the colony when he became a landgrave.
Locke was thus very conscious of the private gains to be made
through colonization.'6
At first England's overall search for private gain took the
form of trade and adventurers searcriing for gold, silver and
other precious minerals. Raleigh, the first English colonizer
was well known for his desire to strike it rich in the new
world. 'Few men loved gold as Sir Walter Raleigh did or sought
it more assiduously.'' 7
 The oft failed attempts of these
adventurers to find such treasures was one factor, amongst
several others, for the transformation in the 17th century of
English colonization from a pattern of trading, mining, and
exploration to settlement and agriculture. As Osgoode remarks:
Though at the outset mines were sought, that
soon became a subsidiary object, and
agriculture, trade, and fishing commanded the
chief attentjon...The reason for this is that
the colonies...were passing through the early
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stage of settlement, and that while in this
condition they were under the control of
parties who had undertaken to develop them as
an investment.18
Gary Nash comments on these initial motives,
The early voyages were not primarily intended
for the purpose of large scale settlement and
agricultural production...The 	 English were
primarily	 interested	 in	 a	 mercantile
relationship. Trade with the Indians, the
search for gold and silver and discovery of the
North West Passage were the keys.19
The shift from adventure and trade to agriculture and
settlement was a profound one, both for the English settlers
brought to America and those natives already living there. As
Nash goes on to comment:
The crucial difference between the Roanoke
colony of the 1580's and the settlement of
James town in 1607 was that the latter...was
planned as a permanent community. From this
point onward, Englishmen came to America not
merely to trade with the natives or to extract
the riches of the land but to build an enduring
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society.. .permanent	 settlement	 required
acquisition by whites of land - land which was
in the possession of the Indian.20
'Settling' the new world brought with it new objectives for
English imperialism, while extending the scope of the ones
already mentioned. Spreading of the gospel and the empire was
further facilitated by larger settlements based on agricultural
plantations. The desire to settle rather than to trade opened
a new debate over the right of ownership and sovereignty in
these new lands. By the end of the 17th century, definitions
for these two terms had been completely altered to facilite the
settling of America. Sovereignty was provided by the King's
patent and almost entirely divorced from the right of ownership
which derived from either purchasing title from the natives for
land or applying industry to already vacant land. 21
II - AN EVOLVING DEFINITION OF PROPERTY
both the definition of property and sovereignty had evolved in
international law over the preceding centuries. In the 16th
century, new lands were considered to be the property of those
who first arrived without need of labour or purchase.
Sovereignty and ownership were merged into a right of
discovery. As Francis Jennings describes it, a 'vague "law of
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nations" rationale gave all heathens and their territories to
that Christian sovereign whose subjects had first made
discovery or conquest'.22
In 1580, this changed when the English government developed a
law of property to challenge the Spanish claims of ownership by
conquest. Now, discovery was not enough but possession,
through purchase or settlement became the basis of a nation's
right to exclude others. In subsequent disputes, such as the
one between the England and Holland in 1619, agreement was
reached by allowing each company to call its own that which it
already possessed. 23
 Settling of the land was England's legal
argument against Spanish claims of prior ownership in areas
such as Carolina. Indeed, this new definition of property
formed the basis of many of England's claims in the new world,
particularly in that land which had been claimed by other
European powers, by virtue of prior discovery.
Settlement of the land was also defended in terms of private
gain. Sugar in Barbados and tobacco in New England proved to be
trofitable crops. As James Merrell states:
Tobacco promised to make a man wealthy here and
now, not in some remote land in some future
time...so people set aside thoughts of the
minerall country' and an important era in the
history of Piedmont came to an end.24
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Arguments ensued in the 17th century between traders and
settlers as to the best means for exploiting the wealth of the
new world. Those defending the agricultural plantation argued
that the creation of wealth lay in the establishment of a
dependent colony and English overseers who held tight rein on
the division of land in accordance with the industry provided
by the settler in terms of servants and slaves.
In Carolina, Letters between the Lords Proprietors in England
and the councils in America reveal a relationship fraught with
disagreement and tension.
The political history of the Colony during
their government is one long story of efforts
on the part of the citizens to administer their
local affairs in their own way, met by the
resistance of the Proprietors intent upon
making some profit out of the lands they had
granted, and upon keeping in power the office-
holders who were subservient to their will.25
A final new objective of British colonialism through settlement
was the relief of unemployment in England. As the Cambridge
History of the British Empire puts it:
Another motive for colonisation was to rid
England of some of the surplus population from
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which many folk then believed her to be
suffering.26
Richard Hakluyt writes in A Discourse Concerning Western
Plantations: 'This enterprise will be for the manifold
employment of numbers of idle men.' Similarly, Francis Bacon
writes in Of Plantations, 'Colonies and foreign plantations
I are] very necessary as outlets to a populous nation.' 27 The
fact that no outlet was actually needed, that England could
support its own population did nothing to discourage this myth.
Sir Charles Lucas comments on the gap between reality and myth
in this regard.
It is difficult to understand how the soil of
England can have been overpopulated in the 16th
century and yet the necessity for disposing of
the unemployed was a stock argument with
advocates of expansion.28
The tenacity of the belief may be explained in part through
the parallels drawn, by writers, including Locke himself in
Chapter 5 of the Second Treatise, to a Biblical 'exodus' where
a population of people exceeding their geographical limits are
led, by God and his chosen prophet, to another unpopulated
land, thus relieving pressure at home. 29	In order to fit the
Biblical mold, for example, the story of Job and Lot in
Genesis, it is necessary however for the population to be
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overflowing at home. The belief in the need for an outlet was
also fed, in part, by writers and politicians interested in the
fate of the poor who argued, as Locke did in a paper prepared
for the Board of Trade, that colonization could be a last
resort for the problems of unemployment and petty crime.30
Herman Lebovics, in an article entitled, 'The Uses of America
in Locke's Second Treatise on Government', claims that a
massive resettlement of the poor was the primary thesis
underlying Locke's writing of the Second Treatise.
If one possessed neither adequate land nor gold
and silver money in England - as were the
circumstances of the vast majority of the
nation - Locke offered America as the key which
would give access to participation in the life
of the commonwealth.3'
While Locke used some of the myths surrounding the resettlement
of the unemployed to sell the idea of the plantation to
skeptics at home, it iould be misleading to think that this was
a primary motivation, as Lebovics argues, for Locke's defense
of colonialism. His experience in Carolina and Barbados was of
an enterprise aimed primarily at expanding private and nationa'
profit more than as a forum for social welfare. In 1671, Lord
Ashley instructed Captain Haistead to collect people from
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Barbados and take them to Carolina for settlement but to
exclude poor people:
For we find ourselves mightily mistaken in
endeavouring to get a great number of poor
people there, it being substantial men and
their families that most make the
plantation...whereas others rely and eat upon
us.32
Beer comments,
Shaftesbury. . .recognized that England herself
needed a larger population and favoured the
encouragement of immigration. It was not as an
outlet for England's surplus numbers that he
and his associates founded Carolina, but...they
sought both to increase the commerce of England
and to create new sources of supply.33
In reality the corporations and proprietors involved in
settling America wished to attract those people who would
guarantee a return on their investment. Since colonies were
run more in the interests of profit than social welfare, tie
corporation or proprietors involved necessarily preferred
individuals already productive at home. As George Beer
comments:
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The territorial acquisitions in America were
...not prized as	 possible homes	 for an
overflowing	 population	 in	 England,	 but
virtually solely	 as	 feeders for English
commerce.	 In the eyes of the English
government, colonial expansion was a
subordinate, though vital, part of the larger
movement of commercial progress.34
Finally in order to have these 'industrious' people leave
England and settle in America it was necessary to convince them
of the benefits of making such a move. Thus, pamphlets began
to appear in England expounding on the virtues of the new
world. The promise of free land, as embodied in the head right
system, was tempting but people needed to be convinced that
settling would be easy. The proprietors of the American
colonies began using the Garden of Eden metaphor in their
pamphlets to sell their plots of land. The new world became
one where nature was spontaneous and very little labour needed
to be applied in order to garner the earth's fruits, but if
Englishmen applied labour as they did in England, much greater
returns could be made from the soil of America.
Locke, himself, was asked by Sir Peter Colleton to draft a
description of Carolina in order to attract more settlers. The
letter, dated November 3, 1671, reads in part:
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If you would doe us the favour to draw a
discourse to bee Added to this map in the
nature of a description such as might invite
people without seeming to come from us it would
very much conduce to our speedy settlement.35
Having considered the overall objectives of English colonialism
in the period leading up to John Locke's penning of the Two
Treatises on Government, we must now consider the implications
such objectives had for English attitudes to 'natural man'.
III - COLONIALISM: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INDIANS
The English attitudes towards the Indians were defined by the
objective of the colonists concerned. Thus, imperial and
private goals of national and individual gain had a different
impact on the lives of native Americans depending on whether
the European colonist was a trader/adventurer or a settler.
The traders needed the In1ians as facilitators of their own
business. Similarly, adventurers looking for mines needed the
Indians for information regarding the location of certain
mountains and the possible bounty which might be discovered
there. Thus they both learnt the necessary customs for doing
business with the natives and were happy to leave them with
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their own lands and religions as long as the deal could be
done. Gary Nash comments:
Since trade was the key to success in these
bold new adventures, a special incentive
existed for seeing the Indian as something more
than an intractable savage...it was only a
friendly Indian who could be a trading Indian.
If trade was the key to overseas development,
then it is not surprising that English
promoters suggested that the Indian might be
receptive and generous.36
The traders themselves reflected the desire to maintain
friendly relations. Consequently, unlike the settlers, they
had no vested interest in either displacing the Indians from
their lands or converting them to Christianity. On the
contrary, the traders were often willing to partake in Indian
customs in order to secure their goods. James Merrell comments
in his study of the Catawbas of Carolina:
For all their faults, traders generally had
shown a willingness to abide by the rules
native society laid down....Settlers hardly
tried. Where a trader saw profits and a crown
official saw allies, a planter tended to see
nothing but trouble. 	 To his mind, native
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neighbours were good only for obstructing
settlement, threatening life and property, and
attracting other Indians to the area.37
The conflict between settlers and traders in their attitudes to
Indians can be illustrated by an incident in Carolina where a
trader, named John Ellis had informed the Catawba Indians that
colonists settling the area 'had no right to the Lands by them
.possessed and that even his Majesty had no right to those
Lands.' 38
 The response from the governor was prompt as he
ordered that anyone making similar suggestions in the future
would be arrested.
As James Merrell points out, Ellis and his fellow traders were
trying to protect their livelihood from the threat of
encroaching settlers.
[Ellis's] speeches may have had a serious
purpose. Since he was a trader from Virginia,
his words were probably designed to protect his
livelihood against people thr.atening his
Catawba partners...He was defending an entire
way of life, a traders' way embracing both
Indians and colonists.39
Traders did not always respect and deal fairly with their
Indian counterparts; frequently they did not but there was no
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vested interest in undermining their claim to land or property
or converting them to Christianity.
The English attitude towards the Indian changed with the
transformation of their colonization from trade and exploration
to settlement and plantations. In the first place, an emphasis
on conversion of an ignorant but rational and peaceful Indian
population became an important theme amongst the defenders of
the plantations to convince Englishmen that settling in the new
world would not mean living in a permanent state of var. In
Virginia, for example,
The Virginia promoters recognized that if they
were to induce investment in the enterprise and
migration to the colony, they could tolerate
nothing in their promotional literature casting
doubts on their chances of success. The
optimistic tone and rosy hue that generally
pervade their propaganda are strikingly present
in its references to the Amerindian.4°
Similarly Richard Ebure writes in 1624, in A Plain Pathway to
Plantations that the 'exceedingly tractable' natives are
'ingenious to learn of us and practice with us most arts and
sciences. '41
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As settlement came to take on more importance in the English
colonies, Indians became increasingly perceived in America
itself as obstacles to colonial growth. The emphasis began to
shift to include not only questions of conversion and
civilization but also issues of property and land control.
Francis Jennings draws the chronological distinction:
Change came with the discovery of tobacco's
value as a staple commodity. Whereas the fur
trade had required Indian trappers and hunters,
tobacco could be produced more lucratively by-
the colonists themselves. Indians were
transformed from participants in the old trade
to hindrances upon the new trade.42
Thus, the native American became an obstacle in America and
with the settlement of New England and the need to attract both
investment and settlers, questions and debates began in England
regarding the Indian's natural right to property and under what
conditions Europeans could occupy and settle these 'new' lands.
Loren Pennington comments:
About the middle of the 16th century...there
began to emerge a literature aimed at promoting
[colonial] expansion. In much of it the native
races were a major therne...TSe interest in the
American Indian was especially intense because
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in America it was proposed to put down in the
natives'	 midst	 substantial	 groups	 of
Englishmen. This raised the whole question of
the right of displacement...in terms of native
conversion.
This debate, increasingly intense in England, was not new. The
Spanish had already faced similar questions at an earlier
period in central and south America. In particular, Francisco
Vitoria wrote a long treatise on the legitimate and
illegitimate claims the Spanish had to Indian land in North
America. 44
 Under the former, Vitoria included the right of
travel, propagation of Christianity and right of trade; where
these rights were denied, war was justified and the seizure of
goods and enslavement of the vanquished deemed legitimate. As
has been discussed, Fufendorf launched a strong attack on
Vittoria, in particular and the Spanish view, in general, that
conquest was justifiable under such broadly defined
conditions
The English recognized two methods for expanding national
wealth through imperialism. Charles Davenant, a contemporary
of Locke, described the distinction in a discourse he wrote on
English trade:
The Collective Body of a Nation has but two
Courses of acquiring Wealth, either by Inroads
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and Depredations upon its Neighbours, or by the
Trade, Labour, Arts and Manufactures of its
People 46
The distinction here is between colonization through conquest
versus labour or peaceful settlement. The latter course
involves taking over land either considered vacant or bought
from the local natives and then settled by working on it. For
the English reader, conquest was considered to be the Spanish
form of both converting the natives and extinguishing their
land title. The English explorers, in their attempts to both
denounce Spanish methods of conversion and encourage English
colonization, chose to reject conquest by emphasizing the
peacefulness of English methods of conversion and
proprietorship instead. Thus, early explorers, such as Raleigh
and Purchas used, according to Pennington, 'Spanish
maltreatment of the American Indians as an important and direct
argument for English activities in America.'47
Similarly, the Virginia Company in its 'True Declaration of the
Estate of the Colony of Virginia', wrote, 'As for...conquest,
it was the method of Spain' and clearly not that of the
English, for the declaration goes on to ask how it is possible,
'to set their soules at liberty, when we have brought their
bodies to slaverie?' 48 Finally, Captain John Smith of
Virginia, made the inevitable comparison, in his Description of
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New England, between the Protestant English and Catholic
Spanish with regard to the natives:
Religion above all things, should move us...to
show our Faith by our works in converting those
poor savages to the knowledge of God, seeing
what pains the Spaniards take to bring them to
their adulterated faith.49
The English Protestant view of colonization through peaceful
means rather than conquest became a paradigm for several other
reasons as well. Firstly, the English settlers were not
initially in a position to conduct warfare against the native
tribes encountered in the colonies. Secondly, the use of
'vacuum domiciliurn' had been part of colonial and legal
thinking since the discovery of America and was easily adapted
to the English claim for land under peaceful terms. Thirdly,
the recognition of native Americans' claims to lands made the
English settlers' purchases more secure against both other
Indian tribes and European powers. Finally, as has been
mentioned, the English wanted to attract investment and
settlers to the new world and needed to insist, at least
initially, that settlement would be achieved peaceably through
labour and not by virtue of a constant state of warfare.
In terms of land title, the English paradigm was of a dual
nature based on the rights of occupying land lying vacuum
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domicilium and the legal purchase of title. John Cotton
explained in a response to the Rev. Roger Williams of Salem,
who claimed that the King's patent gave no right of property to
the English, how ownership, as opposed to sovereignty, derived
not from the King's patent but from the two rights stated
above:
It was neither the King's intendment, nor the
English planters to take possession of the
country by murther of the natives, or by
robbery: but either to take possession of the
voyd places of the country by the law of nature
(for vacuum domiciliurn cedit occupanti) or if
we took any lands from the natives, it was by
way of purchase and free consent.5°
Let us consider each of these English claims in turn for they
are central ideas employed in the colonization of America.
Vacuum domicilium has, as John Dunn notes in his essay on
Politics of Locke in England and America', a long history in
colonial thought.51
Thomas More was perhaps the first writer to use this term in
relation to the Americas. Couched in both biblical and
Platonic notions of the promised land or utopian republic, More
drew a link between the vacant land on the one hand and the
overflowing and industrious nation on the other.
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And if the population throughout the island
should happen to well above the fixed quotas,
they enrol citizens out of every city and on
the mainland nearest them, wherever the natives
have much unoccupied and uncultivated land,
they found a colony under their own laws...By
their procedures they make the land sufficient
for both, which previously seemed poor and
barren to the natives. The inhabitants who
refuse to live according to their laws, they
drive from the territory which they carve out
for themselves. If they resist, they wage war
against them.	 They consider it a most just
cause for war when a people which does not use
its soil but keeps it idle and waste
nevertheless forbids the use and possession of
it to others who by the rule of nature ought to
be maintained by it.52
It was the claim that land was vacant which provided English
sett 1.ers and their defenders with their justification for war.
The first half of the 17th century bears witness to many
similar written defences of England's right to settle in
America. 53
 These shall be considered in depth in the next
chapter.
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The second claim made by the English for their right of
proprietorship was the purchase of land. A treaty to purchase
land assumed the recognition by England of Indian claims to a
natural right of property over particular parcels of land. The
reasons for choosing either to accept or to deny some universal
'natural right' can only be understood in relation to the
colonial goals which gave rise to its consideration.
IV - THE RECOGNITION OF INDIAN LAND RIGHTS
There were four basic reasons why a European power would
recognize the Indian's natural right to land. First, as has
been discussed, the English and Dutch wanted to distinguish
themselves from the Spanish conquistador. Secondly, there was
a need to make the European claim secure against Indian attack.
This was more likely if the Indians were given trinkets or
other desired objects in exchange for valuable pieces of land.
Thus, instructions given by the Governor of the New England
Company in London to Governor Endicott of Massachusetts in 1629
reveal that native Americans who 'pretend' to own certain lands
governed by the patent, are to have their lands purchased in
order to insure the security of the colony.
If any one of the savages pretend right of
inheritance to all or any part of the lands
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granted in our patent, we pray you endeavour to
purchase their title that we may avoid the
least scruple of intrusion. Particularly
publish that no wrong or injury be offered to
the natives.54
As Pearce argues:
Indian lands were to be bought if local savages
should pretend to ownership, but to be bought
only as a means of keeping peace with those
savages .
Thirdly, there was the need by one European country to prove to
another that it owned a certain parcel of land. The Indians
were used as a means to this end. When the basis of property
was changed from discovery to occupation, the Dutch were the
first to realize that, by ascribing the natural right of
property to Indians through their occupation of the soil, it
was possible to gain vast tracts of land through purchase. As
Jennings points out
The Dutch perceived possibilities in this
formula: "Possession" did not have to coincide
fully with "habitation". A few Dutchmen living
in one town could "possess" the region of
country surrounding the town. Legal possession
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could be created out of material such as
'natural rights' by the simple process of
manufacturing legal forms.56
It is clear the the Dutch government's use of legal forms, was
primarily aimed at the English love of written contracts and
rule of law. For example, in 1663, Peter Stuyesant, a
Dutchman, advised the West Indies Company to get an 'Acte,
Commission, Patent or Letter' over Long Island as under Dutch
jurisdiction because 'sealed with their High rlightinesses'
Great Seal, at which an Englishman commonly gapes as at an
idol, it would, in our opinion, help matters somewhat.'57
Finally, there were some Europeans who sincerely believed that
natives, unlike black slaves, had natural rights including that
of property which could not without injury be taken from them.
As we shall see however, from the capricious nature of
England's recognition of Indian's rights in early Anglo-
American relations, it is clear that the legitimacy of Indian
rights were contingent on England's larger colonial goals.
Let us consider how the recognition of Indian land rights by
England and her representatives, changed over the 17th century
depending on the colonial interests of the parties concerned.58
In 1632, the English refused to recognize Indian property
rights in a conflict with the Dutch over navigation rights from
North America. The English seized a Dutch ship while in
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harbour in England for violating England's exclusive right,
according to its law, of shipping goods traded with the Indians
back to Europe. The Dutch replied that England could not
prevent Dutch trading, 'in countries whereof his people have
not taken, nor obtained actual possession from the right
owners, [that is the Indiansj either by contract or
purchase.' 59 Colonial documents of New York reveal that 'The
English crown entered a flat denial that Indians could be
considered legal possessors of lands.' 6° Twelve years later
the English changed their minds and recognized Indians as
legitimate owners of the land when it served their interests in
a dispute they were having with the Dutch.
Breaking with their own non-purchasing
precedents, Plymouth's traders acknowledged
Indian tenure rights in principle, and they
turned the principle against the Dutch by
choosing to recognize the right of a different
Indian than the one from whom the Dutch had
purchased •61
Four years later in Salem a famous conflict arose between the
minister, Reverend Roger Williams, and the civil authorities in
Massachusetts when Williams wrote a treatise questioning civil
power in the new colony, in which he asserted:
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The Massachusetts charter had no legal basis
and that the King had no right to grant the
lands on which the colony was founded since
they belonged to the Indian tribes.62
Williams was arrested and 'much of the trial court's time was
spent on Williams's ideas about Indian rights.' 63 Williams
reaffirmed his belief that it was a 'National sinne' to claim
the right to Indian lands by virtue of royal patent.'64
Ultimately:
The General Court responded with a series of
new laws, the first of which was a ban on the
purchase of Indian lands except when such
purchase had prior approval from the court...it
was a prerogative insisted upon, sooner or
later, by the chief authority in every colony.
Control of land distribution...was essential to
European governments.65
John Winthrop, Governor of Massachusetts, in a letter to the
former Governor Endicott, regarding theWilliams case, claimed
that there were three ways in which the English title was good;
by patent, 'vacuum domicilium' and 'good likinge of the
natives'. But even if, as Williams claimed, none of these were
legitimate, it is clear that, for Winthrop, natural right was
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superseded, in any case, by God's right to grant land to his
chosen people.
If God were not pleased with our inheriting
these parts, why did he drive out the natives
before us? And why dothe he still make room for
us, by deminishinge them as we increase?...If
we had no right to this lande yet our God hathe
right to it, and if he be pleased to give it to
us (takinge it from a people who had so long
usurped upon him, and abused his creatures) who
shall controll him on his termes?66
Finally, it is clear that a distinction had developed between
ownership of land and sovereignty over it. The King's patent
certainly provided the latter. The former was secured by
taking over vacant land or through purchase, as has been
discussed. The relationship between these two concepts is
important both in terms of Locke's writings and implications
for native Indians. For while the latter could own property in
their own right, sovereignty rested with the King of England if
their land fell within the King's patent.
Thus, Indians' rights to land were recognized when they served
the interests of the English colonizers to do so, that is, in
order to distinguish themselves from the Spanish, to oblige the
Indians and retain the peace, to ward off similar claims by
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other European powers, and to assert control over disruptive
colonists. At the same time, those who suggested that native
Americans had prior rights to land which the English occupied
by virtue of a royal charter, such as Reverend Williams in
Salem, were summarily banished from the English settlement.
Thirdly, it was the transformation of English colonization from
trade to settlement which made the Indians less facilitators of
English growth than obstacles in the way of its continuing
colonial spread.
So far we have spoken mainly of land rights, but it is
interesting to note that the English generally recognized the
right of the Indian to life and liberty. In this sense the
Indian had a profoundly different place in the English mind
than that of the African slave. Colonial documents repeatedly
refer to the outlawing of Indian slavery and where it was shown
that traders or settlers were mistreating the neighbouring
Indians, instructions were sent to colonists from England that
native Americans were to be treated with justice. For example,
Governor Craddock, the first governor of Massachusetts
instructed Captain Endicett to act 'justly and courteous
towards the Indians.'67
As has been discussed, there were several reasons for the fair
treatment of the Indians, including fear of retaliation, but
there was, nevertheless, a profound difference in the attitude
of English colonizers between the native peoples of Africa and
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America. The difference lay in the belief that Indians were
rational, educable and potentially Christian men. In essence
they, unlike their black counterparts, were like Europeans at
an earlier stage of development. It was, in fact, a commonly
held belief that the Indians descended from the 10 lost tribes
of Israel. Daniel Cookin discusses this in his 1674 treatise
on the origins of the native Americans. 68
 According to Roy
Harvey Pearce, such a viewpoint was commonplace.
Almost universally it was agreed that the
Indians were of the race of men, descendants,
in order, of Adam, Noah and those Asiatic
Tartars who had come to America by a land
bridge from northern Asia.69
Theologically, this provided the Indians with a much different
standing than the African blacks in the minds of Christian
European thinkers. Often Biblical stories were used to provide
insight into the actions of the Indians. In essence, like the
Biblical figures, American Indians were a primitive race who
with the fullness of time would reach the status of 'civil'
man. While the North American Indian was superior to the
black, he was in no way, equal to the white. In colonial terms
this meant that his rights were curtailed to that of a European
dependent rather than a free man. For example, an Indian's
right to trade was limited to those Europeans within whose
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jurisdiction he happened to live. In Carolina, the Lords
Proprietors stated in instructions to the council at Albernarle:
You are to take spetiall care to prohibite all
trade and commerce between the Indians and any
others that are noe freeholders of our Province
of Carolina.70
Secondly, as had been discussed, land had to be traded through
the English proprietors and could not be sold without their
approval. Finally, war against the Indians was treated as
something qualitatively different than that against a European
power. No clearer example of this can be given than at a
meeting of the Committee of Trade and Plantations in the
Council Chamber at Whitehall on the 25 January 1663 when Sir
Peter Colleton, a correspondent of Locke's who lived in the
Bahamas, was called in because the committee was wary of a
clause in the patent which gave colonists the power to begin a
war. The Committee was assured that such a clause would never
be used to begin war against other European nations, only
Indiani.
Sir Peter Colleton one of the Proprietors of
the Bahamas Islands being called in and asked
concerning the clause in that Patent empowering
them to make warr hee takes notice that the
same is common to all Patents granted to
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Proprietors and declaring that they doe not
understand it otherwise than to make war with
[the] Indians.7'
Colleton confirmed that instructions were 'sent to all other
Proprietors in the West Indies that they do not make any other
use of that clause.'72
V - CONCLUSION
Thus, 17th century England became increasingly absorbed by the
colonial quest. The initial aim was to Christianize the
natives, expand their empire, at the expense of the Spanish and
Dutch, and, through investment, secure private economic gain
and honour. The purpose and nature of colonization evolved
from trading, mining and exploration at the beginning of the
century to settleiient and plantations by the end. The
implications for the American Indians, as has been discussed,
were profound and recognized as such by many at the time. As
Wesley Craven has noted:
No one who takes the trouble to go through the
basic records of the early colonies can fail to
recognize that the problem of Indian relations
loomed much larger in the life of our colonial
-156-
forebearers than the space allotted to the
subject by modern writers would suggest. At
the very outset, projections of American
settlement were confronted with the same
question of right and title that has challenged
more modern imperialists...the question, of
course, had to be answered, and no answer could
have met the test without a more or less
definite statement of the principles which were
to guide English settlers in their relations
with the native inhabitants.73
Answers were in fact given as the debate raged over Indian
rights not only in such famous trials as the Massachusetts
minister Roger Williams and his interlocuter, Governor John
Winthrop, but in natural law treatises (such as those of
Vitoria, Grotius and Pufendorf) and in many colonial tracts
(from Virginia to New England to Carolina). As the colonies
grew and political tensions heightened, authorities in England
attempted to impose some order on the activities of the
settlers in America with limited success. From corpo'ations to
boards of trade, to councils for plantations, England attempted
to maintain the colonies in a role which would insure profit
for the mother country.
Having described the general background of English colonial
activity during this period, it is possible now to consider
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Locke's specific involvement in the colonial enterprise of
Carolina and secondly, the particular intellectual debates
which arose in England and America regarding the merit and
legitimacy of the colonial enterprise itself, in order to
discover now Locke's use of America and its native inhabitants
in the Two Treatises not only reflects the general context
within which he lived and worked, but advances, within the
specific debates mentioned above, particular arguments on
behalf of English colonial policy and its defenders.
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Chapter 4: Colonialism - Economic and Ethical Debates
John Locke's passionate interest in England's colonial affairs
is well documented. Maurice Cranston writes in his biography
of Locke and his patron:
Locke was easily infected with Ashley's zeal
for commercial imperialism, seeing as clearly
as his patron saw the possibilities it offered
for personal and national enrichment.'
Locke was not only interested in the ideas but deeply immersed
in the development of actual colonial policy as secretary to
the Lords Proprietors of Carolina from 1668 to 1675, through
his work for the 1672-1676 Council of Trade, and as
Commissioner for the Board of Trade and Plantations (1695-
1700). In each of these capacities, he played a dominant role
in formulating the policies to be implemented. Let us consider
each in turn.
The key figure in the Carolina project was Lord Shaftesbury and
at his side was Locke. The latter's workload was enormous.
From the colonial records of Carolina, one can see that all of
the letters betwien the Lord Proprietors and the Council in
Carolina were endorsed by Locke, some of the laws, including
the Temporary Laws of 1674 were handwritten and sent by him,
and copious notes summarizing the activities were recorded in
his own hand. In addition, he wrote to senior officials in the
colonies of the Bahamas and Carolina, including Joseph West,
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Peter Colleton and Henry Woodward of his own accord during this
time. He was also responsible, in conjunction with
Shaftesbury, for penning the Fundamental Constitutions.
H.R. Foxbourne has claimed that Locke's role in the first of
these colonial enterprises was of paramount importance.
His influence in [the colony's] detailed
management seems to have been almost paramount,
and the zeal shown by him in endeavouring to
secure the property of the settlement was
amazing.	 Down to the autumn of 1672, he
continues his informal, but onerous, office of
secretary to the proprietors.2
In the second, the Council of Trade, for which he was secretary
from 1673-1675, the work was equally demanding. George Beer
describes the work in the following terms:
The Council for Plantations and its enlarged
successor had together a joint life of somewhat
over four years, during which short period they
greatly improved the entire system of imperial
control. They held formal meetings on an
average of at least twice a week.3
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Finally, the third colonial enterprise with which Locke was
involved was the 1695 Board of Trade. A.B. Keith concludes,
'It is clear that Locke dominated the first meeting and
continued to dominate the board while his membership of it
lasted'. 4 Peter Laslett writes of Locke's role on this board,
'It is surely of great significance that colonial policy should
have had such a man as one of its founders.' 5 If not a
founder, Locke can certainly be considered instrumental in the
formulation of colonial policy, beginning long before the 1695
Board of Trade. From his appointment as secretary to the Lords
Proprietors of Carolina in 1668 to his final days, Locke was a
firm supporter of the colonization of America and was immersed
in all of the debates which revolved around the American
plantations, including both the debate over their economic
benefit to England and the right of English settlers to take
over Indian land.
Having considered the general background for the development of
colonial policy and Locke's involvement in it, we must now turn
to the specific content of the debates about colonization, in
order to discover how the intellectual positions advanced there
are reflected in his subsequent political theory.
The two most important questions being discussed at this time
were cornerstones to the legitimacy of the whole colonial
enterprise. The first and most basic issue was the value of
having plantations at all. The second was the right of England
-170-
to plant itself in America, a land already occupied, at least
in part, by another people. The first of these questions was
debated almost exclusively in England as part of the discussion
over England's economy as a whole. We shall consider the ideas
of writers such as Thomas Mun, Cradocke, Sir Josiah Child and
Charles Davenant in relation to those of Locke in this regard.
The second question was addressed mainly by Englishmen living
in America in a series of treatises on England's right to
America. These too shall be discussed in relation to Locke's
theories.
I - ENGLISH COLONIALISM: ThE ECONOMIC DEBATE
The second half of the 17th century in England was a time of
great economic hardship. The crises experienced in the 1660's
and 1670's were due, in part, to the wars being waged by
England against the Dutch. At the same time, the Great Plague
of 1665 and the Fire of London in 1666, led to further drains
on England's re'ources. As Patrick Kelly, the editor of
Locke's economic papers, comments:
Yet war was by no means the only source of
economic crisis in the seventeenth century:
more frequent were natural disasters, such as
plague and harvest failure, and the other forms
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of	 political	 disruption,	 such	 as	 trade
embargoes and currency manipulation.6
The growth of foreign trade was seen, by some, as the solution
to these crises; by others as the cause. Locke, along with his
patron Shaftesbury, were part of the group of Whig politicians
who promoted the former line of argument. As Kelly comments,
'Locke argues that England has no option but to foster its
foreign trade.' 7
 The debate over the alleged benefits of trade
and settlement was fierce, but one in which Locke was deeply
interested. Within his library, Locke created a category for
his works on trade, which included eleven in all, several of
them published in the late 1670's. 8
 Amongst them were works
which analyzed the 'decay' of English trade in relation to that
of Holland, and an account of France's 'usurption' of English
trade. Locke also had a copy of the 1680 Britannia Languens in
his library, which was the classic statement of opposition to
American plantations.
Beyond his library, Locke kept abreast of the debate over trade
through manuscripts and works available in Shaftesbury's own
library. Kelly comments:
As [Locke's] notebooks and correspondence show,
these [books in Locke's library] were far from
constituting the sum total of his reading in
the field. Other works were available to him
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in Shaftesbury's library, and...the Council of
Trade...had collections of books and maps as
well as important manuscript material, a matter
of some significance at a time when much
economic writing circulated in manuscript
before publication in print.9
Thomas Mun was one of the first defenders of England's foreign
trade as the means by which to best accrue revenue. His
influence on Locke was important:
Perhaps the most influential [works for Lockej
were Hun's England Treasure by Forraign Trade,
16 64 . ..[ it ] was the first work of specifically
economic, interest that Locke is known to have
read. 10
Mun begins by claiming that most Englishmen were opposed to the
idea that trade would increase revenues, particularly if money
had to be expended first.
This Position is so contrary to the common
opinion, that it will require many and strong
arguments to prove it before it can be accepted
of the Multitude, who bitterly exclaim when
they see any monies carried out of the Realm."
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Trade, however, for both Hun and Locke is the essential key in
increasing the value of money. Where Hun states 'Money begets
trade and trade encreaseth money', Locke concludes: 'Trade then
is necessary to the produce of Riches, and Money necessary to
the carrying on of Trade'. 12
 Money was invested into foreign
trade during the 1660's but concern grew as England fell behind
Holland in its trade with the new world. Such concern
eventually caused the House of Commons in 1667, the House of
Lords in 1668 and the King, himself, in 1669, to create their
own committees, to 'consider of the causes and grounds of the
fall of rents and decay of trade within this kingdom'.'3
One of the solutions which was suggested, beginning with Mun
and Cradocke in the 1660's but increasingly with Davenant and
Child in subsequent years, was that settlement and cultivation
of new lands, would be the foundation of riches. As Mun
states:
The riches...of every Kingdorne, State, or
Commonwealth, cortsisteth in the possession of
those things, which are needfull for a civill
life. This sufficiency is of two sorts; the
one is naturall, and proceedeth of the
Territorie it selLfe; the other is artificiall,
and dependeth on the industrie of the
Inhabitants •14
-174-
Cultivation of new ground was the key to England's wealth.
Cradocke, an associate of Shaftesbury's in the early 1660's,
comments:
Planting in...riew Plantations throughout the
whole Globe, would...multiply Commodity and
Livelyhood, [ and lead to] the irnployment of
innumerable poor...and the abundant encrease of
our Shippin and Dominion on the Sea.15
It must be understood that during the rnid-1600's, the majority
of men who played a role in England's political affairs
denounced the notion of colonization particularly in terms of
plantations or settlements as an effective form for the
production of wealth. As trade had been opposed, so too
plantations were widely seen as a drain on the nation's wealth
and resources. Some politicians, always in the minority, were
vociferous defenders of the plantation as a means to increase
the nation's wealth. Shaftesbury was amongst this number
arguing that the two issues were virtually indivisible.
Shaftesbury, believing that questions of
overseas possessions were inseparable from
questions of trade...proposed their fusion in a
single and more powerful body. The King agreed
to this proposal, appointed a new Council of
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Trade and Plantations and made Shaftesbury its
President. 16
In the second half of the 17th century, the official and
prevailing view of the plantations was a fiercely negative one.
The Commissioner of Customs wrote against them because:
the encouraging of people to remove to the
plantations, as too many go thither, [will
lead) to the unpeopling and ruin of the
kingdom. 17
Similarly, Britannia Languens, presented to the Parliament of
England in 1680, a copy of which is in Locke's library, was, in
the words of Sir Charles Lucas, 'a very wholesale condemnation
of colonisation.' 18
 It stated in part:
These plantations may be considered as the true
grounds and causes of all our present
mischiefs; for, had our fishers been put on no
other employment, had those millions of people
which we have lost or been prevented of by the
plantations	 continued	 in	 England,	 the
government would long since have been under a
necessity of easing and regulating our
trade...the plantations affording room and
hopes for men...they have desertec the nation
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continually, and left us intricated and
fettered in private interest and destructive
constitutions of trade.19
This notion that plantations would undermine the kingdom was
not limited to a few officials - it was, according to
contemporary commentators, a widespread belief. Sir Josiah
Child, who Locke responds to in his paper on trade and interest
rates, claims in his famous, New Discourse on Trade that those
in favour of plantations are but one in a thousand.
I do not agree that our people in England are
in any considerable measure abated by reason of
our foreign plantations; but propose to prove
the contrary.	 This I know is a controverted
point, and do believe that, where there is one
man of my mind, there may be a thousand of the
contrary.2°
Many of those who denounced colonization were leading public
figures. For example Sir William Coventry, described by George
Beer as 'one of the ablest of public men of the Restoration
Era', wrote that the 'long continued directing of the Young and
prolifick People to the Plantations' is the cause of England's
decay. 21
 John Evelyn, the diarist and official commissioner to
the 1672-1676 Council of Trade and Plantations, who swore in
John Locke as secretary to the Council, wrote of 'the ruinous
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numbers of our Men, daily flocking to the American
Plantations. 22
The need to defend colonialism against a general opinion which
was at best skeptical and at worst hostile fell on the bodies
which adminstered the policies concerned. As Sir Charles Lucas
makes clear, Shaftesbury and Locke faced great opposition in
their ideas favouring colonization.
Shaftesbury, with Locke behind him, was in
favour of plantation, of forming new colonies.
But most of his leading contemporaries were not
of his way of thinking in this respect.23
Throughout the period from 1660 to 1690, there were numerous
responses and vociferous defenses of the plantation. William
Penn argued:
Colonies are the seeds of nations, begun and
nourished by the care of wise and populous
countries, as conceiving them best for the
increase of human stock and beneficial for
cornmerce...With justice, therefore, I deny the
vulgar opinion against plantations that they
weaken England; they have manifestly enriched
and so strengthened her.24
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Central to the concerns of those who opposed the plantations
was not only the drainage from England of good people but also
the fear that the colonies would become independent of the
mother country and compete against her. New England was the
worst example of this problem and its management was denounced
by both supporters and opponents of plantations as something
which was harmful to England's interests. John Evelyn wrote in
1671 that the Council was worried that New Englanders 'were
able to contest with all other plantations about them, and
there was fear of their breaking from all dependence on this
nation.' 25
 It is significant that these fears come to a head
in 1663 over Carolina, as many in England believed this new
province would become yet another drain and competitor to
English trade. Roger Coke, grandson of Lord Justice Coke,
wrote:
In this condition I leave to thee, reader, to
judge, whether it will be yet so much more
pernicious to the trade of this nation to
endeavour a further discovery of new
plantations; and that if the project of
peopling Carolina from the residue of the men
we have left in England, if it succeeds, will
not so much more enfeeble this nation, and
reduce the trade thereof to so much less
proportion by how many men shall be withdrawn
from it.26
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The fear that Carolina would 'enfeeble' the nation was so
deeply felt that King Charles II published, within four days of
opening up Carolina to settlement, through the 'Royal
Declaration and Proposals to All that Will Plant in Carolina',
a second proclamation reinforcing the idea that colonies were
there only to serve the needs of England.
His Majesty and Privy Council, having maturely
considered the importance of two acts lately
made for the increase of shipping and
navigation in relation to trade and revenue,
and for keeping his plantations in constant
dependence, commands the utmost diligence to be
used for punctually observing the same.27
The 'peopling of Carolina' was clearly a worry to those in
England who felt it would create another New England.
Those who wrote in favour of the plantation understood that a
successful colony needed to be closely circumscribed by a body
in England to ensure a settlement of agrarian labourers, rather
than one of adventurers, miners, or manufacturers. It was
thought that the settlement should produce specific crops
needed by England to offset their purchases from other European
competitors and they should be shipped back home by English
ships, exclusively. While Locke was secretary to the Council
of Trade (1673-1675), he would have helped draft exactly this
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type of colonial policy. Cranston writes in his biography of
Locke:
The Council was chiefly preoccupied with
foreign trade...The colonies were expected to
contribute towards the economy of England, to
supply England with raw materials, to buy
English goods, and to abstain from competition
with English industries. In return England
accepted the responsibility of protecting the
coloriies...Various Acts of Trade were passed by
Parliament to ensure that colonies fulfilled
their share of the bargain. 	 These Acts
prescribed	 that	 certain	 'enumerated'
commodities, such as tobacco and sugar should
come to England only, and that all goods
leaving or entering colonial ports should be
carried in English ships.28
This idea of colonization in America and the need for its
defense informs, as I shall hope to show, Locke's Second
Treatise.
Amongst Locke's papers in the Lovelace Collection is a page of
notes in preparation for an essay specifically on trade. Like
Josiah Child, Charles Davenant and William Penn, Locke had
developed several arguments in defense of the plantation
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against the strong opposition it faced in England. Other works
by Locke also defended English colonialism. In particular,
Locke's 'For a Generall Naturalization' and Some Considerations
of the Lowering of Interest and Raising the Value of Money both
defend foreign trade, including settlement, as the source of
England's future wealth. The latter was written, according to
Maurice Cranston, as a reply to Josiah Child. Indeed Locke's
library contains three of Child's works. 29
 It is to Child that
we turn first, then, to consider his defense of plantations as
part of this larger discussion of trade.
II - THE PLANTATION DEBATE: JOSIAH CHILD AND CHARLES DAVENANT
In responding to 'some gentlemen, of no mean capacities, [who]
are of the opinion, that his majesty's plantations abroad have
very much prejudiced this kingdom by draining us of our
people,' Child begins by claiming it is not the the richness of
the land but the industry of the people which creates wealth in
a nation.
First, I agree, that lands, though excellent,
without hands proportionable, will not enrich
any kingdom...Most nations in the civilized
parts of the world are more or less rich or
poor, proportionably to the paucity or plenty
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of their people, and not to the sterility or
fruitfulness of their lands.3°
He then proceeds to argue, contrary to public opinion, that
plantations are profitable to England for several reasons. His
first point is that the colonies will absorb many troublesome
factions, such as the unemployed or criminals, who would not
be contributing to England in any case. He goes on to argue
that the best form of plantation is one based on agriculture
rather than on trade, mining or conquest (the methods of other
countries). Thus he attacks the Dutch for not having
...made any improvement by planting; what they
do in the East Indies being only by war, trade,
and building of fortified towns and castles
upon the sea-coasts, to secure the sole
commerce of the places and with the people whom
they conquer, not [my emphasis] by clearing,
breaking up of ground, and planting, as the
English have done.3'
Equally, the 'French...have made no considerable progress in
planting'. Finally with regard to Spain, he writes, 'The
English...have cleared and improved fifty plantations for one,
and built as many houses for one the Spaniards have built.'32
The English were the best planters; other possible forms of
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labour tried by English colonists were considered to be less
beneficial to the nation's interests.
Mining and grazing, in particular, were often discouraged by
supporters of the plantations. The former was not only seen as
a means for private rather than national gain, but the
intrinsic need to explore large areas of land, in the search
for lucrative mines, also ran counter to the English nation's
desire to settle people and populate small areas of land.
Grazing, or raising cattle was discouraged because it tended to
benefit inter-colonial trade within America rather than that
between the colonies and England. While many colonizers did
attempt to explore both of these avenues for producing private
wealth, it was often actively discouraged by the English
proprietors and thinkers like Child who had England's national
interest at heart. The idea that cultivation rather than
mining was in England's national interest was also based on the
fact that the export of crops to England under the navigation
laws would, in forbidding export on anything but English ships,
create a great national navy and many more jobs in shipping.
Mining simply made the adventurers rich nd would not sustain,
as the English plantations did, the same number of people on
both land and sea. Child comments on all of these inter-
connected issues in his attack on Spain's obsession with mining
in the new world.
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The Spaniards' intense and singular industry in
their mines for gold and silver...doth cause
them to neglect in great measure cultivating of
the earth...which might give employment to a
greater navy, as well as sustenance to a far
greater number of people by sea and land.33
Agrarian activities were thus greatly encouraged, but dating
back to the time of More, those who wished to settle many
people favoured crop growing as an agrarian activity over
grazing animals. More states in Utopia:
Crime, too springs from the...turning tillage
into pasturage, for wool pays better than corn
wherefore sheep 'devour whole fields, houses
and cities', and the peasants thus expelled
must beg or steal and be hanged.34
James Axtell claims that this support for crop-growing was a
feature of the views of both English proprietors and the church
in 17th century settlement in America.
To the preachers and politicians who supported
them, industry meant farming and farming meant
tillage, not grazing...as soon as the
missionaries were able to establish themselves
among the Indians they began to introduce the
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idea of English style farming...the official
English preference for tillage showed itself
every time a new mission was founded.35
Child proceeds to argue that colonies will benefit England only
if they are kept in a dependent relationship to the mother
country which involved, historically, two important components.
Firstly, Navigation Acts had been implemented to insure that
all goods produced in the colonies for export to Europe would
go via English ships directly to the mother country. Secondly,
incentives and legislation had been introduced to ensure that
the right crops, that is the ones useful to England, were grown
in the colonies. Specifically, England wanted commodities
which would supplant those it now bought from southern European
countries, such as wine, dried fruits, nuts and oil.
Dependency ensured that the profits would return to England.
Moreover, Child argues, the demand amongst plantations for
basic manufactured commodities which could not be produced in
the new world necessarily creates employment in England for
those involved in their production. Thus, Child states, 'If we
kept the trade of our said plantations entirely to
England...one Englishmen [in America]...would make employment
for four men in England'.36
These views are echoed by another great defender of the
plantation, Charles Davenant, who makes it clear that tilling
the earth is the best form of development. Like Child,
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Davenant argues that conquest is not a legitimate form of
title, attacking the Turks as having, 'more enlar'd their
Dorninions by Conquest, than by any Arts of Peace.' 37
 According
to Davenant, the enlargement of dorninions by conquest or the
search for gold undermines the health of an empire. The
development and appropriation of property should be restricted
by the English government or its representatives to that which
can be cultivated.
As many Empires have been ruin'd by too much
enlarging their Dominions and by grasping at
too great an Extent of Territory, so our
Interest in America may decay, by aiming at
more Provinces, and a greater Tract of Land,
than we can either cultivate or defend.38
Thus, he attributes many of the problems in Virginia to the
large tracts of land which were owned but not planted:
Many hundred thousand Acres are, as they call
it, taken up, but not planted...these Practices
are without doubt a chief Cause that our Colony
in Virginia has had no better success.39
The solution for Davenant is twofold. First, 'endeavour the
rendring this Territory less extensive, but better Peopled, and
consequently in a readier Condition to improve and defend it's
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self.' Secondly, 'establish something like an Agrarian
Law...to restrain such a fraudulent taking up of Land...as is a
Bar to the Industry of Others.' 4° Davenant argues explicitly
for farming over manufacturing in the colonies because the
latter would compete with English companies exporting such
products to the new world. Like Child, he believes that one of
the great advantages to the plantations was the manufacturing
jobs it created in England.
Tis true, if in New England or in other Parts
there, they should pretend to set up
Manufactures, and to cloath, as well as feed
their Neighbours, their nearness, and low
Price, would give 'em such Advantages over this
Nation, as might prove of pernicious
Consequence; but this Fear seems very remote.
because new Inhabitants, especially in a large
Extent of Country, find their Accompt better,
in Rearing Cattle, Tilling the Earth, clearing
it of Woods, making Fences, and by erecting
Necessary Buildings, than in setting up of
Manufactures •41
Agriculture, that is the clearing, tilling and planting of the
land is not only the English method of claiming property but in
the colonies it is the preferred form of labour for keeping the
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colonies dependent on and out of competition with the mother
country, particularly in the area of manufacturing.
III - LOCKE'S ECONOMIC VIEWS
Locke, in both his economic writings and the Two Treatises,
defends the rights and economic benefits of the colonial
plantation in America, consistent with the views of Child,
Davenarit and other leading commentators of trade at the time.
While Locke's support for the colonial plantation, like these
other thinkers, runs counter to the predominant opinion of his
time, he uses every available forum to put his case. The
correlation between his Two Treatises, his own economic
writings, and the economic thinkers of his day needs to be
considered in more depth.
Locke believes, as Child does, that it is industry, or in
Locke's terms, labour, rather than quantity of land or its
richness which determines the value of property. Thus Locke
argues that labour not only begins the property, but 'makes the
far greatest part of the value' of it, and 'a fruitful Soil,
apt to produce in abundance...f or want of improving it by
labour' will have no real value. 42 The labour theory of value
is also articulated by Locke in his economic writings on trade,
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where he states: 'In all manifactures the greatest part of the
value lies in the labour'.43
Like Child and Davenant, Locke speaks almost exclusively, in
the Second Treatise, of labour in terms of crop-growing,
agrarian activity rather than mining, grazing, manufacturing
or other forms of industry which could theoretically provide an
equal claim to proprietorship through labour. This will be
demonstrated when we examine in detail the specific forms of
labour which Locke describes in his chapter on property.
Suffice it to say that, like Davenant who argues that settlers
who engage themselves in agriculture over manufacturing or
other forms of industry will 'find their accompt better' and
serve English interests more, or Child who claims that
agriculture provides 'sustenance to a far greater number of
people' than any other industry, Locke will repeatedly assume a
preference, to the near exclusion of all other forms of labour,
for an exclusively crop-growing farmer.
That England excels over all other countries in this type of
labour as Child argues in reference to countries such as Spain
and France is something with which Locke concurs. In notes
written by Locke on, 'Trade in Sweden, Denmark and New
England', is the following observation on Swedish plantations,
'labour value to England.' 44
 The relationship between labour
and value accrued is central to the competition for colonial
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riches and is also discussed at some length by Locke in his
chapter on property.
Locke also concurs with Child's conclusion that a planter in
America, far from draining England of employment, creates far
more jobs in England through demand for the necessary
manufactured tools and the development of shipping necessary to
transport them. In his chapter on property in the Second
Treatise, Locke discusses the value that labour brings to land.
He uses as his example in this paragraph land in America
stating that it is labour which brings value to the products of
the land. He goes beyond the industry of those individuals in
America to the manufacture of the tools, supplies and ships
which would be needed to complete their task. Thus in order to
harvest corn and make bread, Locke claims that a 'catalogue of
things', which could be produced only in England, would be
necessary, including 'all the Materials made use of in the
Ship, that brought any of the Commodities made use of by any of
the Workmen, to any part of the Work.' Of the materials listed
in the Two Treatises, it is worth noting the similarity to the
one given by Thomas Mun in his defense of England's trade
through the economic benefits of navigation. Where Mun speaks
of 'Timber, Planks, Boards, Pitch, Hemp, Tar, Flax, Masts,
Cordage and other Ammunitions to make those multitude of
ships', Locke lists amongst other things, 'Timber...Pitch, Tar,
Masts, Ropes, and all the Materials made use of in the Ship'.
Locke, like Hun, is arguing that the value of navigation and
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all of its needs must be accounted for in calculating the worth
of plantations and the labour expended on the 'Acre of
Land...in America' mentioned at the beginning of the
paragraph.45
Locke articulates in this important paragraph of the Second
Treatise, two central tenets in the defense of English trade,
first advanced by the economic writers cited above. The first
.is that most manufactured commodities used by workmen in their
labour in America would need to be shipped to them, that is,
they would be made in England, not in America. This creates
employment in the manufacturing centres in England. Secondly,
the building and operation of the ships themselves, in order to
transport these commodities from the old country to the new
world, would further both the art of navigation and employment
in shipping back home. Both of these tenets underlie the case
that colonization in America benefits England if properly
governed and controlled.
Thus the Navigation Act of 1660 has as two of its basic aims,
'to ensure the promotion of English shipping and seamanship'
and 'to protect British mercantile interests.' 46 By shipping
all of the manufacturers' commodities to America from England,
on English ships, as Locke's argument in the Second Treatise
suggests, the cultivation of the 'Acre of Land...in America'
will lead to the beneficial results listed above and used by
the defenders of English trade policy.47
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Locke, himself, states explicitly in notes prepared in 1674 for
an essay on trade that 'trade is twofold'; the first aspect is
'manifacture...preparing commodities for yr consumption', the
second is 'cariage i.e. navigacori and merchantship'.48
Similarly, in an unpublished paper on naturalization, Locke
states that foreign 'trade consists in two parts, manufacture
and navigation'. 49 Thus, in paragraph 43 of the Second
Treatise, referred to above, Locke begins with an 'Acre of
Land' in America, and proceeds to show how through the
manufacture of the bread. and the shipping of it to the
consumer, the value accrued will be great. It is these same
two aspects of trade which Child and Davenant use for their own
defenses of the English plantation in America. Indeed, amongst
Locke's papers in the Lovelace Collection, is an essay
entitled, 'Of the American Plantations', which links Child's
defense to these same two tenets.
Sr Josiah Child in his printed book of trade
affirms that the plantation imploy two thirds
of our shipping, and did thereby, and by taking
of our manufacturers give sustenance to near
two thousand persons in England.5°
The need for shipment of manufactured goods in the new world is
also something Locke was familiar with in his own colonial
experience, having recieved on several occasions, letters
asking for supplies of tools and clothing. Joseph West,
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governor of Carolina and Sir Peter Colleton, in the Bahamas,
both wrote to Locke, directly, about their 'Extream want of
provisions'. 5 ' In May 1674, the Lord Proprietors in replying
to another request from Carolina respond, 'We have sent another
supply of cloathes and tools'.52
Child and Davenant's discouragement of other forms of industry
are also reflected in the Two Treatises. While Locke mentions
mining and grazing once or twice in his chapter on property,
his almost exclusive emphasis is on American crops and their
plantation, in keeping with the arguments in favour of
colonialism at the time and the specific forms of labour
preferred. His preference is rooted not only in the views of
other thinkers but in his own colonial experience in Carolina
where the implications of other forms of labour such as mining
or grazing were well known.
In a letter signed by Locke responding to requests from
settlers in Carolina for cattle, it is made clear that planting
rather than grazing is the proprietors' preference.
Especially it being our design to have planters
there not graziers for if our inclinations were
to stock Carolina at that rate, we could do
better by bailiffs and servants of our own, who
would be more observant of our orders than you
have been.53
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Locke's preference, in his chapter on property, for growing
crops over other types of labour such as mining, grazing, or
manufacturing is, therefore, consistent with both the economic
writers and specific colonial experiences of his time.
Child's rejection of the Dutch method of conquest to claim land
is also reflected in Locke's chapter on conquest where he is
quite categorical, in a position he himself describes as a
'strange Doctrine', that victory over another people does not
imply a right over their possessions. 54 The colonial arguments
of the English which sought title to land either by cultivation
of the waste or purchase from the Indians, that is peaceable
rather than violent methods, are reflected both in Locke's
economic writings and chapter sixteen of the Second Treatise.
In Some Considerations, Locke writes:
There are but two ways of growing Rich, either
Conquest, or Commerce...no Body is vain enough
to entertain a Thought of our reaping the
Profits of the World with our Swords, and
making tie Spoil...of Vanquished Nations.
Commerce therefore is the only way left to
us...for this the advantages of our Situation,
as well as the Industry and Inclination of our
People...do Naturally fit us.55
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Once again Locke refers to industry or labour being the basis
of 'Profits'. Thus, he concludes that 'securing our Navigation
and Trade [is] more the Interest of this Kingdom than Wars or
Conquest' ,56
It is the cultivation of land within the limits of one's
industry, not military might, which also founds property for
the English writers on trade. Davenant concludes that the
plantation should reach only as far as 'we can...cultivate' and
taking up of property should never become a 'Bar to the
Industry of Others'. 57
 Locke similarly limits appropriation to
that which can be cultivated ensuring that it will not prevent
access to others who are willing to expend a similar degree of
industry.
Men had a right to appropriate, by their
Labour, each one to himself, as much of the
things of Nature, as he could use: Yet this
could not be much nor to the Prejudice of
others, where the same plenty was still left,
to those who would use the same Industry.58
Locke's concern with the taking up of too much ground, like
Child's and Davenant's is again rooted in the experience of the
colonies where too often land was appropriated in vast
quantities and even enclosed without having the number of
people necessary to cultivate the land therein. The principle
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of limiting land to that which can be cultivated was a
fundamental premise for those overseeing the colonies. This
will be discussed at length when we examine Locke's chapter on
property in detail.
Finally, central to the success of the plantation according to
Child and the reason why the Spanish have failed is the
preservation of liberty and property by the English overseers.
Though plantations may have drained Spain of
people, it does not follow that they have or
will drain England or Holland; because, where
liberty	 and property	 are	 not	 so	 well
preserved[my emphasisj...the profit of
plantations...will not rebound to the mother
kingdom, but to other countries...hence it
follows, plantations thus managed prove drains
of the people from their mother kingdom.59
Locke similarly states after describing the great art of
government as the right employing of land that it is liberty
and the protection of property which must lie at the heart of
this governance. Thus, he speaks in the next sentence of the
'Prince who shall be so wise and godlike as by established laws
of liberty [secure] protection and incouragement to the honest
industry of Mankind'. 60 For both Child and Locke, the
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preservation of liberty and property had to be the foundation
of English colonial rule.
Thus it was a very specific colonial enterprise in which Locke
was so intimately involved, in both Carolina and on the Council
of Trade, and for which he, his patron Shaftesbury and a few
others had argued so vociferously throughout the last third of
the 17th century. His ideas in the Second Treatise and amongst
his notes on the subject, echo those of the economic writers
defending the plantation to a largely skeptical audience in
England. He consequently argues, like Mun, Cradocke, Child and
Davenant, that foreign trade and settlement is the best
solution to England's economic woes. Moreover, England will
compete effectively against Holland and Spain only if she
adopts a particular mode of colonization.
Like Child and Davenant, Locke assumes agrarian labour and
denounces the practice of appropriating land by conquest. He
argues, as the colonial defenders did, that appropriation must
be limited, to that which one could cultivate and it was the
government's duty to insure the protection of liberty and
property by, in part, employing such lands efficiently.
Finally, employment will be created at home, particularly in
the manufacture of, in Locke's words, 'all the Materials made
use of in the Ship'.
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IV - THE ETHICAL DEBATE: ENGLISH vs INDIAN LAND RIGHTS
The second crucial debate occuring in England during this
period with regard to the plantation; one often made by those
opposed to the colonial enterprise was the right of England to
land already occupied by another people. The Indian, once
facilitator of England's trade had become an obstacle to its
expansion. Many of those who defended the plantation,
particularly those living in America itself, found it necessary
to justify the right of England to lands already inhabited by
American natives. Treatises such as Samuel
Virginia's Verger, Massachussetts Governor John Winthrop's
General Considerations for Planting New England, Rev. Robert
Cushman's 'Reasons and Considerations Touching the Lawfulness
of Removing Out of England into the Parts of America', Robert
Gray's A Good Speed to Virginia, Chief Newfoundland Adventurer
William Strachey's The Historie of Travaile into Virginia, and
Virginian First Secretary Sir George Peckham's, 'A True Report
of the Late Discoveries are all examples of the European's
defense of their right to America. It should be noted that
every one of these writers played an important role in early
English colonial life.61
It is in this tradition and in response to similar questions
put to the defenders of the plantation that Locke wrote. In
order to draw the links between these thinkers and Locke
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himself, we must first outline the arguments they made. There
can be no doubt that Locke was fascinated by the native tribes
of America, to the extent that many consider him to be an early
anthropologist.
Locke is often said to be the first European
fully to appreciate the new science of
anthropology and to use it for advancing his
doctrines. 62
Beyond the accounts of Indians contained in his travel books,
colonial notes, and theories concerning human understanding, it
is also clear from letters Locke wrote to colonists in America
for more information on the natives that his interest was keen.
For example, in a letter dated 4 September 1676, Joseph West,
governor of Carolina writes to Locke,
Your letter of the 10th of June carne...to hand
which I answered by way of Bermuda and do now
present you with the best account I can gett
Concerning the Natives here hopeing it may give
you or any other Gentle Man some
sattisfaction.63
Another letter to Locke, dated November 12, 1675 from Dr. Henry
Woodward, a colonist in Carolina who served as the liaison
between the colonists and local tribes states:
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I have made the best inquiry that I can
concerneing	 the	 religion	 and	 worship
Originall, and customes of our natives.
especeally among the Port Royall Indians
amongst whom I am best acquainted.64
It shall be shown that Locke's conception of natural man in the
Two Treatises, and, more specifically, his labour theory of
property, reflect the arguments contained in the colonial
writing of Purchas, Winthrop, Strachey and the others. A
purpose of all these treatises, including Locke's, was to
justify England's right to appropriate American land.
The colonial writers all begin with a question or objection put
to them by those challenging England's right to be in America.
Purcrias asks, 'What right can England then challenge to
Virginia?'; Winthrop queries, 'What warrant have we to take
that land, which is and hath been of long time possessed of
others the sons of Adam?'; Gray puts the question directly:
'The first objection is, by what right or warrant we can enter
into the land of these Savages, take away their rightfull
inheritance from them, and plant ourselves in their places?',
and, finally, Cushman states: 'Some will say, What right have I
to go live in the heathens' country?'65
It was a question which dominates the debate about colonial
affairs throughout the 17th century. William Strachey, 1st
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Secretary to the colony of Virginia, writes that there is no
other issue which caused so much consternation.
[Of the] clayme which we make to this part of
America...I have observed more in clamour (me
thought) then at any tyme in force, to cry out
still upon yt, calling yt an unnationall and
unlawfull undertaking...Why? Because injurious
to the naturalls; arid...yt must then
necessarily followe (saye they) that yt can be
no other than a travaile of flat impiety, and
displeasinge before God.66
Perhaps the most important assumption made in these treatises
is that America could be considered 'vacuum domicilium' or
vacant land, open to all for appropration. Samuel Purchas
refers to the English who 'seeke habitations there in vacant
places' or George Strachey who refers to 'the wast and vast
uninhabited growndes of their(s)' or Cushman who describes
America as simply 'empty'. 67 The vacant land of the writers on
trade and economics ttkes on a perjorative connotation in these
writings on Indian rights for it is the inhabitants who are not
enclosing it properly or cultivating it adequately. It is not
just vacant, but wasted, spoilt, or empty. While the
characteristics of such common land vary from writer to writer,
certain fundamental points are common.
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Firstly, land is waste or vacant if there is no sign of private
ownership. Thus Purchas concludes that the English may take
over vacant land, 'especially where the people is wild and
holdeth no settled possession in any parts.' Robert Gray of
Virginia writes, 'these Savages have no particular proprietie
in any part or parcell of that Countrey, but only a generall
recidencie there'. John Winthrop writes, 'that which is common
to all is proper to none. This savage people ruleth over many
lands without title or property'.68
Claiming proprietorship over a piece of land involved two
elements for these writers; the first is to enclose it; the
second, to cultivate it. Regarding the first element, Winthrop
adds to his description, quoted above, of Indians owning no
land, the following explanation, 'for they enclose no ground,
neither have they cattle to maintain it,' and goes on to say
that man 'appropriated some parcels of ground by enclosing.'69
So deeply felt was this need for enclosure that colonial
governments often forced native Indians to fence their lands,
in order to prove ownership.	 Osgoode writes, 'Plymouth and
Hassachusetts...ordered that the corn lands of the Indians
should be fenced... Connecticut sought the same objective by a
general order.'7°
The second important element in one's claim over land is the
application of industry, particularly agrarian cultivation.
Winthrop writes:
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The whole earth is trie Lord's garden, and he
hath given it to the sons of Adam to be tilled
and improved by tnern. hy then should we stand
starving here for places of habitation.., and
in the mean time suffer whole countries, as
profitable for the use of man, to lie waste
without improvement.7'
Cushman's description of Indian land follows similar lines.
The country is yet ra g ; the land untilled; the
cities not builded; the cattle not settled. We
are compassed about with a helpless and idle
people, the natives of the country, which
cannot...help themselves, much less us.72
The Massachusetts General Court made clear the importance of
cultivation in consideration of the Indians' claim to a natural
I
right of property. The Court, in its judgement,
manifestly proved that the Indians having only
a natural right to so much land as they had or
could improve, so as the rest of the country
lay open to any that could and would improve
it.73
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The vacancy of America, in these terms, was frequently linked
to descriptions of an overflowing population in England and the
desirability for people to move from the latter to the former.
This theme of an empty America and a full England is often
imbued, as has been discussed, with a theological significance.
The authors discussing Indian land draw the same parallels to
Biblical stories comparing Indians to nomadic natives in the
early colonization of the Middle East. Filling the land thus
jtakes on mythical proportions in line with exoduses described
in the first few books of the Old Testament.
Roy Harvey Pearce, one of the leading commentators on English
and Indian relations writes:
Demonstrating land tenure from theology had
been simple even for Pilgrim precursors of the
Puritans...the Indians were heathens and thus
in need of conversion...Indians' lands were
empty, English lands full, and the English
therefore bound to go to the Indians and fill
their lands.74
Cushman articulates this juxtaposition of empty and full in his
treatise on England's right to the 'heathen country'.
We ought...to endeavour and use the means to
convert them; and the means cannot be used
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unless we go to them, or they come to us. To
us they cannot come, our land is full; to them
we may go, their land is empty.75
Robert Gray describes in his pamphlet on Virginia, the problems
of overpopulation at home:
This should teach us of this kingdome and
countrey, prudence and providence, the Lord
hath blessed us, and we are growne to be a
great people, so that one lot is not sufficient
for us: Our multitudes like too much blood in
the body, do infect our countrey with plague
and povertie.76
John White, author of The Planter's Plea, describes England in
similar terms, offering America as the place to absorb the
excess. 'The land affords void ground enough to receive more
people than this state [England] can spare.77
Given that America is vacant and can absorb an 'overflowing'
English populace, many of these writers turn to the Bible to
provide the specific theological justification for such a move.
The most commonly used example is that of Abraham and Lot,
whose flocks have grown to such a size, 'the land was not able
to bear them', search for new land. Lot goes to Jordan and
Abraham arrives in Canaan where 'the Lord said unto
-206-
{ him]...arise, walk through the land in the length and breadth
of it; for I will give it unto thee.'78
Samuel Purchas is probably the first to use this particular
section of the Bible to justify the appropriation of land in
America by the English:
The same reason giveth liberty to other men
which want convenient habitation to seat
themselves...especially where the people is
wild and holdeth no settled possession in any
parts. Thus the holy Patriarks [i.e. Abraham
Lot and Jacob] removed their habitations and
pasturages, when those parts of the world were
not yet replenished: and thus the whole world
hath been planted and peopled with former and
later Colonies and thus Virginia hath roome
enough.
Winthrop also makes specific reference to this Biblical
passage:
And why may not Christians have liberty to go
and dwell amongst them in their waste lands and
woods...as lawfully as Abraham did amongst the
Sodornites? (Genesis xiii)80
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Solornan Stoddard, another settler, uses the same reference:
There was some part of the land that was not
purchased, neither was there need it should; it
was vacuum domicilium...By God's first grant
men were to subdue the earth. When Abraham
came into the land of Canaan, he made use of
vacant land as he pleased.81
Finally, Cushman also uses the same passage from Genesis to
justify England's right to America:
As the anc.ient patriarchs, therefore, removed
from straiter places into more roomy, where the
land iay idle and waste and none used it,
though there dwelt inhabitants by them, as
Genesis xiii...so it is lawful now to take a
land which none useth, and make use of it.82
The use of Genesis 13 is significant, for Locke uses tne same
passage in his chapter on property to provide an example of
vacant land which can be legitimately taken over in the state
of nature when, like in the case of Abraham, one can use the
space in another land.
For we see, that in that part of the World
which was first inhabited, and therefore like
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to be best peopled, even as low down as
Abraham's time...when there was not room enough
in the same place, for their Herds to feed
together, they, by consent, as Abraham and Lot
did, Gen. xiii 5. separated and inlarged their
pasture, where it best liked them.83
The principle is the same for Locke as for the other writers.
It is not only lawful but pleasing to God that people who have
been industrious and used all their own land and resources
should move to another place which the inhabitants make no use
of. The idea that God granted to Abraham the 'length and
breadth' of the new land is not lost on these colonial writers
or on the king who grants them their patents.
Another commandment often used in conjunction with the story of
Genesis 13 is the famous Genesis 1:28, 'Be fruitful and
multiply and replenish the earth and subdue it', the words
spoken by God in the Bible when he grants the earth to
humanity. This sentiment is echoed in all of the colonial
writings. Winthrop states: 'The whole earth is the Lord's
garden, and he hath given it to the sons of Adam to be tilled
and improved by them'. 84 John Cotton, also quotes in his
leaflet, God's Promise to His Plantations, the commandment from
Genesis adding, 'Fulfill the earth and multiply: so that it is
free from that common grant for any to take possession of
vacant countries' 85
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Hugh Henry Brac.keridge claims that this commandment, built on
the notion of a vacant country, was the explicit justification
Puritans used to take over America.
Can it be morally right for the white man to
occupy land that was already occupied by the
Indians?	 The Puritans had to answer this
question in the affirmative. 	 And they did,
resting their argument on two not unrelated
principles. Tne first was the idea that the
American's land was vacuum domicilium and the
Indians possessed it only by a natural right
which was not valid. The second rested on the
revealed word of God, in the Bible, ordaining
that man occupy the earth, increase and
multiply.86
An excerpt from 'An Essay on the Ordering of Towns' by an
anonymous Virginian author during Winthrop's administration
links the King's patent to this same biblical text:
Improvement of all his said ground...is one of
the principall clauses of that Grand Charter
made by the Greate Lord of the wholl earth and
King of the nations unto Adam: Replenish the
earth and subdue it...Therefore I cannot yet
see that any man hath theologicall right unto
-210-
any possession without a faithfull practicall
care of the performance of this principall
condition. 87
Locke devotes a chapter in the First Treatise to Genesis 1:28.
He concludes, in his challenge to Filrner, that this text gives
Adam no sovereignty over the world as the latter has argued,
but rather it is limited to providing property, where property,
Locke argues, is not the same as sovereignty.
If...Adam was made sole Proprietor of the whole
Earth, what will this be to his Soveraignty?
And how will it appear, that Property in Land
gives a Man Power over the Life of another?88
Locke goes on to argue that the property which God provides by
this commandment is not private to Adam but communal to all
men.
God who bid Mankind increase and multiply,
should rather himseif give them all a Right, to
make use of the Food and Rayment and other
Conveniences of Life.89
Locke reiterates this view in his chapter on property where he
speaks of, 'those Grants God made of the World to Adam',
concluding in similar terms to those above,
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God, who hath given the World to Men in common,
hath also given them reason to make use of it
to	 the	 best	 advantage	 of	 Life,	 and
convenience...no body has originally a private
Dominion, exclusive of the rest of Mankind.90
Locke makes clear that the commandment in Genesis 1:28 does not
just mean a rudimentary dominion over the world but extends
itself into the exclusively European realm of the conveniences
of life through knowledge in arts and sciences.
This great and primary Blessing of God
Almighty, Be fruitful, and multiply 1 and
replenish the Earth...contains in it the
improvement too of Arts and Sc.iences and the
conveniences of Life.91
Given that Locke describes the native Americans as a people who
for want of labour, 'have not one hundreth part of the
Conveniences we enjoy', he, like the other colonial writers,
interprets this verse to mean God wants America improved by the
arts, sciences and conviences of life which only Europeans
could bestow on it. 92 This viewpoint, that native Americans
were not following the commandment given in Genesis 1:28 made
certain conclusions inevitable, as Pearce makes clear.
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The fact that the Indians possessed their lands
only as a natural right, since that possession
existed anterior to and outside of a properly
civilized state and since that possession was
not in accordance with God's commandment to men
to occupy the earth, increase and multiply;
what followed, then, was that the land was
technically vacuum domicilium, and that the
English, who would farm the land and make it
fructify, who would give it order, were obliged
to take over.93
'Farming the land' was of great importance. The English
predisposition to aricu1tura1 activities in America over other
forms of industry was central not only to those writing on
trade, as has been discussed, but also to those defending
England's right to take over Indian land.
Thus John White writes,
It were a great wrong to Goc to conceive
He...tenders a gift that he never meant should
be enjoyed: now how men should make benefit of
the earth, but by culture and habitation cannot
bee imagined.94
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Above all, hunting or gathering on land provides no claim to
the land only the fruits or animals which are picked or slain
respectively. Stoddard states: 'There was some part of the
land that was...vacuurn domicilium... the Indians made no use of
it, but for huntin'.95
John Cotton's response to Roger Williams' claim that Indians
owned the land by virtue of their right to hunting grounds ran
along similar lines: 'We do not conceive this as a just title
to so vast a continent, to make no improvement of millions of
acres in it'.96
The relationship between English and Indian industry was often
described in terms of ratios. For example the land would yield
ten or a hundred times more given the correct application of
labour. These ratios are often coupled with a comparison
between the fertility of American soil and the paucity of
English and the necessary conclusion that it is industry which
makes the difference. Purchas writes in exactly these terms,
They have not above 5000 men able to bear
armes, which manured amd civilly planted might
well nourish 1500000 and many many more; as
appeareth by this our countrie [England], not
having so rich a natural inheritance. [my
emphasis]97
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Winthrop's ratios are decidedly lower and given in terms of
labour but reflect a similar comparison between the application
of industry in England versus America where yields would be 100
times better in the latter's fertile soil.
Many men spending as much labour and cost to
recover or keep sometimes an acre or two of
lands [in England) as would procure him many
hundreds of acres, as good or better, in
another place [namely Virginia].98
Strachey, like Purchas puts the ratio at 1 to a 1000.
In the wast and vast uninhabited growndes of
theirs, amongst a world of which not one foote
of a thousand doe they either use, or knowe
howe to turne to any benefitt.99
What is common to all of these comparisons between English and
Indian use of land is the element of industry or labour.
Cushman describes succinctly what Indians lack: 'They are not
industrious, neither have art, science, skill or faculty to use
either the land or the commodities of it'.10°
Winthrop ultimately draws the conclusion that it is industry
which lies at the heart of English claims to property: 'Men
-215-
accounted nothing their own but that which they had
appropriated by their own industry.'10'
The final element in all of these authors' justifications for
English claims in America is that they will cause the Indians
no injury. Rather, the Indians will gain from the superior
English knowledge, skills and technology. Firstly, there can be
no injury because there is more than enough for the use of both
English and Indians. Purchas comments:
And if a country be inhabited in some parts
thereof, other parts remaining unpeopled, the
same reason giveth liberty to other men which
want convenient habitation to seat themselves,
where (without wrong to others) they may
provide for themselves.102
Similarly, Winthrop gives as one of his reasons for why the
English cannot injure the Indians: 'There is more than enough
for them and us.'1°3
Far from injuring the natives, many of these writers argue that
English knowledge will be of benefit. Strachey states,
Nor is this any injurye unto them, from whome
we will not forceably take of their provision
and labours...but prepare and breake up newe
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growndes, and therby open unto them likewise a
newe waye of thrift or husbandry.104
One author asks:
What just cause of complaint may they
have?...God did create land, to the end that it
should by culture and husbandry yeeld things
necessary for mans life.105
This argument is made to the point where a few of the colonial
observers conclude that the Indians will in fact welcome the
English into their lands in order to benefit from their
superior culture, religion and agricultural knowledge.
Francis Higginson, comments in his New England's Plantations:
[The Indians] profess to like well of our
coming and planting here...because there is
abundance of ground that they cannot possess
nor make use of)°6
Winthrop concurs: 'We shall come in with good leave of the
natives.' 107
Ultimately, Winthrop argues, as Locke does, that all the world
was America. All once had a natural right to the soil and its
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products but Europeans have progressed beyond that by enclosing
the land into parcels providing these men with a qualitatively
different right, which Winthrop unlike Locke calls a civil
right, namely that of private property. The two stages
described by Winthrop in his essay defending England's right to
land in Virginia are echoed, as we shall see, in Locke's
chapter on property. Winthrop states:
For God hath given to the sons of men a twofold
right to the earth; there is a natural right,
and a civil right. The first right was
natural, when men held the earth in common,
every man soiing and feeding where he pleased.
Then, as men and cattle increased, they
appropriated some parcels of ground by
enclosing...and this in time got triem a civil
right.108
V - CONCLUSION
Thus, Locke's involvement in the development of English
colonial policy, drew him into the 17th century debates
surrounding the new enterprise. For Locke, like the other
liberal economic writers, there were, contrary to popular
opinion, firm economic reasons for colonizing the new world, if
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and only if the colonies concerned, followed certain rules.
For the plantations to succeed, England should only allow
agrarian cultivation, must limit the size of farms to
defensible proportions, and use English ships to transport all
goods. The second and related debate, over England's right to
take land occupied by another people, would have been of equal
interest to Locke. Like the defenders of English plantations,
Locke would eventually argue that Indians held the land in
common only; it was English cultivation which would begin
private property. These two sets of ideas, as we shall attempt
to show, were ultimately incorporated into both Locke's
practical ideas about current colonial interests and his more
encompassing political theory.
The specific answers developed by Locke in response to these
debates over the colonial enterprise can be discovered in a
practical way in the form of the the blueprint he created,
along with Shaftesbury for the plantation in Carolina. 	 Before
we consider his more theoretical reply in the Two Treatises, we
turn first to consider this colony.
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Chapter 5: Carolina - A Colonial Blueprint
Having examined English colonialism in general during the
latter part of the 17th century, and the debates which raged in
England over tne need for this new form of producing wealth, we
shall now turn to look at Carolina specifically. Using
documents written and endorsed by Locke on behalf of the Lords
Proprietors of this colony, it will be shown that Locke was
closely involved in the debates over colonization outlined in
the previous two chapters.
What first emerges from the colonial records of Carolina
between the years 1668 and 1675 is the degree to which Locke,
as secretary to the Lords Proprietor, is involved in the most
minute details of colonial life.' The amount of paperwork
involved in administering Carolina and therefore, which passed
through Locke's hands was, for the time, staggering. While
much of this paper has been lost, it is possible to deduce from
the documents that we do have, the amount of correspondence
which passed between the settlers in Carolina and the Lords
Proprietors in London. In 1670-1671, Locke wrote summaries of
all the letters and documents sent by the colonists to the
Lords Proprietors, which made requests or presented new
proposals. Five of these summaries still exist. In November
1670, Locke lists the contents of twenty separate letters
written to the Lords between September and November 1670.
Similarly in November 1671, Locke registers the contents of
twenty-six letters written to the Lords between August and
September 1671, giving a total, in just over five months, of
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forty-six letters all of which needed a reply. Of these forty-
six letters listed by Locke, twenty-six are missing and
therefore are not part of the documentary record cited above.2
Thus, the documents which will be referred to in the chapter
represent a fraction of tre work Locke actually did on behalf
of his patron and the other Lords. It is clear, however, that
Locke had an intimate day to day knowledge of Carolina and the
problems the Lords Proprietors had in attempting to implement,
often against the wishes of the colonists in America, their
particular form of colonization. What also emerges from the
colonial records is a clear picture of the problems faced by
the young colony arid the solutions posed by its champions, most
notably the Earl of Shaftesbury.
One cannot underestimate the 'zeal', as Cranston describes it,
of Shaftesbury in his colonial enterprise. Shaftesbury himself
describes Carolina in a letter to Sir Peter Colleton, one of
the other Lords Proprietors, on the 27th of November 1672, as
'a designe of soe faire hopes and soe greate consequence on
which I have sett my minde...[for this is].. my Darling.'3
Like other English colonies there were deep religious
connotations attached to the Englishman's role in the new
world. In a letter, endorsed by Locke, from Dr. Woodward (the
liaison in Carolina between the settlers and the Indians) to
Sir John Yeamans in September 1670, the former claims that he
has,
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discouered a Country soe delitious, pleasant &
fruitfull, yt were it cultivated doutless it
would proue a second Paradize.4
In a similar letter from the Council to the Lords Proprietors
in July 1670, Carolina is described in religious terms as the
new promised land where nature is overflowing; all that was
needed was the labour of Englishmen to bring it to fruition.
The colonist's descriptions echo those of the earlier
travelogues found in Locke's library, and the colonial
defenders of England's right to the land.5
Amongst those who founded Carolina was the belief that it, of
all the colonies, would become the jewel in England's crown.
Sir Peter Colleton in a letter to Locke in May 1673, writes:
'Carolina will excell all other English plantations.' 6 In an
enterprise of such excellence and of 'soe greate consequence',
it was essential to develop a clear idea of the exact steps
necessary to make it a success. The documents demonstrate that
the Lords Proprietors had just such a blueprint.
The first requirement of any colony is people, enough to ensure
the stability of the settlement. Only then could other needs
be considered. In a letter endorsed by Locke, Joseph Dalton,
the Secretary of the Colony, writes to Lord Ashley:
The Collony is indeed safely setled and with a
-235-
very propritious aspect there only remaines the
preservation of it which consists cheifly in two
things, carefull supplyes and a wise politicke
Government...By carefull supplyes I meane a
speedy peopling of this place.7
Locke, himself, writes, in a memorandum in November 1670, the
following statement: 'Welfare of plantation depending upon the
increase of peoples.' 8 One of the key reasons for peopling the
land quickly was to ensure that the Indians and Spanish were
discouraged from encroaching on the Lords Proprietors' land.
Sir George Carteret writes, in a letter endorsed by Locke:
The Indians were Spanish Indians with many
Spaniards among them sent from St.
Augustine...After Your HOflr hath perused this I
need not writte the want of more people.9
The Spanish settlements were a constant theme in the
correspondence between the colonists of Carolina and their
Lords Proprietors. Locke, himself, notes as early as September
1670 that the Spaniards are fighting against the English
colony) 0
 Several conflicts between English settlers in
Carolina and the Spanish colonizers to the south took place in
the early 1670's.
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The role of the Spanish colonies and their approach to the new
world during this period, as we have discussed in the previous
chapter, is fundamental to an analysis of the English method of
colonization. This is particularly true for those settlements
which were closest to Florida and Mexico, namely Carolina.
The Spanish approach to America and the Indians who lived there
was based on the right of conquest, justified on several
grounds including the Indians' refusal to obey 'natural law'.
Moreover, settlement was not necessarily the aim of Spanish
colonizers. In many cases they attempted to mine the land for
precious metals or gems and then move on to other sites.
As we have seen, the English approach to colonization was
different. The English colonizers, in the late 17th century,
believed that one's claim to land could not be made simply by
discovery or conquest)y was legitimized by the peaceable
agricultural industry of the colonizers on the land. 	 There
was a common view amongst the English that the Spanish were
there simply to plunder the land, through mining or other
means, while simultaneously conquering and enslaving the
natives in order to gain the riches of the new world. These
views are true for Carolina as well, as revealed in the
documentary record. William Owen, a leading settler in
Carolina, states of the Spanish in a letter to Lord Ashley,
and endorsed by Locke: 'It may be said that [the Spaniard]
cares not for ye Land.' In another letter, also sent to Ashley
-237-
arid endorsed by Locke in the same month, Joseph Dalton,
Secretary to the Colony, writes:
We are here settled in the very chaps of the
Spaniard whose clandestine actions both
domesticke and forraigne are not unknown to your
Lordshipp...they start bloud with a prick at a
thousend miles distance.1'
The relationship between the Spanish and Indians was generally
considered by the English colonists, to be one in which the
rights of the latter were not respected by the former. Dalton
goes on to say in tne same letter:
The Indians that are under him [Spanish] dare
not trust for his long continued tyranny among
them has taught them how to desire liberty.'2
All of these perceived elements in the Spanish method of
colonization: the lack of concern for the land, the refusal to
recognize the rights of Indians in terms of their lives and
liberties, and the belief in colonization through conquest and
the search for mines was rejected wholeheartedly by the English
colonizers. Carolina, with Shaftesbury as its champion,
provides a clear blueprint of the elements necessary to a
successful En1ish plantation. All of the elements of this
blueprint can be extracted from the colonial record in
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Carolina. They are consistent with, given some variation, the
overall English idea of colonization provided in the last
chapter.
Having peopled the land, the next necessary step in the
founding of a healthy settlement was to ensure the cultivation
of the land, keeping in proportion the amount of land enclosed
to the number of people present. Secondly, one needed to
establish towns so that trade could be done efficiently,
between England and the new world. Thirdly, industrious
individuals rather than the idle or poor were to be encouraged
to settle in America. Fourthly, mining and other forms of
'plundering' for riches associated with the Spanish were
rejected by the Lords Proprietors and were to be actively
discouraged by the council in Carolina. Fifthly, the Indians'
lives, liberties, and properties (as defined by English law)
were to be respected; slavery under no conditions was to be
allowed. Appropriation, therefore, was to occur by means of
peaceable industry and purchase of land rather than through
violent conquest. Finally, plantations would succeed only if
there was a gocd government with correct laws obeyed by all.
Each of these points will be taken in turn and examined in
relation to the colonial records of Carolina, for they not only
form the basis of the Carolina project but also underlie John
Locke's chapters on property and conquest in the Second
Treatise.
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In September 1671, the Earl of Shaftesbury wrote to ttie
colonists explaining how important it was that they settle in a
small area centred around a town with just enough ground for
each individual to cultivate, rather than laying claim to a
much larger piece of property.
A Towne in a healthy Place will give more
Reputation, Security and Advantage to us then
ten times that number of People scattered about
the countrey)3
Settlers, contrary to these instructions, often took up more
land then they could actually cultivate and a constant theme in
the Lords Proprietors' instructions to the councils in Carolina
was that settlement be orderly and enclosed land should not
exceed the amount which is allocated.
Thus the Lords Proprietors' instructions to Andrew Percival,
Register and Secretary to the Province, in May 1674, were:
y0U are to grant land to none that comes to
setle under yor Government, but upon condition
they setle in Towneships, and take up land
according to ye draught herewt delivered yoU)
Similarly in a letter to the Council in the same month, the
Lords Proprietors berate the settlers for failing to be:
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...observant of our orders...[to] Take up noe
more lands than what they had use for...
[occupying] scattered Settlement and large
Tracts of ground taken up not like to bee
planted these many years, [and] exclude others
from coming neare them.'5
These instructions were even legislated by the Lords
Proprietors under the conditions of the Temporary Laws for
Carolina:
To prevent the taking up of great tracts of land
sooner than they could be settled, it was
provided that...each land and cacique [should
have] but one barony [and] were to be required
to have upon his barony 30 persons.16
By 1675, Shaftesbury was making specific conditions on land
provided to the council. For example, in June of that year,
12,000 acres was given to a 1 4r. Sethell, 'on condition that
within five years he build ira it a Towne of at least Thirty
Houses and have at least Six score people upon it."7
The third important aspect of English colonial aspirations,
namely the encouragement of the industrious, becarre
increasingly important as the Lords Proprietors found the
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plantation's productivity was not increasing over time and was
gradually becoming nothing more than a steady drain on their
resources. The Lords Proprietors began to conclude that the
only explanation for why their great enterprise was failing to
provide a sufficient return on their investment, given the
great spontaneous nature of America's 'promised land', was that
the settlers were not industrious enough. Locke writes in a
memorandum in 1670, 'Governor and planters there somewhat
slugish. *18
'Industrious' thus became the key word to the Lords Proprietors
for it was the labour of those who would work that brought
value to the plantation. In a letter to Governor Joseph West
in December 1671, Shaftesbury writes:
Wee intend from time to time soe to furnish our
Stores that Industriouse People...may be supplyd
with things they want...but doe not intend that
the Lazy or debauchd who will never be good for
themselves or the Plantation shall run farther
in our Debts.19
In a memorandum written shortly after, Locke describes six
hundred people coming from New York as 'industrious people'.2°
In May 1674, the Lords Proprietors once again state their
intentions to supply only industrious men not 'the idle'.21
The industry of the 'industrious' was, as has been discussed,
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agrarian in nature. Thus, phrases like 'better Husbands [to
the land] and more industrious', in correspondence between the
Lords Proprietors and the council reflects the close connection
between farming and the Lords' idea of labour.22
Moreover, other forms of labour were actively discouraged.
Shaftesbury went to great lengths to deter the search for
precious metals amongst the settlers, fearing l 't would enrich
the individual but undermine the plantation. In April 1671, he
writes to Henry Woodward:
If those Inland Countrys have given you any
knowledge or conjecture of Mines there I
earnestly desire you not to give the least hint
of it to anybody whatsoever For feare our People
being tempted by the hopes of present gairie
should forsake their Plantation.23
In this letter, Shaftesbury suggests that Woodward use a
pseudonym for gold and sliver in case someone should come
acrosz' the letters and take advantage of the information
contained therein.
Give me some hint of it in Letters...Pray call
gold always Antimony and Silver Iron by which I
shall be able to understand you without any
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danger if your Letters should fall into other
hands 24
Woodward followed instructions and used the term antimony for
gold in a subsequent letter. A final letter from Ashley, but
written in Locke's own hand to Governor William Saile in May
1671 contains another set of instructions ordering the council
to use all possible measures to stop the settlers from
searching for quick riches.
If you firide that any such report is got amongst
the people that farther up in the country there
are mines of gold and silver I desire you would
endeavour to suppresse it and put it out of
their heads by all means you can.25
The fifthelement in the blueprint for Carolina's success as a
colony is a respect for others rights and attempts to settle
peaceably amongst those already established in the Americas
rather than conquering them. One of the advertisements which
Locke helped to draft in order to induce Englishmen to settle
in Carolina promised liberty to all so long as they were:
...behaving themselves peaceable and quietly and
not using this liberty to licentiousness nor the
civil injury or outward disturbance of others.26
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In May 1670, a Mr. John Rivers, agent for Lord Ashley, was on a
ship bound for Carolina when it hit a storm and went off
course. Rivers' boat landed at St. Katherine, Florida and he
and seven others were taken prisoner by the Spanish. Appeals
were made on their behalf and finally in October 1670, a
'Memorial to the Spanish Ambassador', written in Locke's hand,
was sent on behalf of the Lords Proprietors. Contained within
it was their view of English colonization. It states:
And the said Lords &C having sent those persons
with a designe only to plant and carry on the
fore mentioned plantation without disturbing any
others whatsoever...nor shall they allow any
piracy nor permit any of their people to invade
others with force or use any acts of
hostility.27
The Lords Proprietors' desire for peaceful relations also
extended to the native Americans. In December 1671, temporary
laws, written in Locke's own hand, were sent to the Governor
and Council of Carol 4 na forbidding the enslavement of nati'e
Americans under any circumstances.
Noe Indian upon any occasion or pretense
whatsoever is to be made a slave [or] without
his owne consent to be caned out of our
Country. 28
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This viewpoint was reiterated many times in correspondence from
the Lords Proprietors to the Council in Carolina. In another
letter, the Lords give specific instructions that the colonists
are to 'observe the rules of strict justice, friendshipp and
amity with the neighbour Indians.' 29 To insure the Indians are
not being treated unjustly, the Lords asked the council to send
back:
A true account of what tribute or payment are
rendered by any of our people or officers from
any of the Indians and upon what account such
tribute or payment is demanded.3°
It should be noted that the 'just' treatment of Indians
encouraged by the Lords was, as in other English settlements,
partially based on an ontological distinction drawn between the
native American as 'natural' pre-Christian man who, with the
fullness of time, would be transformed from their natural state
into civil Christian men, and the African black who was somehow
less than human. In other words, the latter could be enslaved
and the former could not an 1 , consequently, Locke and his
patron could simultaneously hold shares in the the African
slave trade and author explicit instructions against slavery as
quoted above.
Secondly and perhaps more importantly, the Lords hoped that
through friendship, the Indians would be of service to, rather
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than enemies of, the English. Colonial documents from Carolina
clearly demonstrate this link between the extension of
friendship to the Indian population and the belief that the
Indians would offer their services and allegiance to the
English colonists in return. England could, consequently, rule
over the Indians without the need for the Spanish method of
conquest or violence. Shaftesbury tells Stephen Bull, his
deputy in Carolina, that it would be,
...very agreeable to our design...to get and
continue the friendship and assistance of the
Indians and make them useful without force or
injury. Should be very glad that all the tribes
of Indians round about had each an Englishman
for their Cassique.31
In another letter, whose superscription is in Locke's hand,
Shaftesbury commends one of the settlers for being made a
cassique but reminds him where the greater power lies, namely
in England and amongst the Lords Proprietors:
I am glad you have behaved yourselfe soe well
towards the Indians that they have chosen you
there Cassica...pray be careful to use them
justly and kindly, and by none but faire ways
endeavour to unite them with us. But if you
answer my expectations in the management of my
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affairs...I shall be able to make you a more
considerable Cassique then any of the Indians
there. 32
The final element for the English blueprint for colonization in
Carolina was the need for a wise government and a set of sound
laws obeyed by all. Such a constitution, would have as its two
main objectives: the protection of the individual lives,
liberties and properties of the colonists and the orderly
management and division of the land by the government. It is
clear that the latter objective, in the eyes of Carolina's
founders, eventually superceded the former.
On the first objective, Shaftesbury writes to Joseph West in
November 1670 that the new government and its laws must uphold
the rights of the individual in terms of life, liberty and
property vis a vis his neighbour.
We shall endeavour to establish our Government
on strict rules of equity and Justice, and as we
shall take care that noe body there shall be
oppressed in his just rights and lyberties, soe
we expect that noe body should offer to injure
us by such fraud which we will not suffer him to
use to his neighbour.33
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The Fundamental Constitutions also reflected this objective of
insuring the rights of the individual citizens particularly in
terms of their religious freedom.34
Shaftesbury refers to the Fundamental Constitutions, in another
letter to West, when it is clear that factions have formed
within the new colony and power is no longer being wielded in
the interests of the people. He begins by stating, 'I know how
hard it is for -Jealousy to be removed and Factions united when
once begunn though amongst men.' 35 He tells the colonists to
look to the 'Fundamentall Constitutions', or as he describes
them, the 'Laws of liberty', to find and insure peace and
stability within the colony.
I recommend...to keepe unbiassed to those rules
you will finde in our Fundamental
Constitutions...haveing binn soe carefull to
balance one anothers power to prevent the
ingroseing it into any one hand.36
Thus, the defense of individual rights and liberties in a young
colony such as Carolina is, in part, to insure the stability of
the settlement as a whole. Shaftesbury is concerned with the
potential for one neighbour to take up against another or for
factions and jealousies to undermine the stability of the
colony.
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The second objective of the constitution, namely the peaceful
and orderly division of land, became increasingly difficult to
manage as factions developed and individual settlers
appropriated ever greater tracts of land. The government of
Carolina was encouraged to override the natural rights of the
individual to property in the interests of the whole. For
example, the local council was explicitly told to limit the
rights of individuals who claim land they might cultivate
through their own labour or buy from the Indians to an amount
stipulated by the Lords Proprietors.
As early as 1663, the Lords Proprietors wrote to Sir William
Berkeley, the Governor of Virginia and Carolina, about the
importance of enforcing the allotment laws against those who
might claim more land by virtue of labour or purchase. The
last sentence in the following quotation reflects the Lords'
awareness that many of the settlers could react against a
government who so circumscribes their natural freedoms,
We understand that the people that are there
have bought great tracts of land from the
Indians, which if they injoye will weaken the
plantation...wherefore it is our resolution and
desire that you persuade and compell those
persons to be sattisfyed with such proportions
as we allot to others...more will but scatter
the people and render them lyable to be easyly
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destroyed by any eneymyes soe that the fixing
the way our Instructions mentions wilbe the best
course of setling...Keepe this Letter and our
Instructions and proposealls private to your
selfe.37
In May 1672, a letter from Locke to Captain Kingdon reiterates
the need to limit people to the lands provided under the
constitutions. Individuals are not to claim property through
their labour alone but as surveyed and granted by the laws
written by the Lords Proprietor:
Upon consideration this day had of the better
reducing the settlement of this Province to the
Rules of the Lords Proprietors instructions and
for disposing and preserving of an orderly
method therein to the sattisfaction of all men
as much as may be and for the prevention of
differences and inconveniences which hereafter
may happen for want of knowledge of the true
bounds and limitts of lands And...as divers
persons have taken up severall quantitys of land
in this Province which...have not yett been
surveyed or bounded...it is this day ordered by
the Grand Councill that all...possessed of any
lands not surveyed and fully bounded...forthwith
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Itake out warrants for their lands so as the same
may be surveyed. 38
These five elements of the blueprint for English colonization
in Carolina are similar to those of other colonies. The Lords'
objectives, like those of other English colonists must be
understood in contrast to the Spanish approach to the new
world. The English believed that through their method of
colonization, Spanish claims, founded on little more than
discovery and conquest would fall into English hands, by virtue
of the stability of their settlement. In the competition for
America's riches, the English method was bound to win.
There is no clearer summary of all the elements of this English
blueprint of colonization and their centrality to England's
hoped for dominance in America than in a letter written in John
Locke's own hand, on behalf of Lord Ashley to the Governor of
Carolina, William Saile on May 13, 1671:
You are to take care...that you suffer not the
people out of greedinesse to molest either the
Spaniards on that side or any of our neighbour
Indians in their quiet possessions...the people
may goe noe farther up into the country then
what shall be necessary to their planting. This
you are to looke well after as you will answer
it to his Majestie whose pleasure it is that we
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should keepe our selves within the rules of the
peace. Neither doe we thinke it advantageous for
our people to live by rapin and plunder which we
doe not nor will not allow Planting and Trade
is both our designe and your interest and if you
will but therein follow our directions we shall
lay a way open to you to gett all the Spaniards
riches in that Country with their consent, and
without any hazard to yourselves, and therefore
I must presse it upon you that you bind the
peoples mind wholy to planting and trade,
wherein if they will with industry and honestly
imploy themselves they will not only answer his
Majesty's and our ends of sending them thither
but finde themselves with great safety and ease
become masters of all that is desirable in those
parts.
This is the English method of colonization, succinctly written
by John Locke and covering each of the elements we have
discussed at length in this chapter. The encouraging of
agricultural cultivation of the land and trading through towns
('planting and trade is both our designe and interest'), the
application of honest industry by settlers ('if they will with
industry and honestly imploy themselves'), the rejection of
plundering land for riches ('We think it disadvantageous for
our people to live by rapin' and plunder which we doe not nor
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will not allow'), the treating of Indians with respect,
('suffer not...to molest...our neighbour Indians') and finally
the need for the rule of law, ('keepe ourselves within the
rules of the peace') are all components in both the maintenance
of the English colony and, without any need of conquest, the
expansion into, and absorption of, Spanish riches.
Thus, Locke and Shaftesbury have, with their colonial blueprint
for Carolina, provided the strongest and most practical
response to the questions raging in England over both the need
for colonies at all, and more particularly, England's right to
claim a land already occupied by another people. It is this
debate, as described in the previous chapter, and Locke's
response to it, in the form of the colonial blueprint described
above, which, as I shall argue in the next chapter, constitutes
the basis for Locke's chapter on property.
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Chapter 6: Colonialism - Locke's Theory of Property
Property lies at the heart of John Locke's Two Treatises of
Government. The creation of property and its protection
constitute the foundation of the state of nature and civil
society respectively. Property, its origin and protection are
also central to England's colonial settlements in America, and
by extension, to the Earl of Shaftesbury's Carolina. Locke's
chapter on property, as I shall demonstrate, is,
simultaneously, a philosophical treatise expounding the natural
right to property as the basis of civil government, an
exposition of the economic benefits of the English plantation,
and a defense of England's right to American soil. While his
basic schism between natural man and civil society reflects the
accounts of America and its inhabitants contained in his
library's travelogues, the specific chapter on property
incorporates the more polemical arguments discussed in the
preceding chapters regarding both the right and economic wisdom
of England's settling in America. Consequently, Locke's
chapter on property is an economic defense, like that of Josiah
Child and Charles Davenant of England's colonial aims and
methods in America. It is also, an ethical justification, like
those of Samuel Purchas and Johr Winthrop, of England's
appropriation of American soil. While following in the
tradition of these defenders of the English plantation, Locke's
chapter on property, as we shall see, provides, through
incorporation of the new doctrine of natural rights, an
original and forceful argument.
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I - PROPERTY: PRELIMINARY REMARKS
Locke's definition of property has often been discussed by
scholars, and many have concluded that he uses the term
'property' in at least two different ways: the first, or narrow
definition, is land and objects external to the individual
which are owned by him, and therefore closer to the definition
we now use for the term. The second is the broader definition
meaning the property within the individual as well, that is,
his 'Life, Liberty and Estate'.'
What is peculiar about his use of these two definitions is
that, on examination, they are used in very specific sections
of the Second Treatise. As Peter Laslett states, the broader
definition is always used 'except in the chapter on property,
and in other cases where it is clear that material possessions
are meant.' 2 Of the twenty references to 'property' in the
narrow sense, fifteen of them occur in the chapters, 'On
Property' and 'Conquest'. None of the twelve references that
Laslett has listed of property defined as 'Life, Liberty and
Estate', occur in these two chapters. In other words, the two
definitions seem to be mutually exclusive and are used by Locke
in very specific places in his argument.
It is significant that he chooses to use land and its products
as his definition of property chiefly in chapter five of the
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Second Treatise because, as I hope to demonstrate, his argument
there revolves around the issue of who has right to,
specifically, land in Arrierica, and not the more philosophical
question, reflected in the broader definition of natural
rights, in terms of the person and his freedom, with which the
rest of the Second Treatise is more concerned. This pattern'
becomes even more significant to our analysis when you combine
it with the almost exclusive use Locke makes of American
Indians in the same chapters.
The state of nature and its inhabitants, as philosophical
concepts, are referred to throughout Locke's Second Treatise.
American Indians, however, as examples of actual natural men,
are referred to only in the chapters on conquest, the beginning
of political societies and above all, on property. Half of the
references to America or its inhabitants in the Second
Treatise, are contained in the twenty six paragraphs of the
chapter on property. Thus, chapter 5 is the meeting point in
Locke's argument between property defined as land, and natural
man defined as the American Indian.
Like the travelogue writers and the defenders of England's
right to America, Locke equates the situation of early Biblical
men with those living in America in his references to the state
of nature. Thus at paragraphs 130 and 131 of the First
Treatise, Locke equates the situation of a planter in the West
Indies making war, with that of Abraham arid Esau in the Bible.
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In the chapter on property in the Second Treatise, Locke again
refers, when he discusses the principle of labour as the basis
for value in things, to Adam and his descendents in relation to
the 'several Nations of the Americans'. 3 Another example would
be the famous line from this same chapter which echoes that of
Genesis 'Thus in the beginning all the World was America'.4
Finally, Locke equates the 'first peopling of the World by the
Children of Adam or Noah' with those who 'plant in some in-
land, vacant places of America'. 5 Peter Laslett notes that,
'this passage is a direct statement of Locke's assumption that
the state of nature in contemporary America can be assimilated
to the conditions of patriarchal times.' 6 Laslett is correct,
but he fails to point out that such references are common
currency for those who are travelling to the new world as
colonizers and Christian missionaries or for those writers who
are trying to defend the right of England to American lands.
Locke is simply using the language of those who see the native
inhabitants of the colonies as pre-civilized Europeans, waiting
to be brought into the religious light of the new Testament and
the political light of civilized England. Consequently the
question, 'How was private property created by the first men?'
is for the Locke the same question as, 'Who has just title to
appropriate the lands of America now?'. The chapters on
property and conquest reflect Locke's decision to answer both
questions simultaneously.
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The chapter on property begins with the premise that 'God...has
given the Earth to the Children of Men, given it to Mankind in
common.' 7 The question of private property is immediately
raised but in very specific terms. Locke writes, 'It seems to
some a very great difficulty, how any one should ever come to
have a Property in any thing.' 8 The 'some' that Locke refers
to includes Samuel Pufendorf, the natural law theorist.
Locke's statement at the end of this paragraph that he hopes to
show how men come to have a property in several parts of the
'common' 'without any express Compact of all the Commoners' is
a clear reference to Pufendorf's insistence that property can
only be made private when consented to by all. 9 As James Tully
concludes in reference to this paragraph:
Who are the some who find difficulties with this
particular problem of individuation of common
property?...one member of the 'some' is clearly
Pufendorf.1°
Thus, Locke's initial discussion of common and how property
comes to be private is written, as Tully argues, in the
tradition of natural law. Sir Robert Filmer, in his
Observations Concerning the Original of Government, concludes
that natural law is 'a logically inconsistent foundation for
political theory.'' 1 It is Locke's desire to criticize Filmer,
according to Tully, which sparks his decision to use natural
law as the basis for his chapter on property.
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The presence and widespread awareness of Filmer's
critique renders a consistent natural law theory
of property a necessary precondition for Locke's
major goal, a convincing resistance theory.'2
Locke is indeed engaged in an argument based on natural law.
However, his purpose, like that of Francisco Vitoria, Hugo
Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf, is not simply in reference to
domestic politics as Tully claims. 13 Natural law, as has been
argued in a previous chapter, is firmly rooted in the colonial
expansion of Spain, Holland and England. Vittoria, Grotius,
and Locke are all using natural law to reach positions which
will justify their country's claims in disputes over
colonization in the new world.
Locke begins his chapter on property, as Grotius did, with the
idea of man's common ownership of the world as a positive
thing. If everybody owns everything it is necessary to find
the basis for denying someone else's claim to the same fruit
that you are about to use. 'There must of necessity be a means
to appropriate them some way or other before they can be of any
use, or at all beneficial to any particular Man.'' 5 Founding
property is the right to deny other individuals' claims as
Locke makes clear when re first introduces the American Indian
in his argument.
-266-
The Fruit, or Venison, which nourishes the wild
Indian...must be his and so his, i.e. a part of
him, that another can no longer have any right to
it, before it can do him any good for the support
of his Life.'6
The question that both Locke and Grotius are addressing and
upon which their positive community is based is: Upon what
criterion can one individual claim to own anything vis a vis
his neighbours and thereby deny them the right to use the same
object? While the answer given by Grotius, as has been shown,
is a defense of Dutch colonial aspirations on the sea, Locke's
response constitutes a similar colonial defense, only of
English interests on the land.
II - THE INDIAN'S DEER: PROPERTY IN THE EARTH'S PRODUCTS
The criterion Locke develops as the basis for private ownership
of property is, of course, labour. Again, he refers to the
Indian in making this point.
Thus this Law of reason makes the Deer, that
Indian's who hath killed it; 'tis allowed to be
his goods who hath bestowed his labour upon it,
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though before, it was the common right of every
one. '17
This initial premise that labour founds property echoes John
Winthrop in his General Considerations for Planting in New
England, where he states, 'Men accounted nothing their own but
that which they had appropriated by their own industry.'' 8
 This
premise will form the basis of Winthrop's defense of England's
right to 'take land, which is and hath been of longtime
possessed of others [i.e. the Indian s].' 19 Labour is used by
other theorists in their analysis of property. For example
Locke's friend and colleague, Tyrell discusses labour at some
length, using Indians to demonstrate his principle of labour in
relation to the fruits of the earth. 2° Unlike Locke, however,
Tyrell uses labour as the means to retain property once taken
rather than as the way by which it is founded. As Peter
Laslett comments of Tyrell:
Following Grotius, he refers to the Stoic axiom
about seats in the theatre, and cites many other
arguments about property, ignored by Locke: for
him the labour proposition is not the one rational
method of making use of the earth's produce, but
rather a ground for retaining property acquired.21
For Locke, labour, defined as agrarian cultivation, is the only
rational method of appropriating the products of the earth.
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Unlike Pufendorf and Filrner, the consent of the commoner is not
required in the state of nature to begin property through
labour:
And will any one say he had no right to those
Acorns or Apples he thus appropriated, because he
had not the consent of all Mankind to make them
his?...If such a consent as that was necessary,
Man had starved, notwithstanding the Plenty God
had given him. 22
It should be noted that on this important matter of the
necessity of consent to appropriate from the common, Locke will
distinguish between English and American property held in
common when he discusses land rather than simply that which
exists upon it. 23
 For Locke, while the individual in America
need not have the consent of his fellows to appropriate
property, he is required to do so in England. This will be
discussed in greater detail when we consider the issue of land
specifically.
What is clear from this initial section on the fruits of the
earth and the beasts which live upon it is that the right of
Indians to ownership of the spontaneous products of nature is
equivalent to that of the English or civil man. There are no
comparisons here, as we shall see in his argument regarding
land, between the industriousness of the native American and
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the Englishman. The defense of the Indian's right to his
venison is completely consistent with the colonial viewpoint.
Amongst the travel books and the writings of those defending
England's right to take over American soil, are the constant
themes of nature's spontaneous bounty in America and the
Indians right to use it. 24 The basic needs of Indians for
subsistence, namely the fruits and beasts of the earth, did not
interfere with English colonial aims, and therefore, as has
been noted in previous chapters, English proprietors often
defended the right of Indians to claim the products of the
earth so long as they did not claim the land itself.
While Locke's defense of the Indian's right to the deer is
consistent with the views of Englarids' colonizers, he believes,
like them, that the crux of the issue lay not in the land's
products but in the soil itself. Thus he quickly turns in his
chapter on property to the 'chief matter of Property', which
Locke concludes is 'not the Fruits of the Earth [nor} the
Beasts that subsist on it, but the Earth it self.'25
III - PROPERTY IN LAND: CULTIVATION AND ENCLOSURE
Immediately after introducing the question of land, Locke
asserts that the principle which governs private appropriation
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of the products of nature also applies to the soil itself. 'I
think it is plain, that Property in that too [the Earth itself]
is acquired as the former [the fruits and beas ts].' 26 Labour
is thus the basis of appropriation of land but it is a very
specific form of labour, namely agricultural cultivation.
Locke continues in the next sentence, 'As much Land as a Man
Tills, Plants, Improves, Cultivates and can use the Product of,
so much is his Property. He by his Labour does, as it were,
inclose it from the Common.' 27
 These two factors, cultivation
and enclosure, determine private property for Locke. Each will
be considered in turn in terms of their use in chapter 5 of the
Second Treatise and the colonial writings of his day.
Throughout Locke's chapter on property are references to the
agrarian cultivation of land. At paragraph 35, he speaks of
'cultivating' the earth; at 36, of 'plough, sow and reap'; at
37, of 'improvement, tillage or husbandry' ; at 38, of he who
'tilled and reaped'; and at 42, of 'Pasturage, Tillage' and
'Planting'. 28
 When discussing the cultivation of soil in this
chapter, Locke often uses for his examples crops native to
America. In paragraphs 36, 37, 43 and 48, he speaks of corn,
the crop which Spanish author D'Acosta, quoted by Locke in the
Second Treatise, describes as peculiar to the Americas.
In our discourse of plants wee will beginne with
those which are proper and peculiar to the
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Indies...Mays [corn] holds the first place and
with reason...God hath imparted to ev'ry region
what is needefull...to the Indians he hath given
May •29
Locke also refers, in paragraph 40 to tobacco, the most
important crop of New England, and sugar, the staple crop of
Barbados, in which Locke once had shares.3°
Thus, like Child, Davenant, Purchas, and Shaftesbury, Locke
concludes, in the Second Treatise, that agrarian labour, as
opposed to hunting or mining, considered to be the Indian and
Spanish methods, respectively, is the only legitimate basis for
claiming property. Locke's defense of argrarian cultivation
develops, in chapter 5, a distinctly Christian dimension.
God, when he gave the World in common to all
Mankind, commanded Man also to labour...He that in
Obedience to this Command of God, subdued, tilled
and sowed any part of it, thereby annexed to it
something that was his Property, which another had
no Title to.'3'
It is worth noting the term 'subdued', in the text, has
Biblical overtones. Locke is echoing the words of Genesis I,
28, 'Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth and
subdue it'. As has been discussed, many of the writers
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defending England's right to America refer to thjs specific
Biblical verse. Both John Winthrop, the governor of New
England and John Cotton use this quotation from Genesis for
their defense of England's right to American soil.32
From subduing the land, Locke makes the inevitable leap, that
Winthrop and his fellow writers do, to claiming dominion. God,
consequently, not only commanded the English in America to
cultivate the land, in accordance with Genesis I, 28, but to
appropriate and hold dominion over it as well.
In language strikingly similar to Locke's, Sir George Peckham
draws the Christian connection, in his defense of England's
right to American soil, between subduing and agrarian labour,
when he states, 'Since the nativitie of Christ, mightie and
puisant empourers and kings have performed the like, I say to
plant, possess and subdue.' 33
 Locke comments:
Hence subduing or cultivating the Earth, and
having Dominion , we see are joyned together. The
one geve Title to the other. So that God, by
commanding to sudue, gave Authority so far to
appropriate .34
The second aspect to Locke's initial definition of property in
land is enclosure. The term 'enclosure' is used repeatedly by
Locke. Like his use of 'cultivation' throughout this chapter
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on property, Locke reintroduces enclosure with each aspect of
his argument. At paragraph 33, enclosure is discussed in
relation to injury of other rights, at paragraph 38 in relation
to spoilage, and at 48 in the context of the use of money.
Enclosure is clearly something which the individual does in
order to begin property and thereby prevent other individuals
from encroaching upon it.35
Enclosure, as has been discussed, was central to the English
notion of property in the new world. The headright system in
Carolina depended on the surveying and marking out boundaries
to individual pieces of property. Moreover, the colonial
record makes clear that Indians rarely enclosed land and only
complied with English views on enclosure when commanded to do
so by English courts. 36
 Similarly, Purchas, Winthrop and the
defenders of England's right to American soil refer to the
Indians as without claim to property for 'they enclose no
ground', and proprietorship as well as value can only be
brought to land when it is enclosed and cultivated by the
English. '
Locke clearly concurs with this idea, arguing that it is the
act of enclosure, along with that of cultivation which brings
value to the land. He uses ratios, like the other writers, to
make his point.
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The provisions serving to the support of humane
life, produced by one acre of inc.losed and
cultivated land, [my emphasis] are...ten times
more, than those, which are yielded by an acre of
Land, of an equal richnesse, lyeing wast in
common.38
Because land cultivated in common cannot be considered
appropriated orof any value until it is enclosed by the
individual, native Americans engaged in agricultural activities
as a collective unit, rather than as individuals within
enclosed ground, will have no exclusive right to their
property. Thus the Indian nation, in Locke's theory of
property, can have no authority over their land, until they
adopt a European form of agrarian labour. Title to property,
that is the right to exclude others from it, can Ofli be
claimed, by definition, by the individual.
Thus, property is begun in land by individual cultivation and
enclosure. Locke is quick to argue that such appropriation is
not unlimited. One can on 1 y appropriate land under two well-
known conditions; if there is enough for everyone else and if
it does not spoil. The first condition is not an issue in
America because there is enough for everyone. The second
limitation, namely spoilage, is of more consequence in the
American context. Locke states explicitly that the law of
nature which prevented spoilage in the products of the soil,
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'governed the Possession of Land too'. 39 Once again Locke's
views echo those involved in trade to the new world. Where
Davenant concludes that the plantation should extend only as
far as 'we can...cultivate' and taking up property should never
become a 'bar to the industry of others,' Locke states that one
'had a Property in...all that his Industry could extend to'
(i.e. without spoilage); to cultivate more 'robb'd others'.4°
If either the Grass of his Inclosure rotted on the
Ground, or tne Fruit of his planting perished
without gathering, and laying up, this part of the
Earth, notwithstanding his Inclosure, was still to
be looked on as Waste, and might be the Possession
of any other.4'
Thus, it is not only the grass or fruit which is again open to
appropriation but the land itself. Consequently, Indians are
limited to that which they may immediately consume: if there is
any spoilage, their land may be appropriated, according to the
law of nature, by those who can avoid such spoilage.
IV - PROPERTY: THE ROLE OF TRADE AND COMMERCE
The argument is taken a step further by Locke when he
introduces the notion of money as a means to transcend this
-276-
second limitation. While Locke's ostensible reason for
introducing money is the need to overcome the waste or spoilage
of too much appropriation, Locke fails to point out that money,
in the form of 'a little piece of yellow metal', namely gold,
was not necessary to his purpose; the Indians themselves had
means to avoid spoilage through barter or trade in other forms
of currency. 42 As Herman Lebovics argues,
If Locke's main concern had been purely the divine
and human abhorrence of spoilage and waste, he did
not have to provide a money economy to avoid this
violation of natural law. Barter was practised by
many of the peoples about whom Locke read in his
books of voyage and travel. Moreover, one can
store valuable things in excess of needs in many
forms other than gold and silver coins.43
Locke needed gold and silver, not so much a means to overcome
the spoilage limitation, as the only avenue by which vast acres
of land could be appropriated and cultivated in America and the
goods sold to the rest of the world. The Indians, without gold
and silver, were incapable of this task. Locke states that the
'Inhabitants thereof not having joyned with the rest of
Mankind, in the consent of the Use of their common Money' have
left, 'great Tracts of Ground [lying] waste'. Locke goes on to
argue that without access to the world market to sell their
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products, the Indians, themselves, would never appropriate
these lands beyond what was necessary for subsistence.
What would a Man value Ten Thousand, or an Hundred
Thousand Acres of excellent Land...of the in-land
Parts of America, where he had no hope of Commerce
with other Parts of the World, to draw Money to
him by the Sale of the Product? It would not be
worth the inclosing, and we should see him give up
again to the Wild Common of Nature, whatever was
more than would supply the Conveniences of Life to
be had there for him and his Family.44
Locke thus uses money based on a silver or gold standard as the
means by which he can both limit the Indian's right to property
and define the remaining land as 'waste' and therefore open to
appropriation by others. As Martin Seliger comments,
[Locke] bestowed upon the developed states, the
states amongst which 'the silver money of Europe'
is current the right to determine what was more
land than the inhabitants could make use of.45
The people who could appropriate soil beyond that accrued by
their labour and need for subsistence, namely the 'ten thousand
or an Hundred Thousand Acres of excellent land' are, thus, not
the Inhabitants who labour on it, but those who have money and
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can engage in commerce with the rest of the world, namely the
English colonists. Josiah Child and Charles Davenant, in
writing about the relationship between plantations and trade,
use this conclusion as the first premise in their defense of
English colonies and the Royal Charters, which often involved
hundreds of thousands of acres, like the one granted to
Shaftesbury and his colleagues in Carolina.46
It is the potential to exchange the wealth of the land through
trade in hard currency with other countries which both fuels
and justifies the massive appropriation of land by English
colonial interests. As Locke writes in notes he wrote for an
essay on trade, 'The chief end of trade is riches and
power...riches consist in plenty of moveables that will yield a
price to foraigner...espetially in plenty of gold and
silver.
Labour thus begins property for the Indian only in the products
of the soil and small parcels of land. The use of money begins
property for the Englishman in everything else. Locke
explicitly states that it is those with money who have a right
to greater possessions. 'The Invention of Money...introduced
(by Consent) larger Possessions, and a Right to them.' [my
emphasis] Moreover, Locke claims, it was the agreement to use
'gold and silver', which makes 'plain', 'that Men have agreed
to disproportionate and unequal Possession of the Earth', that
is, the entire globe.48
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V - VACUUM DOMICILLIUM: WASTE LAND
Throughout Locke's discussion of spoilage, he often refers to
land in America lying 'waste'. Vacuum domicillium, as has been
discussed, is central to the defense of England's colonial
claims in the 17th century; for example, Purchas's reference to
'vacant places' in America or George Strachey's 'wast and vast
uninhabited growndes.' 49 It is also a term used repeatedly in
Locke's chapter on property, particularly as an antonym for
cultivation and enclosure. Locke explicitly defines waste at
paragraph 42, by simultaneously imparting a perjorative
connotation to land lying in common arid invoking a direct,
inverse correlation to European forms of cultivation.
Land that is left wholly to Nature, that hath no
improvement of Pasturage, Tillage or Planting, is
called, as indeed it is, wast; and we shall find
the benefit of it amount to little more than
nothing.50
Waste is defined as the antonym of cultivation again at
paragraphs 36 and 37. Similarly, Cushman makes the same
connection between vacant land and the need for tillage when he
states, 'the country is yet raw [and] the land untilled.'5'
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This notion of waste or vacant land is used both in the
descriptions of America given in Locke's travelogues, and, more
importantly, to underpin the defense of England's right to
American soil amongst colonizers in the new world. Thus,
Samuel Purchas, George Strachey, Robert Cushman, Robert Gray,
and John Winthrop all begin their defenses of England's right
to American soil with the premise that the land is vacant or
was ted.52
While 'vacant' land seems to be that which has not yet been
touched by human hands, waste can also be defined as soil which
has not been properly tended to. Thus Locke refers to a piece
of 'neglected, and consequently waste Land'. 53
 Locke's use of
neglect is important for it implies that one can judge in the
case of property which has been used by other people, whether
they have in fact neglected the land and thereby made it
nothing more than waste and available again for appropriation
through the labour of others. The sentence referred to above
concludes that neglected land may be appropriated by he, who is
willing to cultivate it. Locke thus talks about the individual
who 'by hi Industry on neglected and consequently waste Land
[increases] the stock of Corn.'54
This notion of waste land also plays an important role in
Locke's theory of conquest which he, himself, describes as, 'at
first sight...a strange Doctrine, it being so quite contrary to
the practice of the World.' Locke's 'strange doctrine' asserts
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that while a conqueror has 'an absolute power over the Lives'
of those he conquered, 'he has not thereby a Right and Title to
their Possessions'.55
VI - CONQUEST AND PROPERTY
In his chapter on 'Conquest', Locke explicitly states that
conquest provides neither individuals nor nations with any
right to the land of the vanquished, but only to an amount of
the land's products proportional to the reparations due.
The right then of Conquest extends only to the
Lives of those who joyn'd in the War, not to their
Estates, but only in order to make reparation for
the damages received...The destruction of a Years
Product or two...is the utmost spoil, that usually
can be done.56
This argument is completely consistent with the case made by
the defenders of the English plantation that the agricultural
settlement rather than mining or conquest was the better method
of colonization. The two methods were often directly compared,
as when Charles Davenant states:
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The Collective Body of a Nation has but two
Courses of acquiring Wealth, either by Inroads and
Depredations upon its neighbours, or by the Trade,
Labour, Arts, and Manufactures of its People.57
Amongst Locke's papers in the Lovelace Collection is a
representation to the Lord Justices, signed by Locke, which
claims that the Spanish are engaged in the the first method of
acquiring wealth, namely, depredations upon their neighbours,
'by alluring away their inhabitants with hopes of mines and
treasures' 58
For both Davenant and Locke, only the second method, namely
labour and trade should be the basis of England's creation of
wealth. In a letter in Locke's own handwriting are the
following instructions to colonists in Carolina:
Neither doe we thinke it advantageous for our
people to live by rapin and plunder which we doe
not nor will not allow.	 Planting and Trade is
both our designe anc1 your interest and...shall lay
a way open to gett all the Spaniards riches.59
Locke places an important condition on this rule that a
conqueror cannot acquire the land of others when he states that
it does not hold true where land is lying waste:
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The Damages of War can scarce amount to the value
of any considerable Tract of Land, in any part of
the World, where all the Land is Possessed and
none lies waste [my emphasis]...{that is] equally
cultivated. 60
The only time where land may be appropriated, according to
Locke, is not when a people is conquered but, consistent with
English colonial policies, when their land is lying waste, that
is, uncultivated.
Where there being more Land, than the Inhabitants
possess, and make use of, any one has liberty to
make use of the waste.6'
It is English labour rather than Spanish war which will, in
Locke's own words, 'lay a way open to gett' all of America's
riches. While anyone may have the liberty to make use of the
'waste', Locke makes clear who, according to God's command,
will ultimately acquire it. Where Winthrop states, the 'earth
is the Lord's garden and he hath given it to the sons of Adam
to be tilled and improved by them'; 62 Locke claims,
God gave the World to Men in Common; but...it
cannot be supposed he meant it should always
remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the
use of the Industrious and Rational, (and Labour
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was to be his Title to it;) not to the Fancy or
Covetousness of the Quarrelsom and Contentious.63
The 'Industrious and Rational' shall inherit the earth, or at
least America; but what do these two terms mean? Let us
consider each in turn.
VII - 'THE INDUSTRIOUS AND RATIONAL'
For both Locke and defenders of England's right to America,
waste or common land in America is associated with neglect or
an absence of industriousness, and those who can bring labour
to the land can, thereby, appropriate it to themselves. The
argument runs as follows: America is wasted or neglected
because the inhabitants have not cultivated or enclosed land
and therefore have not used the labour which God has commanded
them to use; the English, by contrast, have already exhibited a
level of industry which would make the land in America ten or a
hundred times more valuable and thereby culfill the
commandments of God. In the words of Robert Cushman, 'So it is
lawful now to take a land which none useth and make use of.'
Thus, the industrious English will appropriate the land.
Locke makes this argument that the Englishman is more
industrious than the Indian in several different ways when he
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moves from the premise that labour begins property in land to
the proposition that it is also the measure of land's value.
First he draws the connection between Indians and waste; where
Cushman states the Indians 'are not industrious..,to use either
the land or the commodities of it', 64
 Locke claims:
There cannot be a clearer demonstration of any
thing, than several Nations of the Americans are
of this, who are rich in Land...yet for want of
improving it by labour, have not one hundreth part
of the Conveniencies we enjoy.65
Having asserted the idleness of the Indians, Locke then claims
that the English are a hundred times more industrious, using a
ratio very common to the colonial writings of his day. Where
Winthrop speaks of men 'spending as much labour and cost to
[keep] an acre or two of lands [in England] as would procure
him many hundreds of acres [in America]', and Strachey, of land
where 'not one foote of a thousand doe they...knowe howe to
turne to any benefitt', 66
 Locke writes:
For I aske whether in the wild woods and
uncultivated wast of America left to Nature,
without any improvement, tillage or husbandry, a
thousand acres will yield the needy and wretched
inhabitants as many conveniences of life as ten
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acres of equally fertile land doe in Devonshire
where they are well cultivated?67
It is clear from Locke's discussion of the relationship between
the value of property and labour that it is the English who
will win title to such lands if judged in accordance with his
'industrious' criterion, but what about the 'rational'? What
does it mean to be rational and who qualifies under the given
criteria?
Industry, on its own, can be defined as the cultivation of
land, but God's grant to the 'rational' incorporates the
application of that rationality beyond simply the cultivation
of the ground to the improvement of human life through European
forms of culture and education. Thus at paragraph 33 of the
First Treatise, Locke states:
This great and primary Blessing of God Almighty,
Be fruitful, and multiply and replenish the
earth...contains in it the improvement too of Arts
anSciences and the conveniences of Life.(my
emphasis)°8
It is through the application of rational thought that one both
develops arts and sciences and, thereby, improves the
conveniences of life. The American Indian, consequently, has
only '100th part of the conveniences' the English do, because
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they have not developed their rational thought. If, according
to Locke's argument in the Essay Concerning Human
Understanding, they had applied themselves to the understanding
of the principle of things, they would, have come to learn two
sets of principles. Firstly, the existence of God to be as
'great a truth as any [which] can enter into the mind of men
and [deserving of] the first place amongst all practical
principles,' and secondly, they would have developed derivative
principles, in the form of arts and sciences, already known by
the 'more improved Englishman'. The relationship between this
primary principle, the existence of God, and the secondary
principles, arts and sciences, is, for Locke, a very close one,
and the failure amongst the Indians to recognize the first is
inextricably linked to failure to develop the second.
[There are] whole Nations...amongst whom there was
to be found no Notion of a God, no
Religion...These are Instances of Nations where
uncultivated Nature has been left to it self,
without the help of Letters, and Discipline, and
the Improvements of Arts and Sciences.69
While arts and sciences, that is the principles of English
education and culture, are always linked in Locke's Essay with
the recognition of the Christian God, both are arrived at via
the same path, namely, due application of rational thought.
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I doubt not but to shew, that a Man by the right
use of his natural Abilities, may, without any
innate Principles, attain the Knowledge of a God,
and other things that concern him. God having
endued Man with those Faculties of knowing which
he hath, was no more obliged by his Goodness, to
implant those innate Notions in his Mind, than
that having given him Reason, Hands, and
Materials, he should build him Bridges, or Houses;
which some People in the World [ wan t]...The reason
in both cases being, That they never employ'd
their Parts, Faculties, and Powers, industriously
that way, but contented themselves with the
Opinions, Fashions, and Things of their Country,
as they found them, without looking any farther.7°
Thus, the reason why the Indians have no convenciences, like
bridges and roads, nor the science to build them, and do not
recognize the existence of a unitary Christian God is the same;
they have not applied themselves to the question nor exercised
their rational faculties far enough but instead adopted the
ways of their own country. According to Locke, we are born
with only the potential for rationality and it will grow, only
if we exercise it.71
Thus, for Locke, the Indian, like the Englishman, has a seed of
rationality. Unlike the English, however, rationality and
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Sunderstanding will only be achieved by the Indian, when he goes
beyond the 'ways, modes and notions' of his own people to adopt
the God, arts and sciences of another, 'more improved' people,
namely the English. Such a process, once the seed of
rationality has been nurtured, is inevitable.
Had the Virginia king Apochancana, been educated
in England, he [would be] as good a Mathematician,
as any in it. The difference between him, and a
more improved English-man, lying barely in this,
That the exerciese of his Faculties was bounded
within the Ways, Modes, and Notions of his own
Country...And if he had not any Idea of a God, it
was only because he pursued not those Thoughts,
that would have led him to it.72
In essence, Locke is not excluding native Americans from the
'industrious and rational' criterion. On the contrary, when
the Indian adopts an agrarian form of labour, a sedentary
lifestyle and private appropration while recognizing the
Christian God and developing English forms of education and
culture, he will qualify under both criteria and be worthy of
God's gift.
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VIII - PROPERTY AND INJURY
Having provided the justification for England's right to claim
land in America, Locke attempts to prove why taking over such
land would cause n injury to the current inhabitants. The
first argument given by the defenders of England's right to
American soil, against the claims that injury is being done to
the native inhabitants by English settlements, is that there
can be no injury when there is enough for all. In the words of
John Winthrop, 'There is more than enough for them and us.'73
Locke echoes this sentiment when he makes the case that injury
cannot be done in the state of nature when land and its
products are more than enough for its inhabitants. At
paragraph 33, Locke states,
No Body could think himself injur'd by the
drinking of another Man, though he took a good
Draught, who had a whole River of the same Water
left him to quench his thirst. And the Case of
Land and Water, where there is enough of both, is
perfectly the same.74
Locke provides as the clear contemporary example of a country
with such abundance that no injury could possibly be done to
its inhabitants, inland America. He concludes that Englishmen
planting in America do not injure the native inhabitants.
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In some in-land, vacant places of America, we
shall find that tne Possessions [a planter] could
make...would not...prejudice the rest of Mankind,
or give them reason to complain, or think
themselves injured by this Man's Incroachrnent.75
While the Englishman planting in America will not injure the
Indian, the Indian, still governed by the law of nature and
therefore forbidden from appropriating more than is immediately
useful to him, will only injure others if he breaks this
natural law and attempts to appropriate larger pieces of land.
Locke makes this point during the course of his argument on
injury:
Trie measure of Property, Nature has well set, by
the Extent of Hens Labour, and tre Conveniency of
Life: No Mans Labour could subdue, or appropriate
all: nor could his Enjoyment consume more than a
small part; so that it was impossible for any Man,
this way, to intrench upon the right of
another...This measure did confine every Man's
Possession, to a very moderate Proportion.76
Moreover, native Americans' lack of money and trade also limits
their property to limited amounts; they cannot legitimately
appropriate the amount of vacant land available to them that
Englishmen can.
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From Locke's argument we can conclude that the only injury
which can be done to the Indian would involve interfering with
the products of nature that he actually has in his hands or the
small pieces of land which he needs to maintain this level of
subsistence. On the other hand, natural man, or Indians, will
injure others if they go in any way beyond this limited amount.
The real potential for injury arises when Locke considers the
possibility of it being done to civil men, or the English,
namely those who cultivate and enclose larger pieces of land,
as the English did on settling America. Once land has been
settled by a&rarian labour, the Indian who might attempt to
claim this land back on the basis of his hunting or gathering
will clearly cause injury to the Englishman.
He that...subdued, tilled and sowed any part of
it...another had no Title to, nor could without
injury take from him.77
The vast majority of land in America could thus be taken
without injury from that which was used by the Indians in
America, but not from the Englishmen, once settled.
Locke finally argues, like Winthrop and other colonial writers,
that, far fom injuring the natives, appropriation of land by
those with the money and industry to cultivate such property
will in fact benefit the world, including America's
inhabitants. Thus Locke states:
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He that incloses Land and has a greater plenty of
the conveniencys of life from ten acres, than he
could have from an hundred left to Nature, may
truly be said, to give ninety acres to Mankind.78
Locke goes further to claim that the inhabitants will in fact
be obliged to the English for increasing the amount of products
which the soil will yield. Like George Strachey who claims
'Nor is this any injurye unto them [for] whome we
will...prepare and breake up new growndes, and therby...a newe
way of thrift or husbandry', Locke states, 'the Inhabitants
[will] think themselves beholden to him, who, by his Industry
on...waste Land, has increased the stock of Corn, which they
wanted. 179
IX - COMMUNAL PROPERTY: ENGLAND v-s AMERICA
Thus far we have spoken only of title to property being given
to individuals, but property can also be owned by groups or
even nations. This is also a form of common ownership but
unlike the initial form of common property granted by God, it
cannot be claimed by all men but only those, the group or
nation, who have agreed to its joint ownership. Locke clearly
recognizes such a possibility in his description of the English
manorial system. Why does Locke not allow for the possibility
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that land in America can be held in common as a compact between
a group of people, an Indian 'tribe' for example? It must be
possible to make and honour such a compact, given his adamancy,
unlike Hobbes, that agreements made in the state of nature are
as binding as those in civil society, 'For Truth and keeping of
Faith belongs to Men, as Men, and not as Members of Society.'80
This question is never answered by Locke who instead simply
claims that property held in common has a different meaning in
England than America. Locke makes this distinction explicit at
paragraph 35, beginning with common land in England:
'Tis true, in Land that is common in England, or
any other Country, where there is Plenty of People
under Government, who have Money and Commerce, no
one can inclose or appropriate any part, without
the consent of all his Fellow-Commoners: Because
this is left common by Compact, i.e. by the Law of
the Land, which is not to be violated. And though
it be Common, in respect of some Men, it is not so
to ll Mankind; but is the joint property of this
Country, or this Parish.8'
Whereas in the latter, that is the state of nature or America:
It was quite otherwise. The Law Man was under, was
rather for appropriating. God Commanded, and his
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IWants forced him to labour. That was his Property
which could not be taken from him where-ever he
had fixed it. And hence subduing or cultivating
the Earth, and having Dominion, we see are joyned
together. The one gave Title to the other. So
that God, by commanding to subdue, gave Authority
so far to appropriate.82
This passage underlines certain assumptions Locke makes about
the nature of land in America versus England. 'Common' now
has two different meanings. In America, land is held in
common as an original gift from God; in England it is the
result of a compact between a certain group of men.
Consequently, land held in common in England, 'is not so to
all Mankind', but only to the members of the 'Parish' or
'Country'. Moreover, while land held in common in England is
of value to its co-owners, land in America, is not. Locke
explicitly claims that those who held land in common in
America did not value it.
Whence it ic plain, that at least, a great part of
the Land lay in common; that its Inhabitants
valued it not [my emphasisl, nor claimed Property
in any more than they made use of.83
In Peter Laslett's comments on the distinction between common
property in civil society and the state of nature, he claims
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that Locke is simply using the manorial system to explain the
notion of 'common'. Locke, however, is making a far more
profound argument regarding the definition of property in
England versus America and his use of the word 'country' in
this paragraph, and Laslett's misinterpretation of it, is
instructive in this regard. Let us consider this issue in some
detail.
Laslett/ concludes that Locke is simply using the manorial
system to explain the notion of 'common', but has difficulty
explaining the passage, 'And though [land in England] be Common
in respect of some Men, it is not so to all Mankind; but is the
joint property of this Country, or this Parish.' [my
emphasis] 84 Laslett argues that 'country' is 'presumably'
being used 'in its older meaning of locality', and wonders why
it and the word 'parish' are used when, as Laslett says, 'manor
might be expected.' 85
 Locke however uses the word 'country'
elsewhere in the Second Treatise, not to mean 'locality' as
Laslett claims here, but to mean, as we might expect, 'nation'.
Thus, at paragraph 9 of the Second Treatise, Locke describes
the right of a 'Prince or State' to put to death a foreigner,
'for any crime he'cornmits in their Country [my emphasis].86
The meaning here is clearly one of a prince's or state's
nation.
It is consistent therefore to argue that Locke uses 'country'
in the same manner, three chapters hence, when discussing the
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notion of common property in England. Locke is not making an
argument about property held in common limited to the manorial
system of property. Rather he is trying to distinguish between
one country, namely England and another, namely America and
define the rights to common land in each. In essence Locke is
arguing that although land may be held in common in England by
the 'country' or state (in places such as the parliament
buildings or common parks), or by a smaller group within the
nation, such as a 'parish', there is no common land left in
England which can be considered still available for
appropriation.
Having claimed in the previous paragraph that land held in
common is open to appropriation by those who are prepared to
labour on it, he needs to distinguish between land held in
common in England as a whole and compare this to land held in
common in America for which appropriation was 'the law man was
under'. Thus common property in England is not available to
'all mankind' as it is in America but only to those who have
joint ownership as members of either 'the country', that is
other Englishmen, or 'the parish', a smaller, geographically
defined group of Englishmen. Parallels can be drawn in America
to the Indian nation as a whole or particular tribes
respectively, but Locke claims neither of these groups
exercise the same right as Englishnen in claiming exclusive
access to common property in America. Thus, while Englishmen,
as a country or parish, may agree through compact, to hold
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property in common and exclude all others from its use,
American Indians have no such rights. Moreover, those
Englishmen who are part of this compact can only enclose
property with the consent of their fellow commoners. On the
other hand, anyone can go to America and enclose or appropriate
land needing no consent of the inhabitants already there.
American natives, unlike their English counterparts, live
under the 'law' for 'appropriating' as commanded by God and
those who act in accordance with this law in America, will
clearly have, through their agricultural labour, dominion over
that land. God himself, through his commandment to subdue the
land, has also given 'Authority so far to appropriate.' Thus
Locke encourages his European readers, at paragraph 36, to
cultivate the wastelands of America:
Let him plant in some in-land, vacant places of
America, we shall find that the Possessions he
could make himself...would not...give them reason
to complain.87
X - PROPERTY IN CIVIL SOCIETY
While Locke has argued that property is begun by labour, and
it is labour which gives the individual a natural right to
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exclude others from it, several commentators have concluded
that this is true only in the state of nature and not in civil
society. In the latter, it is argued, Locke claims property
is decided not by one's labour but by laws and therefore is a
conventional rather than natural right.
Thomas Scanlon states:
Locke clearly distinguishes between the natural
property rights that he sees as holding in a state
of nature antecedent to [positive law] or social
convention and the systems of property that arise
later with the introduction of money and the
creation of government.88
This view is based on several passages in the chapter on
property which refer to property in civil society. For
example, in paragraph 30 Locke states:
Amongst those who are counted the civiliz'd part
of Mankind, [were] made and multiplied postive
Laws to determine property.89
And again at paragraph 50 Locke states, 'For in Governments the
Laws regulate the right of property, and the possession of land
is determined by positive constitutions.' 9 °	 It is these two
passages which lead James Tully to conclude:
-300-
His	 express	 statement	 that property under
government	 is	 conventional	 contradicts	 the
standard, but not exclusive interpretation of
Locke's analysis of property. Locke is normally
taken to have attempted to justify private
property by showing that it is natural. This
interpretation is held in the face of his repeated
assertion that whatever property men have in
political society is conventional.9'
Tully is challenging theories, like Robert Nozick's Anarchy,
State and Utopia, where property rights derived from Locke's
theory are defined as natural and can, thereby, be used to
constrain the powers of the state. 92 In order for Nozick to
claim that private property in society is natural rather than
conventional, it is necessary for him, according to Tully, to
ignore the difficult passages he mentions above.
In an otherwise critical article, Jeremy Waidron, concurs with
Tully on this point, concluding that there are several passages
in Locke's chapter or: property, including the ones g.ven above
which have 'always been understood to pose difficulties for the
traditional view', that is the view that private property in
civil society is founded on natural right.93
These passages, which appear to claim that it is the law rather
than labour which founds property in civil society, include,
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Iaccording to Tully and Waldron, the following paragraphs: 30,
'laws determine property'; 35, 'Land that is common in
England...is left common by Compact'; 38, 'Laws within
themselves settled the Properties of those of the same
Society'; 45, 'several Communities...by laws within themselves,
regulated the Properties of the private Men of their Society';
and 50, 'in Governments the Laws regulate the right of
property, and the possession of land is determined by positive
constitutions.
Firstly, as Waldrori points out, Locke uses terms such as
'settle', 'determine', and 'regulate' to describe the
relationship between law and property in society. Nowhere does
he say that laws found or re-create property in civil society.
While labour or industry first began property everywhere, now a
distinction can be drawn between the 'civilz'd part of
mankind', namely the English who in England, settle their
property on the basis of law rather than industry and the
Indians who have no such laws and whose property therefore, is
still founded and determined by labour. Englishmen in England
or Indians in America provide clear examples of property
determined by civil and natural law respectively, but what
happens, as with colonization when the Englishmen settle in
America; which law prevails?95
Locke clearly wants to claim that labour founds property in all
cases, but when the English begin a settlement on American soil
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(like the one in Carolina), and thereby establish a civil
society, the natural right of begining property through labour
or money must be circumscribed by government. It is the law
that must settle, regulate or determine property in such civil
societies. It is this underlying argument based on Locke's
colonial experience which provides a full answer to the
questions perplexing both Tully and Waidron in the references
made by Locke to the settlement of property by law in civil
society. Let us consider this argument in some depth in
relation to each of the paragraphs cited.
Locke argues, like the other defenders of England's right to
American soil, that it is through the Englishman's labour and
access to money and commerce that he begins the right to
property in America. However, once the colony is settled, and
civil society has taken root in Carolina, it is the civil laws
which determine or regulate property. These laws however, as
Locke makes clear in paragraph 45, do not found property; they
settle or regulate that which the labour of Englishmen, as a
whole, has already begun.
Several communities settled the Bounds of their
distinct Territories, and by Laws within
themselves, regulated the Properties of the
private Men of the Society, and so, by Compact and
Agreement, settled the Property which Labour and
Industry began.96
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Locke, as secretary to Shaftesbury, observed in Carolina the
need to impose laws to insure that the settlers did not take
too much land, which tended to undermine the plantation itself.
As Child and Davenant argue in their defense of the plantation,
it was necessary that the authorities in England maintain a
close rein over the appropriation of land in America, if the
enterprise was to succeed at all. Locke concurs, stating in
notes composed in 1674 for an 'Essay on Trade' that the
'promotion' as opposed to the 'hindrance' of trade, depended
on, amongst other things, the 'register or certainty of
property'. 97 Amongst settlers in the new world, it was
necessary to insure that property in a civil society is no
longer determined, settled or regulated by the rights of
nature, that is by right of labour or purchase which could be
capricious and damaging, but rather by the more certain edicts
of government.98
This fear had been proven by some colonizers in the new world
who had taken up, through purchase from the Indians, much more
property than could be defended and had consequently, put at
risk the survival of the plantation. Thus, as has been
discussed, Carolina forbade the purchase of land by settlers
from Indians, because it was the Lords Proprietors right to
settle and determine property in the interests of the
plantation as a whole.99
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In a letter from the Lords Proprietors to the new colony, the
former expressed concern that the settlers buying great tracts
of land from the Indians, would 'weaken the plantation' and
instructed the settlers 'to be sattisfyed with such proportions
as we allot...more will but scatter the people.' 10° The Lords
Proprietors conclude that their instructions 'wilbe the best
course of setling.''° 1
 In other words, the natural right to
property through labour or purchase must, in civil society, be
circumscribed by the regulations of government in order to
insure the survival and defense of the community or plantation
as a whole. In the words of Charles Davenant, 'Many Empires
have been ruin'd by too much enlarging their Dominioris, and by
grasping at too great an Extent of Territory.'102
Locke uses similar language to make the same point when he
states:
Numbers of men are to be preferd to largenesse of
domiriions, and that the increase of lands and the
right imploying of them is the great art of
government •103
This theme of maintaining or controlling numbers of men through
government regulation is a constant theme in writers on trade.
Locke himself, in the notes written in 1674 in preparation for
the 'Essay on Trade' states, 'The chief end of trade is riches
-305-	 - -
and power...power consists in numbers of men and ability to
maintain them. .104
The way in which the settlers, and therefore the plantations,
are to be controlled or maintained in the new world is through
the just enforcement of particular laws.'° 5 While Davenant
argues for a just 'agrarian law', Child concludes that the
preservation of 'liberty and property' in English law will
ensure that English colonies are far better off than Dutch
colonies.' 06 Similarly, Shaftesbury refers in Carolina to his
'laws of libery' as the means by which 'jelousy' is 'removed
and factions united'.'° 7 Locke follows the same words as Child
and Shaftesbury when he states immediately following his
comments about the 'right imploying' of lands:
And that Prince who shall be so wise and godlike,
as by established laws of liberty to secure
protection and incouragement to the honest
industry of Mankind against the oppression of
power and narrowness of Party will quickly be too
hard for his neighbours.'08
Locke seems to be referring amongst other issues, to the
problems in Carolina in this passage. Firstly, the Lords
Proprietors established what they themselves described as 'laws
of liberty' and encouraged the settlers to abide by the
Fundamental Constitutions and their instructions regarding the
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allocation of property to avoid factions and settle quarrels
which arose. 109 Secondly, these instructions repeatedly
referred to the Lord Proprietors' wish to 'give all reasonable
encouragement to honest and industrious men'."° That these
laws became too 'hard' for the settlers and they instead began
to form narrow factions is made clear by memoranda written by
Locke including one which states the settlers 'depend lazily on
the Proprietors' supplys', and become 'divided amongst
themselves. ,111
Each of the passages mentioned above (paragraphs 30, 35, 38,
45, and 50) can be explained in terms of this colonial need to
insure that Englishmen living in America, that is civil men
surrounded by the state of nature, are still subject to the
laws of civil society and their property must be determined by
these laws.
To take each in turn, the Englishman in Carolina would be, in
the words of Locke at paragraph 30, 'amongst those who are
counted the Civiliz'd part of Mankind' and have therefore
'multiplied positive Laws to determine Property'. rather than
those who determine property on the basis of labour or trade
with the Indians."2
Paragraph 35 has been discussed at some length and
distinguishes the 'common' in civil society, namely England
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from that of the natural state (or America), leaving these
latter lands open to the 'laws of appropriation'."3
The next paragraph (38) provides us with a description of the
settlement of Carolina:
They incorporated, settled themselves together,
and built Cities, and then, by consent, they came
in time, to set out the bounds of their distinct
Territories, and agree on limits between them and
their Neighbours, and by Laws within themselves,
settled the Properties of those of the same
Society. 114
Paragraph 45 has two references which can be accoucited for by
this argument. The first sentence refers to 'regulation' and
settling of property in society after it has been first begun
by 'labour and industry'. 115 This is the classic formulation
of the defense of England's plantations in America (through
labour) followed by the conditions necessary to ensure its
survival (the civil law).
In the second part of paragraph 45, Locke refers to the
determination of property between societies rather than
individuals within any particular society. He refers to:
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the Leagues that have been made between several
States and Kingdoms...disowning all Claim and
Right to the Land in the others Possession, have
by common consent [and so] by positive agreement,
settled a property amongst themselves, in distinct
Parts and Parcels of the World: yet there are
still great Tracts of Ground to be found,
which...lie waste. [my emphasis]116
Clearly what Locke is referring to here is the colonial
division of the world between several European nation states,
not individuals within a particular society, as Tully claims of
all these references.
The final problematic paragraph (50) can be explained in terms
of the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, written by Locke,
which included an elaborate system of property rules, and
further instructions given to the settlers circumscribing the
settlers' natural right to property through labour or purchase
by positive law. So Locke concludes his chapter on property
with the following statement defending the power of positive
constitutions, such as the one he established in Carolina, to
determine property in civil society.
For in Governments the Laws regulate the right of
property, and the possession of land is determined
by positive constitutions."7
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XI - CONCLUSION
Locke's theory of property in the state of nature thus both
reflects and defends England's colonial enterprises in Carolina
and America in general. Locke begins by defending the Indian's
right to the fruits and beasts of the earth, for it is their
labour which makes it theirs. True to Shaftesbury's blueprint
for Carolina and the defenders of English colonization, Locke
clearly believes that the Indian's life and Liberty are to be
respected and their subsistence provided. It is only when he
moves to his discussion of the 'Earth itself' that his argument
with reference to the Indian versus the Englishman changes.
His definition of labour end thereby the founding of property
in land is that of the Englishman in America tilling, planting
and subduing the soil. Through cultivation and enclosure, the
English colonizer can legitimately claim the property formerly
used for its fruits and beasts, by the Indian, and bring value
to land previously left waste or neglected. By cultivating the
ground, the Englishman fulfils the commandment of Cod that the
'industrious and rational' have dominion over the earth, their
standard of labour being ten or a hundred times better than
that of the Indians. Even if Indians decide to cultivate the
ground in larger quantities like the English, Locke ensures by
his argument that they are still limited by natural law to
relatively small parcels. He argues that without money, which
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does not spoil, or access to international commerce with which
they could make some sales, the Indians' increased goods would
either spoil and thereby break the law of nature against
spoilage or not be worth enclosing. Either way, the Indian has
neither the right nor the need to own the land in the
quantities that the English do. Furthermore, given that
cultivation is the only way to own property, injury in terms of
taking over land can only be done against those who actually
cultivate, namely the English. The English in coming to
America, not only do not injure the Indians but will find,
according to Locke, the inhabitants beholden to them for
increasing their stock of crops.
The originality of Locke's argument on property, which will be
discussed in greater depth in the following chapter, is that
colonization is justified, not just because God or natural law
has commanded it, as Purchas, Winthrop and the others have
argued, but because each colonist has a natural right within
himself, through his labour, to appropriate land. One might
argue that Locke is, by definition, excluding the Indian from
any right to property in land. He is not. The doctrine of
natural rights allows that anyone may lay claim to the soil of
America if he adopts a settled agrarian style of life, joins
the rest of mankind in the use of money and commerce,
establishes laws of liberty, and recognizes the Christian God
to be the first principle of understanding. By founding his
theory of property on natural rights, Locke provides, as shall
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be discussed in the next chapter, a powerful, original and
attractive argument for the early thinkers of the new
confederation of United States in their development of policy
towards the Indians and their lands.
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Chapter 7: Locke, Jefferson and the American Indian
The extent to which John Locke has influenced tne political
development of the United States, particularly during the
revolutionary period has been analyzed in great depth. While
some scholars claim Locke to be a singular and all powerful
influence on the early American republic, others claim his
role to have been much more limited. 1
 Tne debate, like
similar ones on every other aspect of Locke's political
theory, has centered on the implications for civil man and
his society, most particularly in the United States on the
separation of legislative and executive powers within
government and the conditions under which it may be
dissolved, rather than the implications for natural man and
his community. This singular focus is particularly strange
in scholarship on the United States for Locke himself
constantly refers to the Indian in America in nis examples
of the natural state in the Two Treatises of Government.
Before we consider how Locke's theory shaped early American
policies towards the Indian, it is necessary to make clear
that this chapter on the history of ideas in America, while
important, can only be a limited addendum to the analysis
which precedes it. The implications of Locke's thought for
tne development of ideas and policies towards the native
Americans themselves is an important final step in the
thesis I have been trying to develop; however, it is not
intended to be an exhaustive analysis of this period of
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American history due to the complexity of the subject and
the limitation of space.
It is beyond scholarly doubt that John Locke's Two Treatises
of Government was used in the early years of the history of
the United States to justify Americans taking over land
claimed by the Indians. Even John Dunn, in an article which
otherwise dimisses the importance of Locke in 18th century
America, concludes that the attempt to undermine Indian
claims to land provides the single example of an application
of Locke's Second Treatise in the new world.
In what was probably the only sustained
application of Locke's theory of property to
American circumstances, the moral dignity of
labour was deployed to give powerful
embellishment to the expropriation of the
Indians by the labourious and God fearing people
of New England.2
Dunn argues, however, that this application of Locke's
theory is limited to an article by Rev. John Bulkley which
'was presumably of local and practical interest' only, and,
moreover, Locke added nothing original to this debate
regarding white versus Indian title; the Two Treatises was
simply a recapitulation of older colonial arguments.
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SThere was nothing original in the substance of
this claim. It stretches back at least as far
as Thomas More...and it remained a major strain
of apologetic throughout much of subsequent
Indian-white relations.3
Dunn is mistaken on two counts. Firstly, he is wrong to say
that Rev. Bulkley's sermon was of local interest only.
Other preachers, as well as politicians and legal theorists,
used Locke for similar purposes, as shall be demonstrated
shortly. Secondly, while some of the tenets adopted by
Locke in his political theory, such as the idea of vacant
land and God's commandment to multiply are taken from
previous arguments defending England's right to Indian land,
as has been discussed, Locke's conclusions are wholly
original in that he bases his theory on the natural right to
life, liberty and property and defines both the origin of
property and the value of land in terms of agricultural
labour only.
The former aspect of this argument is innovative for it
concludes that land can be claimed by Europeans not only
because one is obeying the law of God, as had been
previously argued, but also because one has the inherent
right through labour to do so. For a country whose
constitution was based on the idea of rights, Locke's
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development of the colonial argument was both original and
very powerful.
However, the most important and original aspect of Locke's
political theory with reference to the American Indians was
the placement of agrarian labour at the heart of private
property. Preachers, legal theorists and politicians all
used Locke's theory of property to define the cultivation of
Jand by American citizens as the only legitimate means to
claim property. Occupancy for thousands of years was
suddenly and dramatically superceded by Locke's distinctly
English form of labour as the basis of holding land.
The yielding of occupancy to labour was a crucial turning
point in the history of the idea of property. Occupancy as
the foundation of property had a long history in natural law
theory. From the time of Cicero through to Grotius and
Pufendorf, it was argued that any unoccupied area, such as
the famous theatre seats, only had to be occupied in order
for it to be considered one's own. England had adopted the
notion of discovery and occupancy as the basis for its
claims in the new world when it first landed on American
shores, but the theory became problematic when England began
to settle in America and the Indians proceeded to claim the
right to large tracts of land, wanted by the English, on the
basis of their prior right of occupancy. The later 18th
century British colonies and the early American republic
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thus needed a new foundation for property, which would go
beyond simple occupancy, in order to claim the land in their
proposed settlements for their own. Locke's theory of
property, based on agrarian labour, provided that new
foundation. Moreover, these same players on the American
stage could, and in fact did, argue that the until the
Indians transformed their labour from hunting and gathering
into agrarian cultivation, they could not be considered as
the ultimate owners of the soil. Not only did they lose the
land they claimed by virtue of past occupancy, but until
they transformed their lifestyle into that of the sedentary
Europeans, they could claim next to nothing in the future.
Thus, while scholars of Locke, like Dunn, have concluded
that Locke's theory provides no original ideas regarding the
ownership of American soil and, moreover, they are limited
to questions of local concern, other scholars, most notably
those studying the history of Indian-European relations
consider Locke to be the original starting point for a
powerful new thesis used throughout America in the late 18th
century, which claimed that the Indians and their nomadic,
communal lifestyle must ultimately yield to civil society
based on the linkage between the private right of property
and agrarian labour. Wilbur Jacobs identifies Locke's Two
Treatises as the origin of this school of thought.
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The argument that nomadic hunters could be
forced to alter their economy by an agricultural
or pastoral people had first...been advanced by
John Locke who saw a relationship between
cultivation of the soil and ownership of
property.4
I - THE PREACHERS
Let us turn then to consider exactly how Locke's thought was
disseminated in the young American nation. Perhaps the first
group to adopt Locke's theory of property for their defense
of American citizens' rights were the preachers of New
England. Clinton Rossiter, in an article on Rev. Jonathan
Mayhew of Boston, claims that Locke became a virtual oracle
to the puritan pastors in revolutionary America.
It was in this period that Locke was elevated to
the status of major prophet by the clergy of
Massachusetts and Connecticut, and Mayhew did as
much as any other preacher to introduce his
ideas to the colonial audience.5
It is perhaps not suprising that Locke would be so easily
adapted to the sermons of this period for the theological
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roots of the Two Treatises, are clearly reconcilable with
the Puritan work ethic advocated by tne clergy in the new
world. As Issac Kramnic.k and Quentin Skinner argue, it is
this Protestant ethic which lies at the heart of the Second
Treatise.
Locke's Second Treatise and its chapter 'Of
Property' with its very Protestant God enjoing
industrious man to subdue the earth through work
...is, as Quentin Skinner insists, 'the
classical text of radic.al Calvinist politics'.
Trie kinship of work-ethic Protestant discourse
to Locke has less to do with the juristic
discourse of rights then with tie Protestant
theme of work.6
Locke was used in varying degrees in the evolving theology
of trie American state. Some, such as Rev. Simeon Howard, in
a sermon preached to the artillery company in Boston simply
refer to Locke in claiming the natural right of individuals
to thair life, liberty and property.
In a state of nature...God has given to everyone
liberty to pursue his own happiness in whatever
way...provided he keeps within the bounds of the
laws of nature. Within these bounds, he may
govern his actions and dispose of his property
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and person, as he thinks proper - See Locke on
government.
Others, such as Jonathan Mayhew, use his theory to defend
the idea that civil society is preferable to the natural
state because in it private property is secured.
[Government] is instituted for the preservation
of men's persons, properties and various rights
against fraud and lawless violence, and that by
means of it, we may both procure and quietly
enjoy those numerous blessings and advantages,
which are unattainable out of society.8
Mayhew is referring to the natural state of the American
Indian. It follows, as it does in Locke's theory that
natural man should want to avoid the 'fraud and lawless
violence' of their state in favour of 'those numerous
blessing and advantages' of civil society.
There are se'eral important preachers who go further in
adopting Locke's theory into their own thought and, in turn,
question the Indian claims to certain tracts of land. We
can begin with Rev. John Witherspoon, President of the
College of New Jersey (which was soon to become Princeton
University) and signatory of the Declaration of
Independence. He opens his argument by supposing man to be
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in a state of nature with certain natural rights, 'the right
to life', the 'right to employ his faculties and industry
for his own use' and the 'right to personal liberty' amongst
others. Like Locke, he claims that while 'some say there is
no trace or record of [a] contract in the beginning of any
society', it is not possible to conclude that no such
contract exists in any society, just because, 'their
beginning is not observed'. 9
 Witherspoon goes on to claim
that colonial expansion, such as the English coming to
America, provides us with an ideal example of the founding
of civil society amongst a natural state. 'In migrations
and planting of colonies...we see evident traces of an
original contract.' 1 ° Having described the state of nature,
he turns, as Locke does to discuss slavery and property. Of
the latter he states:
The next step in...the principles of the social
state, is to consider the foundation,
establishment and extent of Property.'1
Like Locke, it is property which lies at the heart of
Witherspoon's natural state and in turn must be the end for
which government is established. Property, following the
Lockean argument, is founded on occupancy and labour.
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The original ways of acquiring property may be
reduced to these two, 1) Prior occupation, 2)
our own industry.12
Of the two foundations of property, Witherspoon favours the
latter, arguing that those existing in vacant land, such as
the American Indians, cannot possibly claim large tracts of
land to themselves. Rather they are governed by the
principle of utility which limits their appropriation to
that which will provide for their present needs. He states
this in the form of a rhetorical question.
In vacant lands must I take only what I and my
present following can sufficiently occupy or may
I touch a continent and call it mine?13
While Witherspoon never makes a direct reference to Locke
throughout his lectures on moral philosophy, the debt, as
Francis Broderick concludes in his article on the President
of Princeton, is great.
Witherspoon makes no acknowledgement of his
direct debt to Locke...but that debt is apparent
all through his system.'4
Another preacher, referred to previously, who uses Locke in
his own treatise on American rights to the soil, is Reverend
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John Bulkley of Connecticut. In an article published in a
book by Roger Wolcott, Governor and Chief Justice of
Connecticut, Bulkley, like Witherspoon, questions whether
property can be based on the right of occupancy as claimed
by defenders of the Indian claims. He concludes that unless
the land is cultivated, the Indians have no right to claim
the property as their own.
To Assert their Right...to extend to all Lands
in the Country, whether Cultivated by them or
not; is what I never could, nor yet can see any
Sufficient reason for.15
Basing his claims on Locke's Two Treatises, Bulkley contends
that it is labour which is 'the Cause and Original of all
Property'. Therefore, 'as far as Labour extends...so far
the Right of Property must extend' also. He concludes that
the Indians' lack of agrarian cultivation leaves them with
very little property, only that which provides for their
basic subsistence; the remainder is open to appropriation by
Europeans.
Now from what I have thus said concerning the
way of Original or Primary Impropriation in the
state of Nature, it can't be difficult to
determine the Extent of the properties of the
Aborigines of this country...they had really
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good Right or Title, but to here and there a few
spots of it, viz oniy to so much as by means
above mentioned they had separated and inclosed
from the rest of the Country.16
Bulkley's application of Locke's theory to divest the
Indians of their land is one, according to Dunn, of 'which
Locke would have approved'.'7
A final application of Locke's theory by the theologians is
contained in a sermon by Ezra Stiles, President of Yale
College, which outlines the reasons why the United States
will 'ascend into high and distinguished honour among the
nations of the earth.'' 8 He begins by claiming America's
'system of dominion and civil polity' is the key to its
'ascension', wriere 'dominion is founded in property'.'9
Like Locke, Stiles claims that the best state is the one
which protects and preserves its citizens' property by
insuring that the acquisistion of territory is limited, in
accordance with natural law, to that which an individual can
cultivate; 'large territorial property vested in individuals
is pernicious to society.' 2° Thus he argues, like
Witherspoon and Bulkley, that property must be founded on
the basis of labour rather than occupancy.
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The body of a people may have it in their power,
by industry, to become possessed of
real...estate. [My emphasisl21
Stiles goes on to argue, like Locke, that labour not only
founds property but gives value to the land. In words
strikingly similar to Locke's own, he claims that the
European farmer has increased 'tenfold' the value of land
previously claimed by Indian inhabitants. Moreover, the
Europeans' use of the land has benefited the Indians by
increasing the revenue their land may produce.
Industry, is necessary towards giving value to
land...the	 publick	 weal	 requires	 [itsj
encouragernent...A very inconsiderable value
arose from the spare, thin settlement of the
American aboriginals...the protestant Europeans
have generally bought the native right of soil,
as far as they have settled, and paid value
tenfold; and are daily increasing the value of
the remaining Indian territory a thousand fold:
And in this manner we are a constant increasing
revenue to the Sachems and original Lords of the
Soil.22
He concludes his argument by claiming that beyond the
limited Indian 'settlements' and certainly into land claimed
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by the native Americans for hunting, America is still open
for appropriation, likening God's bequest to European
settlers of continental America to a similar gift of the
European continent to Japhet, Noah's son, in the Bible.
Heaven hath provided this country, not indeed
derelict but only partially settled, and
consequently open, for the reception of a new
enlargement of Japhet; America is settling from
Europe. 23
The political implications of these sermons were not lost on
the preachers who made them. In the early days of the
United States of America, religious and political thinking
often went hand in hand; thus preachers and politicians
attempted to convince each other of their views based on
both natural law and biblical reference. The ministers
often chose to give certain political sermons before an
audience which included governors and/or assemblies of
particular states.
For example, Rev. Mayhew preached his sermon in the presence
of the Governor and House of Representative of
Massachusetts, Rev. Stiles in the presence of the Governor
and General Assembly of Connecticut, and John Bulkley's
sermon was published in a book edited by the Governor of
Connecticut. This contiguity between the development of
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Ireligious and political thought can be found no closer than
in the person of John Witherspoon who simultaneously
preached the religious views described above while engaging
in the debates about and eventually signing the Declaration
of Independence.
Despite this closeness in thought between religious and
political writers, there was emerging amongst the latter an
emphasis on purely natural, as opposed to theological
underpinnings of the citizen and his state. Thus, while the
Christian roots of Locke's argument made the Two Treatises
of Government particularly appealing to the preachers of the
new world, it was his emphasis on natural law and individual
rights which opened up its use to the more powerful legal
and political realms within America. The politicians, in
particular, were shaped not only by a direct reading of
Locke but by the writings of legal and philosophical
scholars who incorporated Locke's thought, particularly his
theory of property, into their own analysis.
II - THE JUDICIARY
Foremost amongst these scholars was Sir William Blackstone,
who quotes Locke at length in his Commentaries on the Laws
of England. 24
 In the first volume of the Commentaries,
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Blackstone uses Locke's political theory to explain the
contractual nature of government and the conditions under
which it may be dissolved. John Hargrave, the editor of
Blackstone's views on civil liberty, draws the connection to
the Two Treatises.
Mr. Locke's description of civil liberty is
generally considered the best and it certainly
embodies all the essentials of English
liberty.25
t English liberty', needless to say, is based on the ri&ht of
property. Blackstone begins, the second volume of the
Commentaries with a discussion of property. Like Locke, he
centres his analysis around the state of nature in order to
ascertain the natural rights of men outside of society. His
examples, like those of Locke,'include American Indians and
ancient Europeans. He describes the state of nature in the
following terms:
A state of primeval simplicity: as may be
collected ftorn the manners of many American
nations when first discovered by the Europeans;
and from the antient method of living among the
first Europeans themselves.26
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Like Locke, Blackstone argues that appropriation in this
natural state involved the products of the soil only,
followed by, with the development of man's condition, the
appropriation of land.
And there can be no doubt, but that moveables of
every kind became sooner appropriated than the
permanent substantial soil.27
Blackstone thus turns to consider property in the soil
itself. Using the same Biblical reference as that used by
Locke in his chapter on property, Blackstone claims that it
is the need foTr more soil which drives people on to occupy
and claim 'other lands'.
The soil and pasture of the earth remained still
in common as before, and open to every
occupant...when the multitude of men and cattle
had consumed every convenience on one spot of
ground, it was deemed a natural right to seize
upon and occupy...other lands. This practice is
still retained among the wild and uncultivated
nations...We have also a striking example...in
the history of Abraham and his nephew Lot.28
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Colonies, such as the English developed in America, are
justified along the same grounds, given that property can be
claimed whereever land is still common.
Upon the same principle was founded the right of
migration, or sending colonies to find out new
habitations, when the mother country was
overcharged with inhabitants.29
The question immediately arises: Upon what criterion can
such land be claimed? In a crucial passage, Blackstone
concludes, like Locke, that the basis of the right to both
moveable and immoveable property is labour.
Bodily labour [my emphasis] of the
occupant...bestowed upon any subject which
before lay in common to all men, is universally
allowed to give the fairest and most reasonable
title to an exclusive property therein.30
George Sweet, editor of second volume of the 1844 edition of
the Commentaries challenges Blackstone's argument with
reference to the foundation of property, concluding that it
is occupancy rather than labour which founds an individual's
right.
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To say that a man has acquired a right to a
piece of land because he has occupied it, does
not perhaps establish or illustrate his right
any better than to say that he has the right
because he has bestowed labour in acquiring it;
yet if a choice is to be rnade...it must be
allowed that the advocates of occupancy have the
best of the argument. For where A. first takes
possession of a spot by driving a few stakes
around it, and B. then comes and digs every
part of it and tills it, it is admitted that the
property remains in A....which plainly shews
that priority of occupation, and not labour, is
the criterion of ownership.31
Sweet bases his argument, in part, on David Hume's critique
of the labour theory of property. Hume argues that there
are cases where occupancy of land is assumed to provide the
right to property without any significant additional labour,
such as grazing.
Some philosophers account for the right of
occupation by saying, that every one has a
property in his own labour; and when he joins
that labour to anything, it gives him the
property of the whole; but...there are several
kinds of occupation where we cannot be said to
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join our labour to the object we acquire, as
where we possess a meadow by grazing our cattle
Hume and Sweet, in their critiques, reveal the agrarian
heart of the Two Treatises' theory of labour, for Locke, as
has been discussed, believed that the plantations in the new
world would only survive and grow if they were based on
tilling of the soil, rather than grazing or mining.
Moreover, basing property on European tillage served to
supersede Indian claims to occupancy through hunting on
certain tracts of land. It is this agrarian aspect of
Locke's concept of labour which is incorporated into
Blackstone's Commentaries, and was subsequently adopted by
judges, lawyers and politicians in America to justify their
own belief in the agrarian basis of dominion over land.
The importance of Blackstone's Commentaries in the
development of ideas in 18th century America has, until
recently, been underestimated. Donald S. Lutz argues that
Blacksone is second only to Montesquieu in the number of
times he is quoted by American writers during this period.
In a survey of all the published American
political writing in the founding era, the
period from 1760 to 1805, finds that Montesquieu
and Blackstone were by far the most commonly
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cited sources but that the next common were
Locke and Hume.33
This exhaustive survey on early American political thinking
reveals that Locke's thought was disseminated through
channels other than his own work. Lutz comments:
[Blackstone and Hume] also become vehicles for
extending Locke's visibility indirectly.
Blackstone himself cites Locke a number of
times, and certain of his institutional and
procedural concepts seem to be grounded in
Locke...Hurne, on the other hand, was one of
Locke's most severe critics. To a certain
extent, his work is in opposition to Locke and
can be viewed as running contrary to some of the
implications contained in Locke's writing.34
The 'institutional and procedural concepts', 'grounded in
Locke', were not the only aspects of the Two Treatises
ad3pted by Blackstone in his Commentaries nor indeed were
they the only aspects of both men's writings absorbed by
political thinkers in America. The analysis by Blackstone
of property, as discussed above, was also used by 18th
century American writers to justify their land claims vis a
vis the Indians. A noteable example is Hugh Henry
Brackenridge.
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Brackenridge, a judge in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
was educated at Princeton under the tutelage of none other
than John Witherspoon. He established the first newspaper
in Pittsburgh, was a member of the State Assembly from 1786-
7 and became a leading force in the Republican party. He
wrote and published a number of articles on the limitations
of Indian rights to American soil, but his most extended
treatise on the subject is contained in a book responding to
Blackstone's Commentaries. Brackenridge begins by
discussing Blackstone's notion of dominion over land,
applying it specifically to the American Indians.
Of the right of dominion there is some
evidence...in favour of such as cultivate the
earth; because it is ameliorated or made more
productive, by the skill and labour of such.
But as to savages who do not cultivate the soil,
or sustain themselves to much extent, by that
means they are in the same situation as to this
evidence of right, with the beasts.35
He argues, like Blackstone and Locke, that a distinction can
be drawn between the state of nature in its earlier stage
where there is no competition for resources and later stages
where the opportunity for injury against one another is
great. In the first stage, people may well live by the
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products of nature alone or even by grazing animals on the
soil.
I acknowledge in the early times the cultivation
of the earth was not so immediately enjoined as
necessary; for the few inhabitants might live by
pasturage...[orl they might subsist by
hunting 36
As population increases, however, it will be necessary to
claim land through agrarian cultivation. Those who improve
it, thus have the right to claim dominion over it. Moreover,
Brackenridge argues, as Locke did, that there is a necessary
connection between the evolution of agriculture and the
improvement of human reason generally, as manifest in the
development of the arts and sciences.
It will easily appear that the mode of life by
pasturge or hunting, requires a more extensive
territory than by agriculture; and at the same
time...the power of genius are inactive, the
arts and sciences remain unknown.37
Brackenridge introduces, with this argument, an important
implication of Locke's argument which will be used by
politicians in their policies towards the Indians, namely
the idea that land claimed by agrarian cultivation will be
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much more limited than that which is claimed by virtue of
occupancy or hunting. Ultimately, Brackenridge argues that
the latter claim has no validity, and, like Locke, concludes
that natural men, that is the Indians of America, must limit
their claims on the soil to that which provides them with
subsistence. Cultivation is the key.
The aborigines of this continent can therefore
have but small pretence to a soil which they
never cultivated. The most they can with
justice claim, is a right to those spots of
ground where their wigwarns have been planted,
and to so much soil around them as may be
necessary to produce grain to support them [and]
their families.38
This conclusion regarding the native right of soil leads
inevitably to the claim that Europeans had the right to the
land because they were willing to labour on it.
The continent of Nrth America may therefore on
first discovery of coast, by any civilized
European nation, be considered as, the greater
part of it, a vacant country and liable to
become the property of those who should take the
trouble to possess it.39
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While the foundations of past American claims to land are
thus sound, Brackenridge argues that the labour theory of
property also provides some direction to the development of
policy towards the Indians in the future. While war is
ruled out, limiting Indians lands to that which is necessary
to their subsistence and encouraging them to take on an
agrarian form of life is clearly the implication.
I do not mean to justify the waging an
unnecessary war against the natives...but yet I
would justify encroachment on the territory
claimed by them, until they are reduced to
smaller bounds, and under the necessity of
changing their unpolished and ferocious state of
life, for fixed habitations and the arts of
agriculture 40
This conclusion, which follows logically from Brackenridge's
argument is a justification for the conversion of natural
man, that is the Indians, to a civilized, European way of
life, and the relinquishing of land, by the former, to the
latter as part of this process. Thus, like Locke,
Brackenridge believed property should not be taken by virtue
of conquest, that is by 'an unnecessary war'. It could,
however, be made available for peaceful appropriation if the
American government reduced the Indians' lands from the
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large tracts necessary for hunting to the more limited
grounds required for farming.
Other legal theorists in the old world concurred with this
view of property. In France, Emeric de Vattel adopted
Locke's thesis on property for his own classic treatise on
the principles of natural law. He begins his analysis by
claiming that cultivation of the soil is an obligation for
every nation under the law of nature. Those who do not lead
such a life and choose instead to hunt and gather leave
their land open for appropriation by cultivators.
The cultivation of soil...is...an obligation
imposed upon man by nature...Every nation is
therefore bound by the natural law to cultivate
..There are [some] who in order to avoid
labour, seek to live upon their flocks and the
fruits of the chase...Those who still pursue
this idle mode of life occupy more land than
they would have need of under a system of honest
labour, and they may not complain if other mcre
industrious Nations, too confined at home,
should come and occupy part of their lands.41
Vattel concludes that the colonies established in North
America are justified by this natural law because the
colonizers cultivated the soil which previously lay wasted.
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IIt is asked whether a nation may lawfully occupy
any part of a vast territory in which are to be
found only wandering tribes...We have already
pointed out, in speaking of the obligation of
cultivating the earth, that these tribes can not
take to themselves more land than they have need
of or can inhabit and cultivate. Their
uncertain occupancy of these vast regions cannot
be held as a real...possession; and when the
nations of Europe...come upon land which the
savages have no special need of and are making
no present and continuous use of, they may
lawfully take possession of them.42
While Vattel begins with natural law, he also makes clear,
like Locke, that natural right, begins in labour and most
particularly, the labour involved in farming.
The earth belongs to all mankind...All men have
a natural right to inhabit it and to draw from
it what is necessary for their support...but
when the human race became greatly multiplied in
numbers the earth was no longer capable of
supporting its inhabitants without cultivating
its soil and this cultivation could not be
carried on properly by the wandering
tribes...hence it was necessary for these tribes
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to settle somewhere and appropriate to
themselves certain portions of the earth...such
must have been the origin, as it is the
justification of the rights of property.43
William Paley is another European thinker who influenced the
development of ideas in revolutionary America. Wilson Smith
claims, in his article on Paley, that his 'books on moral
philosophy and natural theology...were once as well known in
American colleges as...the readers of...Noah Webster in the
elementary schools.' 44 Paley was on the reading list of
many of the major law schools including Yale where Ezra
Stiles introduced Paley's thought to his students in 1791.
Like Brackenridge, Paley adopted Locke's theory of property
for his own analysis of rights in the state of nature. 	 He
begins by stating that 'Natural rights are, a man's right to
his life, limbs, and liberty; his right to the produce of
his personal labour.' 45 He elaborates on this last right by
referring to Locke explicitly on his theory of property.
Each man's limbs and labour are his own
exclusively; that, by occupying a piece of
ground, a man inseparably mixes his labour with
it; by which means the piece of ground becomes
thenceforward his own...this is Mr. Locke's
solution; and seems indeed a fair reason.46
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He concludes that the American Indian fails to fulfil the
requirements of this natural right by virtue of his lack of
agrarian labour in the soil, making comparisons similar to
Locke betwen the output of the Indian hunter versus the
English farmer.
The earth...produces little without cultivation
nation of North-American savages,
consisting of two or three hundred, will take
up, and be half-starved upon, a tract of land,
which in Europe, and with European management,
would be sufficient for the maintenance of as
many thousands.47
Paley's version of Locke's theory of property was useful to
American scholars, as Smith points out:
Paley played the Lockean tune of man's natural
right to property ('the produce of his personal
labour') in what proved to be a most beguiling
arrangement for American scholars.48
One of the politicians who picked up on all of these
arguments is Richard Bland. Speaker of the House of
Burgesses and later the House of Delegates in Virginia,
Bland has been described by the Dictionary of American
Biography as the 'best authority of the time' on Virginia's
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history. 49 Thomas Jefferson, a contemporary of Bland, once
described him as 'the most learned arid logical man of those
who took prominent lead in public affairs'. 5° Bland wrote a
number of articles which together describe his theory of
natural rights. He begins by assuming a state of nature in
which men 'are absolutely free and independent of one
another'. 51 Property is founded upon labour and once
claimed, on this basis, cannot be taken from an individual
without injury.
No man can enjoy even the shadow of freedoni if
his property, acquired by his own industry and
the sweat of his brow may be wrested from him at
the will of another.52
If such an attempt at taking property through force occurs,
the original owner may claim, as Locke insists in his
chapter on Conquest, through himself or in future
generations the right of property back from the conqueror.
Power, abstracted from right, cannot give a just
title to dominion. If a man invades my
property, he...puts himself into a state of war
with me...my son, or his son, may, when able,
recover the natural right of his ancestor, which
has been unjustly taken from him.53
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The only way to secure property under such conditions is
through civil society. Thus Bland argues that government
must preserve for men 'the fruits of their own labour with a
security only liberty can impart.'54
Clinton Rossiter claims that Bland followed Locke in a
religious way, using him to justify his position in much the
same way as he used the Bible.
Bland's faith in the teachings of Locke...was
like his faith in the teachings of Jesus. They
were 'true certain and universal', not to be
improved upon.55
III - THE FARMERS
An important political implication of Locke's theory of
property in the United States was its use as a defense of
agrarian forms of labour. This was sometimes translated
into a treatise on behalf of the rights of the farmer, over
the landholder, to claim property. For example, an article
in the New York Post uses Locke's theory to defend the
rights of New Jersey farmers stating:
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[The earth may] be appropriated by every
individual. This is done by the improvement of
any part of it lying vacant, which is thereupon
distinguished from the great common of nature
and made the property of that man who bestowed
his labour on it; from whom it cannot afterwards
be taken, without breaking thro' the rules of
natural justice; for thereby he would acutally
deprived of the fruits of his industry.56
George Logan, in Letters Addressed to the Yeomanry of the
United States, also uses the cultivation of soil as the
basis of the natural right of individuals which must, in
turn, be adequately secured by a 'firm established
government'
Whenever the population of a country becomes so
great as to render the cultivation of the soil
necessary for the support of its inhabitants,
then a firm, established government becomes
equally necessary to support each individual
citizen in the right of soil and the advantages
and profits arising from his labour.58
The agrarian basis of Logan's theory of property and his
philosophy of government, is openly Lockean. As Chester
Eisenger says of Logan, 'Clearly here is the complete Locke
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in tfle garb of a Philadelphia agrarian.' 59
 Finally, Ethan
Allen, described as the 'philosopher-theologian to a
generation of American revolutionaries', also uses Locke to
defend the rights of farmers.
The backwoodsman from Vermont had taken John
Locke into his own hands and had appropriated
his political theory to meet the needs of a
people determined to defend its property.6°
The basis of Allen's defense of the Vermont farmers was
Locke's theory of property. His analysis, however, also
provides a ne twist to Locke's theory of government.
Ethan Allen in nis political tracts was one of
the	 most	 enthusiastic	 exponents...of	 the
agrarian myth which he thoroughly incorporated
into the framework of Lockean political theory.
We find him arguing that organized government
into which man enters from a state of nature, is
the servant, not of those who hold property in
general but specifcally of the 'labouring men
that support the world of mankind', of the
'farmers [who] in reality uphold the state.'6'
Thus, the ministers, legal theorists, judges and farmers all
incorporated Locke's Two Treatises into their own theories
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of property. Through them, Locke's theory of agrarian
labour was disseminated throughout the American republic.
By the end of the 18th century, it formed the basis of the
American government's position towards the Indian. No
figure better illustrates this final development than the
third president of the United States, Thomas Jefferson.
IV - THOMAS JEFFERSON
The degree to which Jefferson was influenced by John Locke
is a matter of debate amongst American historians,
particularly the influence of the Two Treatises on the
composition of the Declaration of Independence. What has
been overlooked, however, in the course of this debate, is
the degree to which Locke, and most particularly his theory
of agrarian labour as the basis of property, may have
shaped, Jefferson's policy towards the Indians. Locke's
theories were known to the President through his reading of
the Two Treatises as well as its adaptations in the work of
Blackstone, Vattel, Bland and others.
It is clear that Jefferson thought most highly of John
Locke, stating in a letter to John Trumball in February
1789, that he considered Locke, Bacon and Newton to be 'the
greatest men that ever lived without any exception.'
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Jefferson went on to commission a painting of the three men
together. He writes again, twenty years later, in a letter
dated January 16, 1811 that 'Bacon, Newton and Locke...were
my trinity of the three greatest men the world has ever
produced. 62
Jefferson clearly believed that Locke was worth reading on
virtually any subject, recommending in a letter to Peter
Carr that he read Locke on both morality and religion, and
requesting in September 1789, that a copy of 'Locke on
education' be sent to Trumball.° 3
 With regard to politics,
Jefferson considered the Two Treatises to be one of the best
books ever written on the subject, and advised that
considerable time should be devoted to its study. Jefferson
recommends that one hour a day from noon to one p.m. should
be devoted to the study of politics, 'beginning with Locke
and Sidney'.64
In a letter to John Norwell, dated June 14, 1807, Jefferson
lists Locke as the first author he would recommend on
government.
I think there does not exist a good elementary
work on the organization of society into civil
government: I mean a work which presents in one
full and comprehensive view the system of
principles on which such an organization should
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be founded...For want of a single work...I
should recommend Locke on Government, Sidney,
Priestly's Essay on First Principles of
Government, Chipman's Principles of Government
and the Federalist.65
While it is the best of its kind, Jefferson clearly believes
that the Two Treatises of Government, is limited in some
way. Thus he says in a letter to Tnomas Mann Randolph Jr.,
dated May 30, 1790 that Locke's essay on government, 'is
perfect as far as it goes.6b In other words, there is
nothing flawed about the analysis as it stands; the problem
is that Locke simply did not follow through far enough in
his thought.
It seems that Jefferson believed that Locke's analysis of
natural rights was perfect, but his views on the actual
mechanics of government were incomplete. Consider the
following statement from Thomas Jefferson's writings,
recorded in the 'Minutes of the Board of Visitors,
University of Virginia':
Resolved that it is the opinion of this Board
that as to the general principles of liberty and
the rights of man, in nature and in society, the
doctrines of Locke in his 'Essay Concerning the
true	 original	 extent	 and	 end	 of	 civil
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government' and of Sidney...may be considered as
those generally approved by our fellow citizens
...and that on the distinctive principles of the
government...the best guides are to be found in
1. The Declaration of Independence...2. The book
known by the title of 'The Federalist'.67
Thus, to go from the theory of rights by nature into the
practical implications of this for the character of
government, one must move from Locke to other books on the
subject. Jefferson states in the letter to Randolph
immediately after recommending Locke's work as 'perfect as
far as it goes', that 'descending from theory to practise',
presumably of government, 'there is no better book than the
Federalist. '68
One can conclude that while Jefferson thought Locke's
analysis of government was incomplete, he agreed fully with
his 'general principles of liberty and the rights of man';
that is, the principles underlying the state of nature, and,
for the purposes of this thesis more particularly, his
theory of property.69
Like Locke, Jefferson believes that the Indians should be
considered to exist in a state of nature without government
or law. Thus he states in his Notes on the State of
Virginia, that Indians of America, for the most part, 'never
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submitted themselves to any laws, any coercive power, any
shadow of government.' 70 He compares this natural state
with that of civil society, claiming in a letter to James
Madison in January 1787 that there are three forms of
society in the world: those without formal government, like
the Indians; those with government and 'a degree of
liberty', like the United States, and those with government
based on force.7'
Central to Jefferson's conception of societies without
government compared to those with, is the inevitable
transformation, described in the Two Treatises, of the
former into the latter. In other words, there is a strong
current throughout Jefferson's thought, which will form the
backbone of his administration's policy, that Indians will
inevitably yield to the ways of civilized man and will give
up their own 'habits' and natural state for a civilized
society based on a sedentary life, property, and 'regular
government'. This idea of conversion or assimilation shall
be considered in greater depth shortly. First we shall
consider Jefferson's view of property more generally.
In A Summary View of the Rights of British America,
Jefferson adopts the Lockean premise that property is based
on natural right, in order to challenge the view that
property in America belongs by virtue of divine right to any
King of England or his descendents. His purpose, like
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Locke's in the First Treatise, is to undermine the
proposition that all property belongs to the King as a
result of an original grant by God to Adam.
We shall at this time also take notice of an
error in the nature of our landholdings which
crept in at a very early period of our
settlement...a general principle...was
introduced that 'all lands in England were held
either mediately or immediately of the crown.'72
Jefferson takes particular exception to this principle when
it is applied to those wno migrated to America, for he
believes it was their labour on plantation farms which gave
them rights to the lands which had previously been vacant.
The King of England, therefore, has no right to claim the
land for himself, rather it is up to the people in America
to form a government and decide between themselves, how
property will be governed in their civil state.
It is time therefore for us to lay this matter
before his Majesty and to declare that he has no
right to grant lands of himself.73
Like Locke, Jefferson argues that civil society, once
formed, may allot property, since government is based on the
consent of the people rather than the will of the King. The
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community itself, or its body of representatives, thus
decides on how land is allotted. In the natural state, land
is still open to appropriation by all, and individuals, by
virtue of their natural right through occupancy and labour
may appropriate such land that is still left 'vacant'.
From the nature and purpose of civil
institutions, all the lands within the limits
[of any particular society] are assumed by that
society and subject to their allotment only.
This may be done by themselves...or by their
legislature...and if they are alotted in neither
of these ways, each individual of the society
may appropriate to himself such lands as he
finds vacant.74
As Merrill Peterson comments in a book on Thomas Jefferson
and the New Nation, regarding Jefferson's Summary View,
'Jefferson's well developed principles of land tenure...
stemmed from the Lockean theory of the natural right to
land.' 75 The implications of this theory of property, used
in part to justify America's right to declare its
independence from England, was also used to great effect in
undermining the Indians' claim to land by virtue of
occupancy.
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President John Adams, to wnom Jefferson was Vice-President,
explicitly uses Locke's three natural rights, 'life, liberty
and property' as the grounds upon which the Indian could be
limited to that which supplies a simple subsistence.
Shall we say that a few handful of scattering
tribes of savages have a right of domain and
property of a quarter of this globe capable of
nourishing hundreds of millions of happy human
beings? The Indian has a right to life, liberty
and property [my emphasis] in common with all
men; but what right to domain or property beyond
these? Every Indian has a right to his wigwam,
his arrow, his utensils; where he had burned the
woods around him and planted his corns and
beans...will you infer from this, that he had
rights of exclusive domain and property of
immense regions of uncultivated wilderness that
he never saw, that he might have the exclusive
privilege of hunting and fishing in them, which
he himself never expected or hoped to enjoy.76
Amongst notes taken by Jefferson in reference to a dispute
between Pennsylvania and Connecticut over the location of
borders, is the following summary of the latter's final
position in tne case:
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Indian title can give no certainty and certainty
is necessary in the establishment of property.
We ought to consider the natives of America as
they were. Cultivation or industry appear to me
the only just criterion of property.77
Clearly, one major argument in favour of American rights
during this period rested in the Lockean idea of labour.
Peterson concludes that Jefferson's views on the origin of
property, falbwithin this tradition: 'Individuals might
themselves take title to land...after the manner of John
Locke's theory of property.' 78
 By the beginning of the 19th
century, the balance of power lay firmly in the hands of the
white immigrants. Jefferson, as President, began to use
Locke's theory, to take the government's policy toward the
Indians one step further. Not only was it used to
legitimize further encroachment on territory claimed by
Indians by virtue of occupancy, but it began to be the basis
for encouraging the transformation of Indians in their
natural state into becoming citizens of American society.
This transfirmation, like that described n the Second
Treatise, was both inevitable and good. Central to his plan
was the need to change Indian labour from hunting to
tillage. In a letter to James Pemberton in November 1807,
Jefferson writes that Indians need 'habits of industry, easy
subsistence and attachment to property'. 79 For Jefferson,
agrarian labour lay at the heart of property and in turn of
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civil society. In January 1802 the President tells a
visting delegation of Indians that the United States will,
...with great pleasure see your people become
disposed to cultivate the earth, to raise herds
of the useful animals and to spin and weave, for
their food and clothing, these resources are
certain; they will never disappoint you, while
those of hunting may fail.'80
The emphasis on agrarian labour was also linked to the
American government's need to limit Indian land in relation
to the expanding population of white Americans, as
Brackenridge had argued. Gradually land would be limited and
the Indians would move, in a Lockean fashion, from their
primitive state through agrarian labour to a civilized state
in need of government. In January, 1803 Jefferson writes:
In order...to provide an extension of territory
which the rapid increase of our numbers will
call for, t'4o measures are deemed expedient.
First, to encourage them [the Indians] to
abandon hunting, to apply to the raising stock,
to agriculture and domestic manufactures, and
tnereby prove to themselves less land and labour
will maintain them in this...leading them thus
to agriculture, to manufactures and civilization
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and in preparing them ultimately to participate
in the benefits of our government.81
As time goes by, Jefferson is periodically encouraged by the
changing activities of the Indians, in that they begin to
give up those lands they are not cultivating, namely 'waste'
for the use of others who are willing to labour on them.
Our Indian neighbours are advancing...beginning
to engage in the pursuits of agriculture and
household manufacture, they are becoming
sensible that the earth yields subsistence with
less labour and more certainty than forests and
find it in their interest from time to time to
dispose of parts of their surplus and waste [my
emphasis] lands for the means of improving those
they occupy.82
For Jefferson, like Locke, one could only be considered
subject to government, after one had adopted farming and
individual ownership of property as a way of life, as
Jefferson makes clear to a group of Cherokee Indians:
You propose...that your part...shall be placed
under the government of the United States,
become citizens thereof and be ruled by our
laws...Are you prepared for this...to leave off
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Shunting for you living, to lay off a farm for
each family to itself, to live by industry?83
The inevitable conclusion for Jefferson's administration was
to pose a choice for the Cherokee nation. On the one hand,
they could become part of civil society by adopting both
agrarian cultivation ('leave off hunting...live by
industry') and private property ('a farm for each family to
itself'); both of which were considered, in accordance with
Locke's Two Treatises of Government, the necessary
requisites of civil society and government. Or, on trie other
hand, they could choose to continue living in their natural
state, but would be removed to west of the Mississippi
River, to continue hunting and holding property in common.
Jefferson's message to the whole delegation took
note of the distinction between those Cherokees
who wished 'to remain on their [ancestral] lands
and 'betake themselves to agriculture' and those
who 'retaining their attachment to the hunter
life...are desirous to remove across the
Mississippi. 84
It is clear however that Jefferson believed that in the long
term, the Cherokee nation would only survive if it chose the
former route, namely transforming itself from its natural
state into civil society with the requisite Lockean
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conditions of agrarian labour, private property and regular
law. Thus, in a message to the Cherokee people dated
January 9, 1809, Jefferson writes:
I sincerely wish you may succeed in your
laudable endeavours to save the remains of your
nation by adopting industrious occupation and a
government of regular law.85
V - JUDGE MARSHALL vs LOCKE AND JEFFERSON
Right of property based on labour rather than occupancy as
articulated by the legal thinkers, preachers, and
politicians described above was at its peak in the United
States in the late 18th and early 19th century. By the
middle of the 19th century, Locke's tneory of property,
based on agrarian labour, had lost much ground.
In the early 1800's, several famous cases, fought all the
way to the Suprerrie Court of the United State of America
illustrate in stark terms the fate of the Lockean
argument. 86
 In the 1823 case of Johnson and Graham's Lessee
v. M'Intosh, those who argued against Indians claims before
this supreme tribunal used, in their testimony, the standard
Lockean argument that cultivation was necessary in order to
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claim property in land. As James Tully comments on this
case:
Counsel for the defendents presented the Lockean
argument, that the amount of land anyone can
acquire by natural law is limited by their
capacity to put it to use. As a consequence,
the aboriginals of America have acquired no
property in the land over which they wandered or
hunted, any more than they do over the water
they fisn, but only a right in the products. So
the land was not occupied in such a way 'as to
prevent it being appropriated by a people of
cultivators' •87
John Marshall, chief justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, wrote a precedent-setting decision, which
began by dismissing the idea that agricultural labour gives
right to land which is deemed vacant because it is being
used for hunting or other similar activities, concluding
that the English only had right to the land the' claimed
because they had conquered the Indians.
We will not enter into the controversy, whetner
agriculturists, merchants and manufacturers have
a right, on abstract principles to expel hunters
from the territory they possess, or to contract
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their limits. Conquest [my emphasis] gives a
title which the courts of the conqueror cannot
deny, whatever the private and speculative
opinions...may be, respecting the original
justice of the claim.88
While rejecting the cultivation argument as a legitimate
basis for claiming rights over Indian land, Marshall
simultaneously -dismisses the standard Lockean notion of
America being, primarily, the home of 'natural' men roaming
around in a state of nature without society or government,
into which the more developed and civilized nations of
Europe descend. Because Jefferson and Locke both posited
consent, founded on one's natural right to life, liberty and
property, to be the basis for government, it was
theoretically impossible to consider that natural men could
have any type of organic sense of nationhood, without having
first acquired the requisites, that is private property and
agrarian labour, to establish the social contract. Marshall
disagreed, concluding that the American Indians, like their
European counterparts, were split into nations of their own,
each with their own languages and forms of government.
America, separated from Europe by a wide ocean,
was inhabited by a distinct people, divided into
separate nations, independent of each other and
of the rest of the world, having institutions of
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their own and governing themselves by their own
laws.89
Marshall's judgements were important, not least because they
became the foundation for all subsequent decisions on Indian
land claims, but also, for the purposes of this thesis,
because they completely undercut the Lockean view of the
Indians in two ways.
First, the distinction between the natural state of Indians
where individuals roamed without property, government, laws,
societies, nations or institutions and European civil
society which could boast of all these things was summarily
dismissed. Those theoreticians, like Locke, who had adopted
the state of nature in order to make claims about rights of
men in civil society had imposed upon the Indians of North
America, the mantle of a natural man simply irreconcilable
with their real existence, for, as Marshall points out,
there were distinct nations of people in the Americas, wrio
did indeed govern themselves in accordance with their own
laws and institutions. What Locke had been able to ignore
in his own readings of the American Indian, Marshall could
not.
Secondly, Marshall makes clear that it was not peaceful
labour or purchase which gave Europe the right to Indian
land but sheer force. It was unnecessary, therefore, to
-372-
discuss whether 'agriculturists' have the right to expel
'hunters' at all, according to Marshall, for this argument,
while providing those wrio made it with some rational and
ethical justification for taking over the land, simply
obfuscates the real basis of the Europeans' right, namely
'conquest'. In other words, the hard reality of
international law is that he who conquers wins the land of
the vanquished; those who have justified it in any other
way, like Jefferson and Locke, have merely cloaked the
bloody spoils of war in a more palatable vision of the just
deserts of natural right or law.
Moreover, Marshall argues that once conquered, not only does
the land but the people become subject to the victorious
government. Because in America the Indians often resisted
such subjugation, they had to be, according to Marshall,
ultimately 'united by force to strangers.' 9° It was not
reason than that brought the Indians to civil life in
America, but force.
VI - CONCLUSION
Locke and Jefferson, above all else in the world, believed
in reason. Thus, Locke did not believe, as Marshall did,
that conquest, or force, was a legitimate basis for tne
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right of property. Locke says himself in his chapter, 'On
Conquest', that although it is a 'strange doctrine', no
significant piece of land can 	 legitimately appropriated
as the result of war. Rather than through force or
coercion, both he and Jefferson believed that it was only
by simple labour that land could be appropriated, by their
own consent that people could be governed, and ultimately by
reason that man could be perfected. In all cases, if the
choice were to be between force and reason, the latter
should always prevail.
Jefferson describes a scene in one of his letters to Dr.
Benjamin Rush which illustrates how he believed reason
rather than force, distinguished his own thought as well as
Locke's from that of his contemporaries and those who had
governed before. Having told Alexander Hamilton that Locke
was one of the three greatest men who ever lived, Jefferson
was surprised when Hamilton responded that Julius Caesar
would be his own choice for tne same exalted position. Upon
reflection, Jefferson concluded that such a choice revealed
the essence of Hamilton's politics as opposed to his own.
While Locke, and indeed Jefferson himself, vested power in
the governed, trusting their reason to choose the right
course of action and leaders for a nation, Hamilton through
his choice of Caesar seemed to be saying that it was the
force of the governor which must prevail in order to keep
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the people in line. Jefferson concludes of Hamilton's
choice:
Hamilton was honest as a man, but as a
politician, [he believed] in the necessity of
either force or corruption to govern men.9'
Jefferson contrasts in this example, those individuals who
believed in force over reason and vice versa. Both Locke
and Jefferson believed that politics could be free of both
force and corruption if based on the reasoned consent of
those who are governed. Moreover, reason lies at the heart
of both Locke's transition from the state of nature into
civil society, and Jefferson's basic policy that Indians
must become like Europeans. In both cases, natural men will
never need to be forced into adopting civil society, as
Marshall later claimed, because they will, by virtue of
their own reason, inevitably choose it for themselves. Both
Jefferson and Locke argue that Indians have cnosen to stay
hunters and natural men even after being exposed to the
superio' European civilization only because they are too
attached to the habits of their ways. Thus, where Locke
criticizes the Indian for being 'bounded within tne ways,
modes and notions of his own country', Jefferson denounces
the Indian who 'maintains the ascendency of habit over the
duty of improving [their] reason.' 92 In time, reason will
prevail; for just as the force of Julius Caesar was not
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required to keep the governed in line, so coercion will not
be necessary to transform tne Indians, and civil society, as
revealed by reason, will eventually reign supreme.
This transition from the state of nature to civil society is
Jefferson and Locke's theoretical ideal, but by imposing it
on a group of people already existing in America, the
theoretical parameters leave the Indians with little real
crioice. They may either retain their own 'habits', 'ways,
modes and notions' and lose their lands or take the
seemingly inevitable path of reason and adopt private
property, the industry of agriculture and government of
regular law and lose themselves. As Bernard Sneehan
comments of Jefferson's America:
This Jeffersonian vision engulfed the real
Indian, whose existence was defined not by the
categories of natural history but by a
historically derived culture, in an overwhelming
and supposedly inevitable process from which
there was no escape....For Jefferson...the
practical success of philosophy could be
measured by the degree to which the Indian
ceased to an Indian...In the end both philosophy
and policy proved futile. The Indian changed
but he did not disappear and he remained an
Indian.
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Thus, Locke's Two Treatises of Government had an enormous
impact on the late 18th, early 19th century attitudes in
America towards the Indian, that is natural man. While
Locke's theory, rooted in theological doctrine and natural
law, first appealed to the preachers of the new world and
their view that labour was the basis of God's first
commandment to mankind, it was Locke's original belief in
the natural right to property coupled with the idea that
agrarian labour lay at the heart of this right which
provided his theory of government and natural society with
such an increasingly large and important audience.
Revs. 'Jitherspoon, Bulkley, Stiles all used Locke's theory
of property to justify their own views on the American
government's right to Indian land. These religious views
cou l?led with the adaptation of Locke's natural law theories
in such thinkers as Blackstone, Vattel, and Paley lead
eventually to the political incorporation of Locke's
philosophy into policy about tne Indians. Thus Americans
like Hugh Henry Brackenridge, Richard Bland, and John Adams
all justified, in acccrdance with Locke's theory of
property, the limiting of Indians' lands to that which could
provide their subsistence.
This argument was given its most important and consistent
voice by Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson not only argued, as
those before him had, that Indian land could, by virtue of
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Locke's interpretation of natural right and labour, be
limited, he took his conclusions one step further to claim
that Indians not only had no right to the vast tracts of
land they currently claimed by virtue of hunting in the
past, but until they changed from their natural state into
civil society, by adopting private property and agrarian
labour, they would hold none in the future either. It was in
fact the idea of reason which informed both Locke's Two
Treatises and Jefferson's Indian policy. In both cases, the
move from the natural state to civil society, both for
ancient times in Europe and current day in America,
ultimately bettered mankind. As Jefferson comments in a
letter to George Washington about the possibility of
bringing Indians into civil society:
To deny that...it could be accomplished, is to
suppose the human character...incapable of
melioration or change - a supposition entirely
contradicted by the progress of society from the
barbarous ages to its present degree of
perfection
It is perhaps lucky that Marshall's decisions cut short
Locke and Jefferson's progress towards the perfection of
human reason and by extinguishing the idea of natural man
gave his real life counterpart the chance to live.
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Conclusion
The world known as America is, in the Two Treatises of
Government, the same world as that inhabited by natural man.
Previous scholarship has largely argued that these two worlds
have had, if anything, a tangential relationship, which is of
use to philosophers only to the extent that it reveals the
basis of civil society. John Locke, according to this school
of thought, has referred to America only to fulfill an
empirical need for evidence of 'natural man', and natural man,
in turn, is nothing more, to Locke, than a logical abstraction,
useful for the elucidation of one's fundamental liberties and
obligations under civil law.
Locke has always been recognized as a philosopher who writes,
in part, for political reasons. But while many commentators
have recognized the importance of the Earl of Shaftesbury's
domestic politics to Locke's developing political theory, few
have even considered the impact of foreign politics and most
particularly, the colonization of America, on these same ideas.
Thus, traditional scholarship, from MacPherson to Dunn, has
concluded that Locke's state ofnature is singularly devoid of
any historical coitent such as might be provided by life in the
Americas. By taking seriously Locke's claim that America and
its natives are living examples of natural man, it was
necessary to examine both the reasons for and implications of
this decision. Thus, between the American native and his land
in the new world and John Locke, the colonial philosopher, in
the old, is a gap which this thesis has sought to bridge.
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We began by examining the sources Locke uses to provide
concrete evidence of his natural man. The numerous volumes on
America within his own library were clearly employed by Locke
to illustrate the character of man in his natural state. The
single most important element contained in these books which
Locke incorporated into his own theory, was the fundamental
division between the 'savagism' of the new world and the
'civility' of the old. Locke translated this profound
dichotomy into the state of nature and civil society,
respectively.
Having adopted this basic division between American savagery
and English civility, Locke has his own more precisely defined
concepts of each. Civil man for Locke is industrious, rational
and ruled by a government based on the rule of law. Savage man
is idle, superstitious and ruled by neither government nor
civil law. It is essental to Locke's colonial purposes of
proving that natural man has no right to own property to
characterize the two forms of human life in this way. As a
result, his use of historical examples are selective, for
'savage' or natural men who exhibit behaviour inconsistent with
Locke's theory would make it impossible to draw the conclusions
he eventually does about their rights to land in America.
For example, Locke virtually ignores the fact that many settled
forms of government existed amongst many American Indian
communities, because the former must be, by definition, aspects
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of civil society. Similarly, those Indians who were skilled
enough in their labour to teach Englishmen how to cultivate
their land were also ignored, for they could not be encompassed
in the more fundamental idea of an idle and irrational man.
Finally, the idea that a highly sophisticated community of
Indians would reject private ownership of land and its produce
in favour of a communally based economy and society was
inconceivable to a priilosopher who placed as both the origin
• and end of natural law in civil society the founding and
protection of private property. Locke, consequently, used his
empirical evidence in a most selective fashion, in order to
illustrate his picture of natural man as one which was
initially nomadic but social, who lacked industry and reason,
but had potential for both and knew little about cultivating
the land or governing hirnsalf. Finally, like the authors of
the travel books contained in his library, Locke not only
created his own version of natural man and imposes it on the
American Indian, but of equal importance, he adopted the
commonly-held assumption that the state of nature must
eventually yield to civil society.
Having considered Locke's idea of natural man and the ways in
which he selectively used the evidence provided by his travel
books, we turned to consider the colonial goals of England as a
whole and Carolina in particular. The initial aim of English
colonization was to convert the natives to Christianity and
engage in trading for goods. By the middle of the century,
-393-
Englishmen, including the Earl of Shaftesbury had become
increasingly interested in the settlement of America itself,
rather than simply trading with its natives. The definition of
property evolved with the changing modes of colonialism, from
ownership through discovery or conquest to actual possession
and occupation of a territory. The implications of Englisr
colonialism for the American Indians were felt most strongly
with the decision of Englishmen to settle in America. The
Indians, once seen as indispensable to trade, were now seen as
obstacles to colonial growth. Debates arose regarding Indians'
claims over certain tracts of land. By what right could
England claim land in America? It was argued that England must
differentiate itself from the Spanish method of conquest and
plunder, by embracing the right to claim property only through
purchase of land from the Indian or appropriation of vacant or
waste land. The English colonists, in the initial stages of
settlement, began to recognize some claims of the Indians to
land, in order either to purchase those lands, or to define
what land still lay vacant. The disputes over property and
colonialism as a whole intensified in the last half of the 17th
century as th numbers settling in America mushroomed. It is
within the context of this fierce debate over England's
colonization of America that Locke wrote. Three different
currents in the stream of colonial thought were identified as
being significant to the development of Locke's thought: the
natural law theorists, the economic writers defending England's
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plantations, and the colonial writers justifying the ethical
superiority of England's land claims in America.
Natural law theory in the 17th century reflected the new issues
raised by the colonization of Asia and America: the definition
of property and the rules governing conquest were of particular
interest. While Hugo Grotius, employed by the East Indies
Company, defended Holland's right in common with all, to the
sea; Locke and his patron Shaftesbury were more interested in
the defense of England's private rights to American soil. It
was argued that natural law allowed land to be appropriated
only through cultivation rather than occupation. Thus, lack of
private ownership of the seas and the beginning of such
ownership in the lands formed the fundamental bases for the
laws of nature posited by Grotius and Locke, respectively.
Samuel Pufendorf, on the other hand, with no colonial master,
founds his theory of natural law on an 'sociable attitude'.
Both Locke and Grotius percieved the initial common right to
the world to have been positive, that is, everybody owned
everything. Like th East Indies Company, or the Lords
Proprietors of Carolina, Grotius and Locke only needed to
discover the principle upon which it had been divided into
unequal private parcels. It was assumed by both that private
appropriation was the only possible mode for the utilization of
land. Pufendorf argued, conversely, that a communal ownership
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of property was legitimate as long as it was agreed to by all
members of that comnunity.
Unlike Locke, Grotius believed along with his fellow Dutchmen,
that conquest was a legitimate means of claiming property. He
argued that one even had a right to war against men simply
because they 'acted like beasts'. Pufendorf challenged both
Grotius and the Spanish legal theorist Francisco Vitoria on the
right of entering new lands, claiming that the Indians of the
Americas have greater rights, by natural law, than either of
these colonial powers had yet granted them. Pufendorf most
pointedly rejected the notion of a natural state of nomadic and
solitary figures amongst the American Indians, in order to
claim that Indian nations, like those of Europe, have an equal
right to defend themselves from the encroachment of others.
Following the argument of English colonists at the time, who
believed that the English method of peaceful settlement was
preferable to the Spanish method of plunder and conquest for
colonizing America, Locke vehemently disagreed with Grotius on
this point, arguing that conquest gave no right to the land of
the vanquished. How Locke'e own version of the natural state
and most particularly, his theory of property were shaped by
England's colonialism depended very much, as Grotius's views
did, on the exact nature of the colonial enterprise embarked
upon and the involvement of the author in its success.
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The second aspect of 17th century colonial thought considered
were the works of English economic writers defending the
financial viablity of trade with the American plantation. The
two thinkers in this tradition which were considered were
Josiah Child and Charles Davenant. The expansion of the
embryonic English empire had caused great debate in England
over the wisdom of the enterprise. The initial forms of
colonial activity which included mainly mining and trading with
Indians for goods harvested by them had caused relatively
little opposition amongst the politicians in England. However,
when the enterprise turned its energy towards the plantation,
that is settling groups of Englishmen in America, many
Englishmen argued that such plantations would drain the old
country of its best young men while creating wealth only for
those who moved to the new world. Opposition grew with the
increasing hostility of the Indians to the English
appropriation of land.
Davenant and Child attempted to defend the English plantation
mainly in economic terms against this overwhelmingly sceptical
English audience. Both thinkers believed that the English
plantation would succeed if agrarian cultivation rather than
conquest or any other form of labour was the basis of claims to
property in the plantations, if land was limited to private
parcels that would allow no spoilage or waste, and if laws like
the 1660 Navigation Act were followed. This last piece of
legislation benefited England economically by protecting
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English farmers from competition abroad, while creating
employment in the shipping industries at home. Locke concurred
with these views, as his draft notes for an essay on trade in
the Lovelace Collection and the Two Treatises makes clear.
Locke not only eschewed conquest in favour of cultivation as
the basis of property, and limited appropriation by the
spoilage proviso, he also listed 'the catalogue of things'
necessary to build the ship carrying goods to the market.
The third stream of thought which shaped Locke's ideas on
property was the English settlers' defense of their right to
parcels of land already claimed, through their prior
occupation, by the native people. They began by claiming that
land in America was lying waste and the people were idle;
Englishmen, who like Abraham, Lot and Jacob in the Bible needed
more room for their overflowing families, could use such land
for their own cultivation. The argument was based on the
authors' interpretation of the book of Genesis, such that God
would be pleased if people went out and multiplied and
replenished the earth through their cultivation of its soil.
Many of the thinkers, like Locke, used ratos to compare the
idleness of the Indians with the heaven blessed industriousness
of the English. Finally, these thinkers claimed that the
Indians would suffer no injury as a result of settlement.
All of these theoretical issues were given practical
expression, for Locke, in the concrete problems encountered
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during his time as secretary to the Lords Proprietors in
Carolina. In analyzing the documents written and endorsed by
Locke in the administration of Carolina, a clear and practical
blueprint of how a colony should develop can be discerned.
Foremost was the need to encourage the enclosure and
cultivation of land, keeping in proportion the number of people
to the acreage enclosed; secondly, industrious Englishmen
rather than the idle or poor were encouraged to settle in
Aznerica; thirdly, methods associated with the Spanish
colonists, such as mining, plundering and conquest were
rejected; fourthly, Indians' lives and liberties, if not their
claims to property, were to be respected by the settlers; and
finally, a good government based on liberal and tolerant laws
was to be developed. This blueprint in conjunction with the
views summarized above underlay John Locke's views of natural
man, property and the rights of civil society as expressed in
his famous Two Treatises of Government.
While couched in terms of the debate surrounding the American
plantation, Locke's theory nevertheless provides an original
case for England's claims in two ways. First, it is the
natural right of labour which begins property. Discovery and
occupation, having stood as the foundations of property in
natural law for centuries, were no longer sufficient. In
America, land claimed by the French, Dutch or Spanish, by
virtue of first discovery, conquest or prior occupation only,
became, according to Locke's theory, open to appropriation by
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any who could labour on it. Moreover, Indian lands which were
occupied but uncultivated could also be appropriated by
Englishmen who were willing to laDour on them. It is,
consequently, the natural right of the individual through his
labour, rather than the laws of economics, states or God, which
anchors England's claims to property in America.
Secondly, Locke's definition of labour was very specifically
agrarian. The founding of property in land was that of the
Englishman, enclosing and cultivating the soil. Indians who
chose not to follow the European forms of labour thereby
relinquished any claim they may potentially have had to the
land. This form of labour carried with it, as Locke was quick
to point out in his chapter on the subject, the development of
money, commerce, international trade and finally the laws of
liberty and government necessary to protect and preserve the
property claimed by the original act of labour.
These two fundamental aspects of Locke's argument regarding
property, namely the right of the individual through labour to
claim land, and the definition of labour on land as
agricultural cultivation were indeed used to justify both the
appropriation of land by the English and the conversion of
Indians to agrarian labour. In the final chapter of this
thesis, we discussed the ways in which Locke's arguments had
been incorporated itto the thinking of early American
ministers, jurists and politicians. It was shown that Locke's
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views on property were disseminated not only through his own
works on government but through the writings of other important
thinkers, most notably Sir William Blackstone. American
judges, such as Hugh Henry Brackenridge, then used the natural
right of property, as articulated by Locke through Blackstone,
to justify the new American republic's claims as well as
policies directed at transforming the Indians into farmers.
Similarly, Richard Bland, Speaker of the House in Virginia,
used William Paley's adaptation of Locke's theory of property
to reiterate America's right to land through labour. Locke's
view of the natural state also entered the religious sphere.
Pastors in New England, such as Hayhew, Bulkley and Witherspoon
all incorporated Locke's thesis into their sermons.
The ultimate expression of Locke's theory, however, was
provided by the third President of the United States, Thomas
Jefferson. While much debate had arisen, amongst American
historians, over the extent of Locke's contribution to the
composition of the Declaration of Independence, little had been
said of Locke's role in the formulation of Jefferson's Indian
policy. Jefferson, in adopting Locke's theory of natural
rights, took the argument in America beyond simply justifying
the European's rights to the land. Instead, Jefferson used
Locke's theory that natural man could never remain in the
natural state for ever to explain how the Indians would
inevitably agree to be incorporated into the United States.
Like Locke, Jefferson argued that agrarian labour leading to
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private property was the key to making Indians civil. Thus,
tz-ie main tnrust of Jefferson's policies towards the Indians was
to convince them of the need for a settled, agrarian way of
life before they could be considered citizens and their land
could be secured. Both Locke and Jefferson believed that no
force would be necessary to effect this change, for the
Indians' reason would lead them to relinquish their natural
habits in favour of the benefits of civilization.
The argument has come full circle. The basic dichotomy of the
savage and civil states, first spoken of in the 16th century
travel books becomes the basis of Jefferson's Indian policy.
In both cases, conversion is inevitable but the means by which
the transformation will occur, has changed. This thesis has
shown that it was John Locke's Two Treatises of Government
which provided an original argument upon which to base one's
claims over property. From the end of the 17th century until
Justice tiarshall's decisions in 1823, the distinction between
natural and civil man, centred, like Locke's theory of property
itself, on the concept of agrarian labour. As it is defined by
Locke, 'labour' creates a new avenue, through which both the
English colonists justify the appropriation of Indian land, and
the Americans of the new republic legitimize the assimilation
of their native population. Both transformations were as
inevitable as that of the natural state becoming civil society
in the Two Treatises of Government.
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